The ANTIOCH REVIEW

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THEODORE SANDS
Do We Need Another "Great Debate"?

LORCA: Seven Lyrics, **translated by Norman di Giovanni**

A National Quarterly — Published in Yellow Springs, Ohio

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"Summer Place," a short story by Seymour Epstein
Poetry by W. R. Moses and Hollis Summers

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The ANTIOCH REVIEW

"Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better or equal hope in the world? —ABRAHAM LINCOLN

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Contents

"I Hold Here in My Hand" 131
JOE WERSHBA

Piety and Politics in President Eisenhower 148
ROBERT E. FITCH

A Suggestion for Cultural Insurance 159
ARTHUR E. MORGAN

Summer Place ..... *a Story* 169
SEYMOUR EPSTEIN

Skid ..... *a Poem* 179
W. R. MOSES

Labor Unity Is No Panacea 180
SIDNEY LENS

The Only Green Is in the Sky ..... *a Poem* 194
HOLLIS SUMMERS

Organization, Bureaucracy, Loyalty 195
KERMIT EBY

America's Conservative Revolution 204
CHADWICK HALL

The Rootless "Roots": Defects in the New Conservatism 217
PETER VIERECK

Federico García Lorca: Seven Lyrics 230
translated by NORMAN di GIOVANNI

Do We Need Another "Great Debate"? 233
THEODORE SANDS

Books 246
RAY GINGER, VICTOR AYOUB, ARTHUR S. HARRIS, JR.

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Editors' Shop Talk

If we can judge from our mail, no subject excites amateur authors in these days so much as the relation of the Negro to American life. The decision of the Supreme Court on segregation in the schools did not initiate this interest but merely accentuated it. Interestingly enough, the issue apparently is not just something to trigger-off the practicing journalist, the professor, the leader of public opinion. Its primary stirring occurs in the grassroots. Most of the stories and articles we receive on the subject are by amateurs, by people who, we suspect, rarely take pen in hand even to write letters to the editor. Their work is hardly publishable in the *Antioch Review* or perhaps in any other magazine; it is too fragmentary, it generalizes too much from individual experience or example, it is often illiterate or badly organized. Yet some of this stuff sticks in an editor's mind after other publishable material has been forgotten: what remains in the memory is its human quality; the personal struggle, however haltingly made, to take an attitude on a complex social phenomenon; and sometimes the raw facts of an experience which few intellectuals (for good and sufficient reasons perhaps) ever meet face to face. We conclude that the question of color and of prejudice cuts vertically and deeply through all layers of society, that it lays bare some aspects of life which normally are never publicly exposed.

We recall one 50-page manuscript which told (quite badly but with much obvious truth) the story of a mixed marriage between a Negro and a white woman; the theme, if one could disentangle it, was the rejection of the pair, painfully spelled out, by first the girl's family and her community, and then by the man's family and his community. We remember an article by a white person who had lived for several years in a community of educated Negroes; he had every sympathy for his colored friends yet his conclusions about the difficulty he foresaw in their adjusting to "equality" and desegregation were harsh and devastating. . . .

If such pieces are born of sincerity, you ask, why not publish them? The fact is they are too full also of ignorance, ineptness, and parochialism to stand alone. One might publish a collection of this type. (Even that would probably be more interesting to the experts in social relations than to the general reader.) But there would be considerable difficulty in eliciting a broad selection of material. Some of these "authors" feel discriminated against. Others are clear off the usual paths of communication. And others feel like the one who noted on his manuscript to us: "No need to return if not acceptable."

P. B.

"I Hold Here in My Hand . . ."

By JOE WERSHBA

> In our excitement over the Yalta Papers, we forget that Yalta was only a consequence of the "recognition" of Bolshevik Russia. That "recognition" was a final triumph of E. M. House, William C. Bullitt, Jacob Schiff and other persons, and anonymous "forces." The identity and motives of the forces which fought for "recognition" in the beginning of the Bolshevik regime are like unpleasant family secrets. The truth can never be extinguished. But it is forbidden to discuss the truth even in history classes in universities.
>
> —*Westbrook Pegler, in his syndicated Hearst King Features column, April 20, 1955.*

On January 25, 1955, the Hearst International News Service reported from Berlin that "William Randolph Hearst, Jr., chairman of the editorial board of the Hearst Newspapers, left East Berlin today for Moscow on a trip which he termed 'strictly journalistic.'" This somewhat curious highlighting of the nature of the trip was emphasized in a front-page headline of Hearst's New York *Journal-American*, which read: *" 'Strictly Journalistic Visit.' "*

The emphasis became even heavier in an editorial parenthesis within the story, which ran:

> (Editor's note: David Sentner, chief of the Hearst Newspapers' Washington Bureau, said Soviet visas for Mr. Hearst and his party came through within a matter of days despite the well-known and long-standing editorial opposition of the Hearst Newspapers to communism. "The Russians were fully aware of the long anti-Communist fight of the Hearst Newspapers when they granted the visas," Sentner said. "There were no illusions about that. We were told the Communists regarded Mr. Hearst's father as their number one American critic of the past generation.")

To those who follow the public prints—and certainly to those who are constant readers of the Hearst press—it appeared that the Hearst

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news agencies had gone to inordinate lengths to remind their readers of the obvious: that the Hearst press stands without peer in its opposition to communism. It seemed somewhat unnecessary to protect Hearst Jr. against any reckless charges of defection to the enemy.

But Mr. Sentner's capsule review of history is inadequate. Grossly inadequate. The "long anti-Communist fight of the Hearst Newspapers" is roughly little more than half as long as Mr. Sentner implies. The over-all portrait of Hearstian anti-communism is grievously replete with illusion. In due justice to Hearst the Elder, the records of his own history show him for a considerable period of time to have been the very opposite of "number one American critic of the past generation."

The world-wide interest in the Yalta Papers—an interest eagerly shared by the Hearst press today—should whet the general appetite for a study of an even more crucial period in the life of Russian communism: the period of 1917-1934 when the Bolshevik Revolution went through the throes of birth, counter-revolution, civil war, intervention, dislocation and famine: in short, a period of greater weakness than it exhibits today when the Hearst press inveighs so heavily against it.

It is the purpose of this all-too-brief survey to restore to the elder Hearst what is rightly his in the annals of journalism, that—to paraphrase Winston Churchill—Mr. Hearst was one of the greatest American friends that Bolshevik Russia ever found. This study is not designed to provide grist for congressional investigation impinging on the right of free thought and free speech. But it is the purpose simply to record that from 1917 until 1934, William Randolph Hearst welcomed the Bolshevik Revolution, characterized its leaders as true democrats, sympathized with its aspirations, urged its diplomatic recognition at an early date and continued to be a well-wisher of the Soviet communist system until Adolf Hitler burst upon the world.

II

William Randolph Hearst's lot was a profitable but not a happy one during the year and a half of America's involvement in the First World War. Hearst for a long time had been trenchantly anti-British and had early given appearance of sympathy with German aspirations. He had fought passionately against United States involvement in the

war and, once in, had striven valorously through the pages of his many newspapers to find an honorable way out. In retrospect, his editorials and news columns smoked with the fires of patriotism, but his numerous and powerful critics of those days smote him hourly with imprecations of disloyalty, sedition, treason, un-Americanism and pro-German espionage. One of the kindest suggestions came from Hearst's old enemy, the corporation lawyer Elihu Root, who was reported to have urged that all dissenting editors be shot.

In that historic first week of November, 1917, Mr. Hearst's New York press was engaged in an all-out campaign to elect Judge John F. Hylan mayor. The opposition immediately declared that a vote for Hylan was a vote for Hearst and a vote for Germany. Hearst responded vigorously in full-page editorials topped by the headline: "Patriotism is the Last Refuge of a Scoundrel." The furore of the mayoralty campaign almost overshadowed the new German-Austrian offensive. French and British reinforcements had been rushed to the Italian front. Hearst's New York *American* reported that the Italians were conducting a "masterly retreat." A two-paragraph squib on page three of November 3 said: "Bolsheviki Crushed in Russian Elections." Returns from 643 towns gave the Bolsheviki only seven per cent of the vote. But there were disconcerting stories out of Petrograd quoting Prime Minister Kerensky that Russia was worn out and needed help desperately. Kerensky subsequently corrected any wrong impressions by asserting vigorously that Russia had no intention of quitting the war—but Russia did need money and matériel immediately.

On November 7, 1917, Hearst's New York *Journal* and *American* joyously reported the impressive victory of Hearst's protégé Hylan. For Hearst, it was a victory over the unholy alliance of Tammany Hall, big business, Wall Street, monopoly and plutocracy. Also on November 7, 1917, the Italian armies were reported to have abandoned the Tagliamento Line in full retreat. The British were reported to have taken Paasschendaele. And on November 7, the Bolsheviki seized power.

The *American* of November 8 reported the story in an eight-column front page streamer: "NEW REVOLT IN PETROGRAD," and the heavy black type was to be kept ready for the duration. As the revolution spread over Russia and chaos was compounded by counter-revolution, civil war and foreign intervention, newspaper reports be-

came confused—a reflection of the confusion of history. But even at this late date, the Hearst reports on the first days of the Bolshevik Revolution stand up as accurate reporting. The Bolsheviks, a minority party led by Lenin and Trotsky, had seized power with the aid of the soldiery. The Bolshevik program was to take over the land and factories and give them to the workers and peasants. The Bolsheviks intended to get out of the war and secure a separate peace with Germany. Private property of industrialists, landowners and the church was to be expropriated. Hearst's *American* summed it up in a quotation by Lenin: "Now we have a revolution. The peasants and workmen control the government. This is only a preliminary step toward a similar revolution everywhere."

Hearst readers were left in no doubt as to the all-encompassing nature of the Bolshevik Revolution. But they were in doubt as to where William Randolph Hearst's sympathies lay. Neither the *American* nor the *Journal* editorialized on the Revolution until December 28. Mr. Hearst's primary interest was an honorable end to the World War. And on December 28, 1917, the *American* took a tentative position on the Bolsheviks' peace declarations. It carried an editorial comment to the effect that the Russian proposal for peace was certain to be accepted because "The German PEOPLE and the German ARMIES are very largely in accord with the Russian proposal of peace without annexations or indemnities or commercial boycott." Again, on January 7, 1918, an *American* editorial said: "The peace terms of Russia are basically the same as those of the United States, and the peace terms of the allies should be made to conform with the peace terms of these essentially democratic nations."

For more than twenty years, the Hearst Press had carried on an unceasing campaign against what Mr. Hearst termed predatory, monopolistic big business, Wall Street, and private ownership of utilities. One of Mr. Hearst's constant editorial themes was that the utilities, (gas, electric, railway and the like) belonged to the people as a whole and should therefore be brought under government ownership. With this as a background, an editorial trial balloon was sent up by the New York *American* on January 28, 1918. Whether it was Mr. Hearst's balloon, or the individual editor's, it was nevertheless a trial, because it was not to be repeated in any form for another thirty days. The *American* editorial read, in part:

In a True Sense the Great War for Human Freedom is Won.

How stands the world's great war today? Which is winning, Imperialism or Democracy? . . .

The world is democratized at this very minute.

All the governments in the world are powerless now and henceforth to hinder that fact.

The common people of the earth—Bolsheviki, proletariats, internationalists—call them what you will—are marching steadily to victory over the dominions and powers, over the autocracies, the money-lords and the constitutions, laws, institutions and traditions which have for thousands of years saddled and bridled the Many for the Few to ride and spur.

The old order is not changing. It HAS changed. It awaits only exterior peace to vanish away completely in swift revolutionary uprisings in every country in Europe.

Amid the thunder of the cannon and the roll of the war drums, the race of Man has overleaped the breadth of centuries in three hugely eventful years, and the vanguards of progress and uplift stand this very hour where, but for the impetus of the world's agony, they might not have stood for a hundred years or more to come. . . .

We are well aware that this is not the view of the chancelleries and the ministries and that it is not the common view.

But we think that it is the just view, the really statesmanlike view, the foreseeing view—and the view that will be finally approved and ratified by the progress of events and the final verdict of time.

The question was, was this the view of William Randolph Hearst, the single most influential publisher in the United States? It did not go far enough for Mr. Hearst. On March 1, 1918, in a full-page editorial in the New York *American*, William Randolph Hearst told his editors and the world where he personally stood on the Bolshevik Revolution. The eight-column headline read: "In Self-Defense We Should Hasten to Aid and Hearten Russia's Revolutionary Government." And the editorial, in the form of a signed letter, read:

The Breakers, Palm Beach, Fla., Feb. 26.

To the Editor of the New York American

I think our whole cause is likely to be injured by any delay in recognizing and supporting the Bolsheviki Government in Russia.

What are the Bolsheviki?

They are the representatives of the most democratic Government in Europe.

Why are we in this war?

We are in it for democracy.

Then, for heaven's sake, why not recognize a democratic Government? We recognized the IMPERIAL Government of Russia, but when Russia secures a DEMOCRATIC Government we have so far not recognized it.

Does this not seem to discredit our professions of a war for democracy?

If the Imperial militaristic Government of Russia should be restored would we hesitate to recognize that?

The Bolsheviki are fighting against imperialism and militarism in Russia as well as in Germany. Are we who are in a war against militarism and imperialism not going to help the Bolsheviki make their fight and, indeed, make OUR fight?

We must not lose the ideals of the war, we must not lose the opportunities of the war, because if we do we will lose the war—at least as far as our American objects are concerned.

Nothing ever said by a public man in any country at any time was more shortsighted than Lloyd George's intimation that Germany was at liberty to satisfy her greed of conquest by helping herself to parts of Russia. If Germany can take part of Russia she can take ALL of Russia; and if Germany adds the domain and resources of Russia to her present vast power and possessions the end of democracy's safety occurs at that very hour.

Russia must be saved from Germany.

Russia must be preserved for democracy.

The one cannot be done without the other, and neither one can be accomplished without recognizing and aiding in every possible way the democratic Government of Russia. We have waited so long that it may be too late to save the situation, but let us not wait a day longer. *Let us recognize the truest democracy in Europe, the truest democracy in the world today.* [Our emphasis.] Then we can fight an inspiring fight for democracy with some truth, some sincerity and some conviction.

—William Randolph Hearst.

And thus was the Hearst official line on Bolshevik Russia established for the guidance of the Hearst papers, the Hearst news services, the Hearst magazines and the Hearst film companies. The line was laid down on March 1, 1918. Only the most bizarre of inquisitorial minds could today use this document, and hundreds of others like it, to charge Mr. Hearst with an affinity for communist causes. Only the stalest of cynics could suggest that Mr. Hearst was insincere in his description of Communist Russia as "the truest democracy in Europe, the truest democracy in the world today." The fact is, Mr. Hearst was at every moment in his more than eight decades of life passionately convinced of the truth and righteousness of any cause that he championed at a given moment. The Hearst editorial of March 1, 1918,

is the official beginning of a policy of sympathy and friendship by the Hearst press to the leaders, the people, the land and the aspirations of the first successful communist revolution in the history of modern civilization. That policy was to last until 1934, a significant segment of time—sixteen years.

Results of the Hearst editorial were immediate, if not in history, at least within the columns of the Hearst papers. The next day's *American* bannered across its front page: "LENINE'S RECOGNITION LIKELY." The story was the product of the usual misconception by Hearst editors that the desires of their employer were the very command of those who led the government. Hearst editors were "premature recognitionists." England did not recognize Russia until 1924; the United States withheld recognition until 1933. But readers of the Hearst press from 1918 onward were constantly under the impression that recognition was imminent.

The Bolsheviks had found a constant friend in William Randolph Hearst. On March 11, 1918, an *American* editorial was headlined: "It is an Outrage to Call the Bolsheviki Traitors to Russia." The editorial inveighed against the spirit of mob violence being pursued by anti-Socialist orators; it pleaded for a long, hard look at the history of Czarist barbarism, tyranny, and cultural darkness in pre-Bolshevik Russia; it examined the beneficial aspects of the Russian Revolution of 1905, castigated the Czarist and bourgeois leaders who had plunged the Russian masses into the slaughterhouse of the Great War (which America was then in), upbraided the deposed Kerensky for the prolongation of the war, defended Lenin "whose patriotism no intellectual man in Europe ever challenged," cited Lenin's passion for Russian peace and world peace, and concluded in this vein:

> The Bolsheviks were compelled to sign an unjust, inconclusive peace for Russia alone because of apathy abroad and treachery at home. The United States of America did not recognize the Bolsheviki as the Government of Russia—although they certainly are the actual and representative Government of Russia—because the aristocracies of Europe did not want the proletariat of Russia established in power.
>
> The modern revolution has not yet arrived except in Russia, but it will come. Every day of war is bringing it nearer and surer. "We will renew the fight," said Lenine pathetically and patriotically, "when we receive the support of the proletariat of the world." But the proletariat of the world are not in power, except in Russia, and the autocracies, the aristocracies and the privileged classes of the world in this war for "democracy" would rather

> see Russia defeated, dismembered, destroyed and lost to democracy than see the proletariat of Russia survive and the new revolution succeed.

The Hearst editorials by happenstance coincided with the precise views of the Bolsheviki. Again, the New York *American* editorial page, March 12, 1918:

> The allies, led by England, hoped to depose the Bolsheviki and to substitute some other government more in accordance with the objects of the allies, more in harmony with the political ideas, as well as the military plans, of the allies. But England and her associates failed to realize that it was not merely the Bolsheviki who expressed the ultra-democratic ideals of Russia; that it was the RUSSIAN PEOPLE who favored universal peace and the restoration of conquered territories and the recognition of the independent countries and the fraternity of nations.

Hearst papers continued to plug for recognition of Russia, for American military aid to help the Bolsheviks withstand Germans who were tearing pieces out of Russia's western territories despite the separate Russo-German peace treaty at Brest-Litovsk, urged American aid to Russia against Japan—"the yellow peril"—and carried a personal editorial by Mr. Hearst against Russian Cossacks who were conspiring with Japan to invade Vladivostok.

On March 22, 1918, the *American* carried grave reports of a new German offensive on the Somme, which was soon to involve American troops at Belleau Woods and Chateau Thierry. For a while the Russians were left to fend for themselves without Mr. Hearst's aid. The publisher was busy defending himself against charges of Bolshevism, pro-German treason, boycotts of his newspaper, city ordinances against the distribution of his press, and even the physical manhandling of his newspapers. But Mr. Hearst was never one to withdraw from a principled fight, and even though there was mounting talk that the United States would intervene with its allies in unofficial war against the Bolsheviks, the New York *American* returned vigorously to the defense of Lenin, Trotsky, et al. The editorial of June 3, 1918 was headlined: "It Would Be Wise to Cease Sneering at the Bolsheviki," and it was a lengthy ode of praise for Bolshevik accomplishments. It said in part:

> It is the part of statesmanship, wisdom and justice for the American people to inform themselves concerning the real character of the Bolsheviki and to understand that the Bolsheviki have committed no act of treason or

disloyalty to their allies; that they have done nothing that we in their circumstances would not have done; that they are today working out the problems of democracy as they can never be worked out by war in Russia. . . .

Let the American people understand the Russian people, let the American people sympathize with their difficult problems and their democratic aspirations and be determined to encourage and help them in every possible way. Let them discountenance the denunciation of the Bolsheviki by men who pretend THEY are for this war for the sake of democracy, but who hate the Bolsheviki because the Bolsheviki are real democrats.

Let the Russian masses be once convinced that the American people and the American government are really with them, and all doubt of victory in this war will be over. The whole force of Russia will be on the side of America.

III

On February 1, 1924, the British Labor Government of Ramsay MacDonald announced that Great Britain would officially recognize the Government of Soviet Russia. Mussolini's Italy conferred recognition that same week, followed by Norway and Czechoslovakia. France delayed recognition until October, and Japan recognized Russia three months later in January 1925. The defeated Germans had already cemented the bonds of diplomatic friendship with the Bolsheviks in 1922. But despite the powerful campaign of the Hearst papers, begun in March 1918 for the recognition of the Soviets, the United States was to remain adamant until November 1933.

British recognition of Russia coincided with a period of great events. Lenin had died but a few days before and the revolution he fathered went on without him, relentlessly. The Russian Revolution had gone through the fires. The allies—in Churchill's phrase—had "failed to strangle Bolshevism in its cradle." In retrospect, the easiest part had been the seizure of power. Then had followed the Great Civil War which lasted roughly until 1920. A baker's dozen of foreign powers—the United States included—had sent troops into Russia, first to keep the Germans out, then to do the Bolsheviks in. The intervention had failed, from Moscow to Vladivostok. The various counter-revolutions had been crushed. The country lay devastated. Military communism had given way to a temporary restoration of capitalist trading known as the NEP (New Economic Policy.) The dictatorship of the proletariat had been refined into the dictatorship of the Party.

The Hearst press noted that Trotsky was calling for the liberalization and decentralization of power from the party directorate to the broader base of workers and peasants. The Russians were hearing more of a previous, relatively obscure Bolshevik named Josef Stalin. And in Munich, a Bavarian citizen named Adolf Hitler went on trial with General Von Ludendorff as co-defendant, charged with treason against the German Weimar Republic.

In the United States, that first week of February 1924, the heart of Woodrow Wilson expired. The heart had broken years earlier with the death of the dream of a League of Nations in which war would be learned no more. William Randolph Hearst had spurned and castigated that dream as much as Wilson had spurned and castigated Hearst. But on the day of his death, the Hearst papers and the nation paused to mourn greatly the passing of Wilson. And then both returned with an insatiable appetite to learn more details of the greatest scandal of corruption in government in the American twentieth century—Teapot Dome.

It was a story that had fulfilled all the dire prophecies of William Randolph Hearst: for almost thirty years in his newspapers he had warned that predatory monopolistic capital always sought to corrupt government officials and that democracy could never be secure until it had expunged this menace from the nation's body. And for the Hearst press, Teapot Dome also helped to explain why the rulers of the American government refused to extend diplomatic recognition to Bolshevik Russia. February 8, 1924, in the New York *American* appeared an editorial titled: "Why So Slow to Recognize Russia":

> Despite the inspired opposition of our State Department, the United States cannot much longer delay the official recognition of Russia.
>
> It is announced from London that the new Labor Government will institute full diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia. A prospective British Ambassador to Russia has already been selected in the person of James O'Grady, a Labor member of Parliament.
>
> Italy, it is announced, will also recognize the Soviet Government without delay.
>
> It is a matter for regret that our own just appraisal of the situation has not, long before this, determined renewal of relationship between the United States and Russia. As it is, the example of Great Britain is certainly a sad one to follow. We may be sure that no exuberant ideality dictates British recognition of the Soviet Republic.

Not even chivalrous sympathy between a Labor Government and the Russian proletariat is responsible for this move.

Only enlightened self-interest prompts British international policy—or, for that matter, any other nation's foreign policy. Indeed, there is the only safe basis for relationship among the nations—and not the misguided sentimentalism of some Americans who would make us the selfless missionaries among the nations.

When Great Britain recognizes Russia, it means that Britain wants and expects increased trade and corresponding improvement for her own economic condition. The same argument holds for our similar action. When Great Britain recognizes Russia, it means her acceptance of the stability of a government that has been able for more than six years to maintain itself against internal foes and against all manner of unsympathy and open, active enmity from most of the powerful nations of the earth.

It is not for the United States, born in revolution, to pass hostile judgment upon another revolutionary government, firmly *de facto* and therefore worthy of recognition as the government *de jure* of the Russian people.

On February 18, 1924, the *American* editorial explained why Teapot Dome had a direct tie with nonrecognition:

Revelations in Washington make it perfectly clear to the intelligent citizen why Russia has not been recognized by the United States. The scandal in oil is only typical of the condition to which our government and our politicians have fallen. It is the curse of the political control by organized, rapacious Big Business. . . .

There is just one remedy—that is to remove the conditions, remove the temptations which make men dishonest. Remove the contact between government and Big Business whenever and wherever possible.

Whenever it becomes necessary for a government to deal constantly with a quasi-public function like the railroads or the telephone or the telegraph companies, or the coal mines or the oil fields, the government should take possession of them and operate them as a public function.

It is the kind of corruption in government which is making America—which ought to have been the first nation to recognize the Russian republic—the last to do so.

And the New York *Journal* of February 11, 1924 editorialized in similar vein:

Great Britain and Italy recognize Russia. Shall we ride with the band or wait and hang on to the tailboard of the calliope? Meanwhile, other nations get in on the ground floor of Nature's greatest storehouse of resources and possibilities.

If [Secretary of State] Hughes can't recognize Moscow because he thinks she tried to get us to trade Uncle Sam for a fellow with long whiskers, then

> Mr. Hughes should have refused to sit in a Cabinet meeting with Mr. Fall, who cut more ground out from under Uncle Sam than anybody else.

Cabinet Member Fall was deeply involved in the Teapot Dome scandal.

The straight news items on Russia in the New York Hearst papers that February of 1924 could not be said to be hostile toward the Bolsheviks. And a long analytical piece by Hearst's Moscow correspondent Isaac Don Levine indicated that the original Hearst sympathies of 1918 were still operative. Mr. Levine's analysis of 1924 still holds up—thirty-one years later—as a clear observation of the struggle for democratization of the Bolshevik Revolution. One may now disagree with his conclusion, but there was no Hearstian editorial disagreement with Mr. Levine when he wrote as follows:

> Five years ago, the Russian revolution, the vastest democratic tide which ever swept over a section of the earth, was attacked from without by all the great military powers of the world. Intervention stultified the normal development of the social upheaval which rocked Russia. Instead of democracy, it forced militarism upon the freedom-hungering people of this country. Instead of decentralization, autonomous self-government, it imposed an absolute dictatorship of the Central Committee. Early in 1919 this dictatorship was proclaimed, and it has remained in effect since.

Mr. Levine's reference to the Bolshevik revolution as the "vastest democratic tide which ever swept over a section of the earth," is not the view of the Hearst press today. But it was the view then. It evoked Mr. Hearst's own characterization of March 1918 that Bolshevik Russia was "the truest democracy in Europe, the truest democracy in the world today." Likewise open to refutation was Mr. Levine's contention that it was foreign-power intervention which stultified the Bolsheviks' revolutionary democracy, and not inherent contradictions within Bolshevik dogma. But the Hearst press in February 1924 was a vigorous press, open to various shades of opinion, and jealously protective of the right of free speech.

IV

The special features in the Sunday edition of the *American* continued to be exceedingly friendly towards Soviet Russia right down until the end of 1933. In November of that year, Soviet Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov set sail for the United States to obtain—at long last—the dream which William Randolph Hearst had cherished ever

since March of 1918. Recognition. The Hearst press, from the page-one column "Today," by Hearst's chief editorial writer, Arthur Brisbane, to the special news section of the Sunday *American* made Litvinov's sea voyage a triumphal ride. Brisbane especially was interested in Litvinov's picture. It was "a good sample of Russia's strength, in the combative 'brachycephalic' head, wide from ear to ear, as opposed to the longer, more narrow head of American type." Brisbane applauded the Russian government's show of strength in face of Japanese provocation on Russia's eastern territory. The Sunday sections carried lengthy articles by Leon Trotzky, Maxim Gorky, Anna Louise Strong and others. All were for recognition of Russia. Trotzky's conclusion, in an article of November 5: "If there still remains on our planet that is torn by disorder, in the atmosphere of new war dangers and bloody convulsions, an economic experiment that deserves being tried out to the end, it is the experiment of Soviet-American collaborations." Trotzky was writing in exile, but with aristocratic restraint he forbore even to mention the name of his exiler: Josef Stalin. The headline on the Trotzky article read: "Trotzky Sees Vast Trade Advantages in Relations Between U.S. and Soviet. Their Economic Collaboration Would Attain a Sweep Unheard of In History." Next to it, another headline —this one over a series of articles by Russia's great revolutionary author Maxim Gorki, explaining that Lenin's passion for peace and security reflected the passion of the average Russian person. The headline: "Lenin Glowed with a Passion to End Human Woe in Russia, Declares Gorki." And Anna Louise Strong, a long-time sympathizer, wrote a series of articles attesting to the identity of interests between the average Russian and the average American for peace and trade.

Peace and prosperity, the two big passions of November 1933. The Japanese had embarked on their rape of China; Hitler was blueprinting his assault on Europe; Mussolini was looking covetously towards Africa. The world was engulfed in the Great Depression. The United States had never seen such long breadlines within its borders. Hearst had secured the Democratic nomination for Roosevelt but Roosevelt had alienated Hearst with his NRA programs, especially the code instituting regulations within the publishing industry. Taxation was driving Hearst to the wall. He and his editors constantly warned against any more loans to foreign nations. The humanitarian passions of March 1918 had cooled; Hearst was naturally still for diplo-

matic recognition but the Russians must understand that we were not a hand-out agency, that if we extended the Russians any loans, the Russians must use that money to buy American goods. In this way would recognition cement friendly relations and help the American economy. So ran the theme of Hearst editorials that November 1933.

On November 17, America recognized Russia. Hearst editors surveyed the details and were satisfied. The New York *American* of November 22, editorialized, in part:

> On the initiative of President Roosevelt, the United States and Russia have at last resumed normal relations on terms that are entirely honorable, mutually advantageous and in harmony with "a happy tradition of friendship" which existed between these two great peoples for more than a century. . . .
>
> As the Hearst newspapers in their long advocacy of the restoration of friendly relations with Russia have repeatedly pointed out, friendly political relations promote trade relations, and trade relations, when maintained on a fair basis, promote friendly political relations.
>
> Consequently the return of Russo-American relations to normal should mean the revival of a commerce between Russia and the United States that will greatly benefit both countries and strengthen the ties that bind the two peoples in the same powerful friendship which they once were proud to claim and with renewed pride can claim again.

Hearst's chief editorial writer, Arthur Brisbane, was not as formal in his comments. His column appeared in 125 newspapers—Hearst and others—and his comments of November 19 were unrestrained joy. The headline on the Brisbane column read:

> Three Cheers for Roosevelt.
> Russia Recognized at Last.
> Hard Blow for Depression.
> By Arthur Brisbane
> Copyright 1933, King Features Syndicate, Inc.
>
> Miami, Fla., Nov. 18.—*At last* this country decides to "recognize" and deal with Russia. The public will exclaim:
>
> "Thank heaven that's over."
>
> Russia is more than twice as big as the United States, its population is by forty millions greater than ours, and all at work, by the way; its wealth and natural resources may prove, under a government for the people and not for the Czars, Grand Dukes and Monte Carlo's gambling tables, to be even greater than our own.
>
> Financiers foolishly lent money to Russia, particularly to the comic opera Kerensky.

Now they weep because Russia won't pay. It should be remembered that Lenin, who is to Russia what George Washington and Abraham Lincoln are to the United States, saw his brother die under the knout, an unpleasant Russian lash, by order of the Czar. [Lenin's brother was hanged for complicity in the assassination of an earlier Czar. Lenin did not see his brother die.—editor's note.] He would not feel like paying the Czar's debts, and Lenin's devoted disciple, Stalin, who set aside the whole calendar of Russian saints to put the embalmed body of Lenin in their place, will not pay the Czar's debts.

Also, the Czarist-Kerensky debt to the United States amounts to only $289,073,000, not much compared to the *twenty-two thousand million dollars* that Europe owes us, including interest. Concerning that debt, Europe says calmly:

"Don't you hope you may get it?"

And we don't refuse to recognize Europe.

The truth is that our "Best Minds," up to their necks in a depression of their own making, have been afraid that Russia's experiments would succeed, and put dangerous notions in the American minds. That is why those best minds have not wanted Russia recognized.

Brisbane discussed the economic benefits which he and many others were certain would accrue to America, and concluded:

Russian recognition will do more than a hundred theories to end our depression.

President Roosevelt is to be congratulated. Everyone hopes that he will enjoy and profit by his visit to Warm Springs, Georgia and come back with another idea as good as Russian recognition.

But whatever good ideas Roosevelt was to come up with, they were soon to meet the implacable hatred of William Randolph Hearst, just as Soviet Russia was soon to meet with the same, and just as Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini were soon to be met with an admiring editorial eye in the Hearst press—an admiration that would of necessity end when the United States went to war with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Mr. Hearst changed his mind, from time to time.

V

This study has not examined into charges made against Mr. Hearst during a great part of his life that he was a Bolshevik or a Socialist because he advocated government ownership of vital industries, or because for sixteen years he gave warm espousal to the Soviet Union. The charges of Bolshevism and socialism are absurd. To enter denials

would be to dignify absurdities. This survey has no room for an examination of political psychopathy. Mr. Hearst was never a Bolshevik; he was never a Socialist. For much of his life he was, in his own, oft-repeated words, a "militant progressive," a conscientious radical. He fought predatory wealth and corruption; he urged public ownership of private utilities. For over four decades his was the most powerful single voice in American communications. For almost two decades he raised that voice in behalf of the Bolshevik Revolution, its leaders, its aspirations. And when his voice was raised, it was passionate and uncompromising.

As in so many of his crusades, the time came when he changed his mind. His new vigor in opposition was as unyielding as it had been in support. His changed attitude towards the Soviet Union matured in a period of world depression, world unrest, social protest. It occurred within the same period that he changed his mind about Roosevelt and the New Deal, public ownership of utilities, government interference with business. It occurred too when he began to find new causes: the virility of Hitler's National Socialism and Mussolini's Fascism. Mr. Hearst changed his mind. It will forever be a closed book how much the government of the United States—and its people—were influenced in the direction of recognition of Russia by the sixteen-year-long crusade of William Randolph Hearst. It also will forever be a closed book on how many regular readers of the Hearst press from 1917-1934 were drawn to close association with Soviet communism and the American Communist Party through the sympathetic characterizations of Soviet communism in the Hearst press.

But the record in black and white, paper and ink, headline and column is clear. And it is clear despite the words of Westbrook Pegler quoted at the head of this article. It ill behooves a Hearst Bureau manager on the occasion of William Randolph Hearst Junior's journalistic visit to Moscow in 1955 to attempt to change that record by asserting that Hearst Senior was the communists' "number one American critic of the past generation." It may also ill behoove the present-day Hearst press to engage in inquisitions of the views of people who in by-gone days were far less intense in their hopes for American-Soviet friendship than Hearst Senior was.

In the first decade of the 1900's, the elder Hearst fathered a minor third party in New York known as the Independence League. League

members remained staunchly faithful to Mr. Hearst during his World War I travails when he was under constant attack as pro-German, treasonous, subversive and un-American. On February 1, 1924, both the New York *Journal* and *American* printed approvingly the full text of the League's platform. It contained a warm endorsement of Hearst's fight for progressive democracy. A few lines bear repeating:

> We hold that the greatest right in the world is the right to be wrong, that in the exercise thereof people have an inviolable right to express their unbridled thoughts on all topics and personalities, being liable only for the abuse of that right.
>
> We hold that no person or set of persons can properly establish a standard of expression for others.

Piety and Politics in President Eisenhower

By ROBERT E. FITCH

BY THIS TIME we have heard enough cheers from the faithful and jeers from the infidels concerning the personal piety of President Eisenhower. It is curious only that the response to this phenomenon is determined more by political than by religious loyalties. What the Republican unbeliever can only deprecate, the Democratic unbeliever acknowledges with a skeptical smile. What makes devout Republicans rejoice causes devout Democrats to shake their heads in pained dubiety.

The important question for the political scientist is whether or not there is any significant correlation between Eisenhower's piety and his political action. That there is a striking connection I hope to establish in this essay, with some help from Martin Luther, from William Shakespeare, and from Paul Hutchinson, the editor of the *Christian Century*.[1] Prevailing American prejudice, as endorsed both by Protestants and by secularists, finds such a notion repellent. But it is too easily forgotten that the legal and institutional separation of church and state by no means excludes the religious and political interpenetration of persons and principles. Our most deeply devout President, Abraham Lincoln, found it impossible to be a member of any church, but it is obvious that the dialectical tension in his piety and in his Christian ethics had a direct bearing on his political practice.

Before we get to the essential, however, it is necessary to clear up two preliminary questions. One is the compatibility of piety with the profession of arms. The other is the place of piety in the character of the typical hero in a democracy. With due respect to Eisenhower's

[1]Cf. "The President's Religious Faith," *The Christian Century*, vol. LXXI, no. 12, 24 Mar. 54, pp. 362-369. Also published in *Life*, vol. 36, no. 12, 22 Mar. 54, pp. 151-170.

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present affiliation with the Presbyterian Church, USA, the assumption is that, in all these affairs, the child is father of the man, and that the simple piety of the River Brethren that he knew in his boyhood home remained with him through his military career and stays with him in the White House. Those who first came to know Eisenhower personally during his brief academic career have made the caustic observation that he did not exhibit as president of Columbia University the religious ardor that he was alleged to have shown in the armed forces. Here I can only remark—as one who has served on the staffs of both of these institutions—that a man may with less embarrassment fall on his knees on the field of battle than at a university faculty meeting.

"God's Fist and God's Pike"

Part of the initial disinclination to take Ike's piety at face value derived from the powerful tradition of pacifism in contemporary American Protestantism. This taught that the career of the Christian and the career of the soldier were inherently incompatible, and also furthered the supercilious assumption that there was a graver temptation to sin against one's Lord in the profession of arms than in the peaceful pursuit of profit. Even though a vigorous and influential sector of American Protestantism has resisted this pacifist teaching, it has still been sufficiently under the influence of that teaching to help develop a mythology of the military man as a uniquely un-Christian monster.

So William Lee Miller, in a brilliantly perverse article in the July 7, 1953 *Reporter*, spoke for many of his Protestant colleagues when he remarked that the President's piety was "a bit sudden," and went on to observe that "Mr. Eisenhower did not seem to be especially concerned with 'moral and spiritual' matters during his Army career, which in this regard was about like that of most other Army officers." As for the first question of fact—Ike's concern for religion while he was in the army—I have statements from eyewitnesses which contradict Mr. Miller's reporting. As for the larger question, the attitude of "most other Army officers" toward religion—well, what is it?

My personal observations come from service as a Navy chaplain on board an attack transport that carried army as well as navy personnel. In general I should remark that piety is distributed among American military men in about the same proportion as it is distributed among American civilians. One combination of traits in the

professional soldier, however, while not too common in occurrence, did strike me as being unique. This was the combination of unusual skill in the precise use of English, a thorough knowledge of the American Constitution, and a deep feeling for the realities of religion. No one is going to accuse Eisenhower of the first of these qualities, but he certainly does exhibit the other two. The important point is that all three of these traits, far from being alien to the professional soldier, are grafted into him as part of his training. Indeed, one is tempted to argue that West Point and Annapolis do a more thorough job here of discipline and indoctrination than do most of our liberal arts colleges.

On the compatibility of piety with the profession of arms it may be helpful to consult Martin Luther. His brief treatise, "Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved" (1526)[2] expounds the fundamental notion that war is God's surgery for cutting out the diseases of society. "Although slaying and robbing do not seem to be a work of love, . . . yet in truth even this is a work of love. By way of illustration, a good physician, when a disease is so bad and so great that he has to cut off a hand, foot, ear, eye, or let it decay, does so, in order to save the body." War, therefore, is only "a little, brief lack of peace" that prevents an everlasting and immeasurable lack of peace. The sword is God's own ordinance, and "the hand that wields this sword and slays with it is then no more man's hand, but God's, and it is not man, but God, who hangs, tortures, beheads, slays and fights." Of course to the "narrow, simple eyes of children" it is not evident that the surgery of war is like the surgery of the physician and is intended to save the whole body.

The soldier who is supported by this insight is invited to fight with conviction. Having made it clear that the good soldier does not fight out of greed for money or out of greed for glory, Luther provides the model of an address to the soldiers before they go into battle:

> Dear comrades, we are gathered here in service, duty, and obedience to our prince. . . . Although, before God, we are poor sinners, as are our enemies, nevertheless, since we know that our prince is in the right in this case, or at least do not know otherwise, we are therefore sure and certain that in serving and obeying him, we are serving God. Let everyone, then, be brave and courageous and let no one think otherwise than that his fist is God's fist, his pike God's pike! . . .

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[2]Quotations are from *Works of Martin Luther*, Philadelphia, Muhlenberg Press, 1943, vol. V, pp. 31-74.

Being sufficiently instructed in these matters, the Christian warrior is finally adjured to go "Forward, with joy!"

Luther also provides the model of a prayer for the soldier who is about to go into battle. The prayer reflects the humility of the sinner who, even while fulfilling his duty of obedience to his country, knows that he cannot be saved by his own works:

> Because I know and have learned from thy gracious Word that none of our good works can help us and no one is saved as a soldier but only as a Christian, therefore I will rely not at all on this obedience and work of mine, but put myself freely at the service of Thy will and believe from the heart that only the innocent blood of Thy dear Son, my Lord Jesus Christ, redeems and saves me, and this He has shed for me in obedience to Thy holy will.

When this prayer is concluded, the soldier is invited, if he will, to say the Creed and the Lord's Prayer, but "let that be enough." Having committed body and soul to his Maker, let him now "draw sword, and smite in God's name."

It is improbable that Eisenhower has ever read, or even heard of, Martin Luther's treatise. But his own words, as cited by Paul Hutchinson, testify that he had been through the spiritual struggle of reconciling himself to his God as he practiced the profession of arms:

> I believe that every soldier—every American soldier, at least—who seeks to find within his own soul some reason for being on the battlefield, for enduring the things he has to endure there, in the long run has got to fix this relationship [to the service of God] in his own mind. That is essential if he is to be really a soldier who can carry forward the terrible load that devolves upon him in those circumstances.

In any case there is a kinship between the simple piety of these two fighting men. If there are differences, they reside at two points. Luther was writing at a time when the devotion to the career of arms was uncomplicated by any strong pacifist sentiment, and he was writing at a place where it was still taken easily for granted that the military profession is more honorable than that of the shopkeeper. The other difference is a difference in humane feelings between the soldier in battle and the civilian at home. Contrary to the sanctimonious assumptions of a businessman's civilization, it is always the civilian who is more fierce and bloodthirsty in his war cries, while the professional warrior is apt to be more tender and restrained. Though Eisenhower

might appreciate the interpretations of a Martin Luther, it is probable that the soldier would be a bit shocked by the savagery of the priest.

The Hero in a Democracy

If we can see that piety is compatible with a military career, we need next to see the place of piety in the popular leader of a democracy. Our interpretation goes counter to Mr. Burnham's *The Machiavellians*, where we get a series of portraits of fascinating fellows whose political skills are in inverse ratio to their religion and their morals. One wonders only how Mr. Burnham could have written such a work with any attention at all to the democratic tradition. As a witness on the other side we may take William Shakespeare, who cannot be accused of being an apologist for the Christian faith, and for whom patriotism was always a stronger emotion than religion. Shakespeare gives us the classic portrait of the hero of a democracy in his Henry V—the combination of warrior, man of simple piety, statesman, and popular leader of the people. Henry V is the dramatic prototype of a George Washington or a Dwight Eisenhower—differing from the American instances, one presumes, only in his superior talents for soldier-like lovemaking.

It may be well to remind ourselves that Shakespeare's presentation of his national hero is not without critical undertones. Henry Goddard's Quaker intuitions have served him well in the interpretation of this play. There is the character of the Boy, who sees all soldiers as thieves, frauds, and scoundrels. There is Bardolph, who is hanged for robbing a church, while at the start of the play Henry has financed his expedition by accepting a "voluntary donation" from the church. There is Michael Williams who insists that a war be in a just cause, and declares that, if it is not, then the King must face a severe reckoning at the Day of Judgment. There is Fluellen, the Welshman, who notes the analogy between Henry's rejection of Falstaff and Alexander the Great's rejection of his friend Cleitus; who, wishing to speak of Alexander the Big, always renders it in his own accent as "Alexander the Pig"; and who, when challenged for this expression, artlessly insists—"The pig, or the great, or the mighty, or the huge, or the magnanimous are all one reckonings, save the phrase is a little variations."

But if Shakespeare was sophisticated enough to provide a dialectical undertone of criticism to his hero, he was also realist enough to

understand the sort of leader that would appeal to his Englishmen. The ethical traits of Henry are fundamental. There is the combination of magnanimity with justice: in justice he arraigns the three traitors; in magnanimity he pardons the drunkard who railed on his person. There is the blend of valor and of humanitarian feeling: like Gideon he glories in the odds against him—"Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more; Or close the wall up with our English dead!"; yet he wishes to spare the people of Harfleur, and he forbids the plundering of the French countryside. There is the humility so fundamental to the hero in a democracy and impermissible ever to the Machiavellian—"I think the King is but a man, as I am. . . . His ceremonies laid by, in his nakedness he appears but a man." There is the extolling of the heart over the head—"a good heart, Kate, is the sun and the moon; or rather, the sun, and not the moon, for it shines bright, and never changes, but keeps his course truly." And there is the essential democracy of one who feels that it is only the outward forms which set him off from others, and who, on the eve of battle, first seeks fellowship with the plain soldiers whom in the hour of crisis he must command.

Furthermore, Henry is the only major character in Shakespeare who wears his piety like a familiar garment. It may be naive, but it is natural, that he should get the Archbishop to provide the religious as well as legal sanction for the invasion of France. It comes to him spontaneously to compare the treason of Scroop to another Fall of Man, and to thank God for bringing the traitor to light. Like Cromwell, who comes after him and after Shakespeare, he gives God the glory for all achievements. When he is warned that the French are about to overwhelm him, he answers firmly, "We are in God's hand, brother, not in theirs." At the end, when he has overwhelmed the French, he exclaims, "O God, thy arm was here! And not to us, but to thy arm alone, Ascribe we all. . . . Take it, God, for it is only thine!" And so he orders *Te Deum*'s sung in acknowledgment "That God fought for us." This sort of piety may be too simple for an Abraham Lincoln; it is not too simple for a George Washington or a Dwight Eisenhower.

It is interesting, too, that Henry, like Martin Luther, thinks of war as a kind of surgery. Only Henry thinks of it as God's instrument, not so much for chastising the nations, as for purifying individuals—"war is his beadle, war is his vengeance." Also Henry's prayer on the

eve of battle is curiously Lutheran in quality: "O God of battles! steel my soldiers' hearts. . . ." The prayer soon moves to the confession of his own implication in the treason by which his father seized the throne, and to an enumeration of the good works he has done to atone for this sin. But Henry also knows that he is saved by grace, and not by works:

> More will I do;
> Though all that I can do is nothing worth,
> Since that my penitence comes after all,
> Imploring pardon.

After such a prayer Henry can "draw sword, and smite in God's name."

While I have had to condense my account of the play, some readers may feel that this is an extraordinarily roundabout way to interpret an Eisenhower. The point, however, is that our greatest English dramatist long ago gave us a portrait of the hero in a democracy, and that his hero and the current American hero are one in their specifications. Justice and magnanimity, humanity and valor, the virtues of the heart before the virtues of the head, a simple trust in God, an unaffected humility in the presence of great honors and responsibilities, an instinctive spiritual kinship with the people whom he governs: these are what make up a Henry and make up an Ike. These are the qualities which, in the leader of a democracy, call forth the affection and confidence and loyalty which so baffle the more sophisticated analysts. And a simple, genuine, uncritical piety is paramount among these qualities.

Pietism and the Practice of Politics

If at last we are prepared to accept Eisenhower's piety at its face value, and also to see it as integral to his character and to his role as hero in a democracy, then we may ask the essential question. Just what effect does Eisenhower's particular brand of religion have upon his particular brand of politics?

A quick look at some of Ike's predecessors in the presidency may suggest that such an influence is not an unusual one.[3] Woodrow Wil-

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[3]Cf. my "American Presidents and Protestant Types," *Christianity and Crisis*, vol. XII, no. 9, 26 May 52, pp. 69-70.

son (like Dulles today) was the classical Calvinist, with the two distinguishing traits of intellectual discipline and of austere moral idealism, and with the Presbyterian genius for legal and constitutional devices. Calvin Coolidge was the perfect Congregationalist moderator as he presided over his national council, a *roi-fainéant* on principle, who supplemented a deliberate policy of *laissez-faire* only with symbolic acts and with moral preachments. Herbert Hoover was the latter-day Quaker, a secularized perfectionist, who excelled in the engineering details of government and failed only in political relations. Franklin D. Roosevelt was a Tory socialist in the great tradition of the Anglicans; and Harry Truman was a good Baptist in his absolute passion for civil rights and liberties as well as in his acceptance of the secular expedient in all other affairs.

The critical test of the influence of Ike's religious heritage lies at the point where that heritage may come into conflict with his military training. Those who have served in the armed forces for any time must have observed that, for the professional soldier, the army represents a culture all of its own. In many respects its folkways are distinct from civilian folkways, and are enforced upon the members of the group no matter in what part of the world they may be serving. It is also true that the religion of the River Brethren is a culture of its own, and that, while its members may live in a secular society, they are subject to disciplines of character, of temperament, and of conduct which set them off from others. Now it would appear that at three points the religious culture of Ike's boyhood has overborne the military culture of his adult years.

The first bit of evidence lies in the quality of the man. In sharp contrast to a General MacArthur, Ike has been almost untouched by the pomp and circumstance of army brass. There is little of the autocrat in him. His obvious traits of character are simplicity, self-reliance, the sense of personal responsibility, a devotion to duty, and the natural humanitarianism of one who is at heart a democrat. These are the traits we should expect in one who is a product of the simple, sectarian piety of the Brethren. When even the soldiers who served under him were ready to acknowledge this democratic feeling in their chief, that is sufficient testimony to the reality of the man. The ordinary veteran voted for Eisenhower; he would not vote for MacArthur. Even when

Eisenhower is President, we can call him "Ike" without feeling disrespectful; no one ever thought of calling MacArthur "Mac."

A second point at which his character is congruent with his religious nurture but in contradiction to his military training is his individualism. Here Ike is a liberal in the classical sense. He believes in *laissez-faire* in business enterprise, in the great civil liberties, in individual initiative and in the techniques of voluntary association, in the arts of democratic leadership and in the ideal of teamwork as it may be shaped by disciplined devotion to great convictions. All this is the exact opposite of the ordered regimentation of affairs which belongs to the military tradition. Here we might remind ourselves of Edward Bellamy's deep disappointment at being unable to get into West Point, and his resolve to project into his utopia the planned society which he admired in the organization of the army. Ike's preferences here are not altogether the outcome of explicit religious training, but they are congruent with his religious background, and they are a natural extension into social ethics of the particular sort of liberal individualism which belongs to the pietist.

A third point of conflict between his military and his religious heritage may be partial rather than total. This is Ike's inordinate passion for peace. In justice to the military, however, it should be remarked that the professional soldier is usually more reluctant to go to war than the civilian. Kaiser Wilhelm was ready to fight when his generals were not. Adolf Hitler proposed an invasion of Russia over the opposition of his generals. In the American tradition, moreover, we have gone to war, not at the prodding of our military men, but under the leadership of high-minded civilians—Lincoln, Wilson, Roosevelt—who were resolved to fight for a principle. Indeed, civilians will rush in where professional soldiers fear to tread. Some part of Ike's caution in this respect, therefore, is certainly to be credited to his wide and intimate experience with the realities of war.

On the other hand, while any general may be cautious about going to war, and while a general in a democracy may sincerely believe that peace is a higher value than war, it is not often that we come across a general who, in the eyes of the plain people, actually appears as a symbol of peace rather than as a symbol of war. The critical testimony came in Ike's NATO days, when he was living in France, and when the French people, never too ready in recent times to idealize an

American, spoke of him as a "peace general." At this moment we note that it is Ike, against a Knowland, a McCarthy, a Radford, who keeps a restraining hand on the bellicose tendencies in parts of our government. Is it possible that the pacifism of his devout mother still has an influence on the President in these days of his greatest responsibilities? When Ike chose the army as a career, he rejected pacifism as an absolute; but now that he serves as the civilian President of a democracy, it is likely that he has a new understanding of peace as one of the great values in society. And one may believe that his present passion for peace gathers reinforcement from the religious aura with which it was surrounded in the days of his childhood. If this interpretation is correct, then Ike's love of peace is the only point at which his otherwise simple piety is complicated by a dialectical tension. He could not accept peace as an absolute; but, even after a career at arms, he could make the establishment and maintenance of peace one of his great objectives.

There is another sense in which Ike's total outlook reflects the pietist pattern. This is the curious blend of conservatism and liberalism. When in answer to a question from a reporter, Ike looked heavenward for a moment in reflection and then said that he was a conservative in economic matters but a liberal on all humanitarian issues, he spoke in the classical tradition of Protestant pietism. It is the tradition of a Saint Paul, a Martin Luther, a John Wesley. Politically and economically all three of these men were Tories. But when it came to human relations on the face-to-face level, they were humanitarians: Paul in the matter of the runaway slave, Luther in his emphasis on the family and the community and the sanctity of the daily task, Wesley in his concern for slaves and orphans and criminals and the economically underprivileged. Their hearts were moved by the desire to help persons in distress, but they did not believe it necessary to overturn the social structure under which they lived.

It is an interesting question whether or not these two impulses are compatible with one another. The Methodists, for instance, have rejected the Tory in Wesley but kept the humanitarian in him, and have even extended his humanitarianism into a considerable program of social action that at times has had a revolutionary impact. Is it possible that Ike will some day find the tension between his conservatism and his liberalism arriving at a breaking point where he must choose be-

tween the one and the other? Indeed, is it not the case that already the strength of his support in Congress comes from the liberal rather than from the conservative wings of both the Republican and Democratic parties?

Finally, I would suggest that Ike's weakness as well as his strength is in harmony with his pietist heritage. For his particular brand of pietism is a culture for persons, but not a discipline for society. It has an ethics for the individual; it has no adequate social ethics. It rests on the naive assumption that there is some automatic transfer from the integrity of the person to the well-being of society. Ike speaks as such a pietist when he says: "If each of us in his own mind would dwell more upon these simple virtues—integrity, courage, self-confidence and unshakable belief in the Bible—would not some of these problems [confronting the nation] tend to simplify themselves? Would not we, after having done our very best with them, be content to leave the rest with the Almighty, and not to charge all our fellow men with the fault of bringing us where we were and are?"

At this point one might wish that, instead of having a Presbyterian foreground to a pietist background, Ike had a genuinely Presbyterian background. For the culture of Calvinism, unlike the culture of pietism, embraces an explicit social discipline. Scratch a Calvinist and you provoke a lawyer, a constitutionalist, a politician, at his best a statesman, in any case one who knows that there is no simple transfer from personal morality to public morality, and who is attentive to the pressures, the intricate manipulations, and the specific devices by which lofty ideals are to be adjusted and enacted into social institutions.

Ike's pietism qualifies him as hero in a democracy. But does it qualify him as the political leader of a democracy? Apparently he sees far enough beyond his heritage to be able to propose a legislative program which articulates the principles by which he believes we should live. But can he crack the whip, will he wield the big stick, will he exert the forceful leadership that might enact these principles into the law of the land? There are times, indeed, when he seems to hope to govern like Aristotle's God, merely by exciting the appetite of the rest of the world, so that it is instinctively drawn toward his virtues. But if he were to model himself after Calvin's God, rather than Aristotle's, he would know that mankind, left too much to the voluntary impulses of the heart, would turn away from the arduous aspiration after righteousness and would only revel again in sin.

A Suggestion for Cultural Insurance

By ARTHUR E. MORGAN

WHAT has become of the world's books? They have had five great enemies—fire, war, political and religious intolerance, cultural decay, and the sheer passage of time. These have worked relentlessly in all or nearly all literate societies.

In Greek literature we have some of the chief spiritual resources of the race. The part of it that has come down to us seems to have survived by precarious chance. During the "dark ages" the mind of Europe was asleep. At intervals the powerful Church was bent on hunting down and destroying the classics of Greece, as well as whatever else did not conform to orthodox doctrine. How thoroughly the job was done may be inferred from the fact that the generally accurate description of our solar system which had existed in Greek writings was so deliberately and thoroughly expurgated and eliminated that when it was rediscovered by Copernicus centuries later the knowledge came as a new discovery.

The burning of heretical books was not the invention of the Church. The habit was borrowed from its pagan predecessors. The Emperor Diocletian in his campaign against the Christians had ordered the destruction of all their books. When Constantine a little later sought to rebuild a Christian library at his new capital of Constantinople and had the Empire searched for that purpose, he was able to accumulate only 6900 volumes. Such campaigns against Christian writings as that of Diocletian may be one reason for the scarcity of early Christian manuscripts.

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Fortunately during the period of darkness in Europe there was a large degree of intellectual freedom and interest in the far-flung Arab Empire. Its several libraries held more than a million volumes, including much of the literature of classic Greece. When the West began to awake, men of the north Italian cities secured copies of ancient Greek writings, partly from Constantinople, which had got them from the Arabs and had come to tolerate them. The borrowing came none too soon, for the Moslem world went orthodox shortly afterward, held the Koran to be all-sufficient, and discarded or destroyed most other books.

The timely transfer of Greek masterpieces to Italy saved only a part of "the greatness that was Greece." All that is left of that towering mind, Democritus, perhaps the greatest of them all, are a few sentences quoted by other writers, occasional references to his views, and chiefly the second-hand but precious *De Rerum Naturae* of Lucretius, who interpreted Democritus to the Roman world. As one measure of this loss of Greek masterpieces, of the seventy plays by one of the greatest of Greek dramatists, Aeschylus, author of *Prometheus Bound*, only seven survive, some of them so mutilated by poor copying that their quality is much blurred. Of many Greek writers and thinkers we have little more than their names and occasional brief references. The greatest treasuries of Greek literature probably were the two libraries at Alexandria. One of these was burned by Julius Cæsar; the other survived and grew for some centuries until it was destroyed by the Christian Emperor Theodosius in his drive against heresy.

But the Greek was not the only great literature that was largely destroyed. Egypt had its books and its libraries which, after existing with various vicissitudes for about two thousand years, were so destroyed, lost and forgotten that no one remained who could read the parts which survived. The Egyptologist, T. L. Griffith, wrote, "For one early papyrus which survives, many millions must have perished." The discovery of the "Rosetta Stone" in 1799, with its identical descriptions in Greek and in Egyptian hieroglyphics and in "demotic characters," gave a beginning clue to the deciphering of this literature. What has been lost was probably far from trivial. For instance, the Pharaoh Ikhnaton has been described as "the most towering personality which had arisen in the world until the ancient Hebrews." His skull, preserved through the centuries with his mummified body, is reported to

have had about the largest brain capacity of any normal human skull ever measured. This progressive and unorthodox man presented to his people a philosophy, a cosmic view, and a view of life far in advance of his time. On his death the orthodox priesthood, striving to obliterate the record of his life and to destroy his writings and related literature, went so far as to raze the city he had built, and passed his name on to posterity as "the criminal."

Ikhnaton died about 1350 B.C. Fortunately his secret tomb escaped the priestly wrath and was not discovered until recent times. Its contents provided a large part of what we know about him. Among the pieces of writing preserved from the fourteenth century B.C. was one item which also was passed down through some other unknown channels, and six or eight hundred years after Ikhnaton's death appeared in Hebrew literature as the magnificent one hundred and fourth Psalm of our Bible. We do not know how much else of his message was transmitted in such ways, or to what extent the Hebrew view of life and of the world is an inheritance from Ikhnaton.

Had not the Assyrians, who took their culture from Babylon, made their records on clay and burned them into bricks which would withstand three or four thousand years of desert climate, we should know almost nothing of these millennium-long cultures. Even so, the greater parts of their writings probably are lost.

Some able scholars today are laboriously piecing together fragments of ancient manuscript found in a desert cave in Palestine, where they had been chewed into tiny bits by rats for making nests. The quantity of these indicates that they were once part of a considerable library. (Most modern books would quickly disintegrate, leaving nothing for either rats or scholars.) The recently discovered Isaiah manuscripts, dating from 150 B.C., found the other day by shepherds in an urn in another Palestine cave, fortunately had escaped the rats. This is much the oldest manuscript of any part of our Bible.

When Rome destroyed Carthage, one of the casualties was the Carthaginian library, said to have contained four or five hundred thousand volumes. Aside from sending to Rome some books on agriculture, the conqueror parceled out this collection to the petty kings or chiefs of Africa. One wonders whether a single one of those volumes now exists.

The libraries of Rome and Italy were purged and destroyed again and again when Rome dwindled to a town of less than ten thousand, the present archives of manuscripts being of later origin, or stray fragments that survived as not offensive to orthodoxy, or escaped destruction by being buried in a mass of uncatalogued and unorganized material. In 1687 the College for the Propagation of the Faith received permission to preserve copies of prohibited books, but its library was destroyed by the French army in 1798.

India, more than most lands, has preserved significant parts of its ancient literature, perhaps through many centuries by verbal memory; yet much of it has been lost. About a thousand years ago the great Buddhist University of Nalanda, with its library and its ten thousand students, was pounced upon by invading Mongols. All the teachers and students were killed, and the libraries and buildings were destroyed. Such action seems to have been typical of the invaders of India through two or three thousand years. Even the British contributed to that destruction. During the siege of Lucknow her soldiers used the library books to block windows and doors, and as fuel for cooking meals. When the siege was relieved they left the remainder scattered about, exposed to the weather.

China has had its own great classical libraries, of which valuable remnants survived such occurrences as a drive entirely through the central part of the country by a horde from Central Asia, with general destruction of life and property. In China of the eleventh century A.D. a remarkable "New Deal" administration came into power under the Emperor Jin Tsung, which for twenty years ruled the country, aiming at the elimination of privilege and the achievement of democratic equality. Then the regime was overthrown and ruthlessly suppressed. Copies of the new constitution and of other records were so thoroughly hunted down and destroyed that most of what we know of its details is from two copies of the original program or constitution, "The Memorial of a Myriad Words." One copy was encased in mortar in a cavity in a brick wall, and the other somewhat similarly hidden, to be found after about eight hundred years.

In eastern Europe for four hundred years beginning in the tenth century, A.D., the Bogomil movement was the greatest challenge to autocracy, feudalism and clericalism. It was democratic in both religion and government, recognizing neither king nor priest, and was strongly

ethical. Except for its philosophy of dualism and its tendency to asceticism, its doctrines and customs were very similar to those of present-day liberal Quakers. It spread widely among the common people, and inspired other movements as far west as France, Italy and England, and over a considerable part of Russia. Yet, under persecution and purging, both the Bogomils and their literature were so completely exterminated that almost all we know of this important cultural movement is from the writings of its enemies. The same fate met the Albigenses of western Europe.

When Cortez conquered Mexico his priests found large libraries of exquisitely inscribed manuscripts, possibly including the literature of that greater pre-Aztec culture, the Toltec. Lest some heresy might be preserved, the priests gathered these and burned them in great heaps. Only three of these beautiful manuscripts survive, in European collections, and knowledge of this vast literature was so completely obliterated that even these cannot be read. Similarly, in ancient Peru a great collection of records, supposedly running back for fifteen hundred years or more, kept in that most ancient form of "writing," knotted and colored cords, was so generally destroyed that the specimens remaining in museums cannot be deciphered.

And so it has gone throughout history. The distilled essence of human experience, observation, reflection and wisdom, recorded in literature, has been disregarded, abandoned, or vigorously purged, and much of it has been lost.

* * *

But now we are civilized, we think, and such destruction could not happen again. So why try to disturb us by referring to ancient history? Yet probably more books have been purged during the past three decades, especially in Germany and China where books have been venerated, and in Russia, than in all the centuries since the Holy Inquisition. Our own country has been both a preserver and a destroyer. American bombs, raining on Leipzig in concentrated attack, struck at one of the world's greatest storehouses of rare manuscripts. On the other hand, but for American military power would not closed-minded dictatorship have swept across western Europe to the Atlantic, and then have sought to eliminate free minds and the literature of free minds?

In our own country, in public libraries and those of state universities and of the United States Information Service, there is cautious search for volumes which might be pounced upon by investigating committees. A powerful religious hierarchy in America circulated a proposal advising its members to train for library work in the schools of that hierarchy, to seek library positions, and then to quietly eliminate or reject books of which the hierarchy disapproves, especially such "dangerous" books as those of John Dewey. To encourage selection by public libraries of books particularly favored by the hierarchy the librarian was instructed in an effective ruse. She was to suggest to numerous people that they request certain books, and then, since library purchases are guided by public demand, these probably would be purchased, whereupon the faithful librarian was to persistently suggest them to readers. When there was inquiry for such "dangerous" books as those of John Dewey the proper course was for the librarian to say that she had examined these and had found them to be of little interest. The quiet but growing campaign against John Dewey, showing up at various points in our country, is a sort of "trace element" to identify the activity of this hierarchy.

* * *

It is the consensus among anthropologists and other qualified persons that unconditioned human nature has not changed appreciably during historic times. What keeps men from barbarism is not inborn "human nature." The change for the better which has taken place through the centuries has been in the cultural tradition. Yet that cultural inheritance is not immune to discontinuity. Moderation and ethical sensitivity are parts of that tradition. If the cultural pattern should break or disintegrate it would have no sure protection. The present differs from earlier times in that arbitrary power has acquired new technical skill in eliminating free opinion.

Quite aside from the exercise of arbitrary power a culture can be greatly modified by changes of public taste and discrimination. In the large University of Madras, once a center of oriental philosophy, I was informed that interest in philosophy had waned to such an extent that no financial provision for teaching it was being made in the university budget. For one or two decades before China became Communist it

was reported that interest in classical Chinese literature was fading so completely that it was doubtful whether in two or three generations there would be anyone living who could read it.

As to our own country I should not expect a discontinuity of discriminating culture unless there had been a severe military disruption. That might be followed by "necessary" and "emergency" dictatorship which would "put first things first" according to its lights. There are active movements in our country both on the right and on the left which would purge our literature if they should have the power. The type of aggressive personality which presses for arbitrary power seldom is a promising guardian of a great and free cultural tradition. Today in America there are some newly rich men, with fantastically large, nearly tax-free incomes, in active alliance with an aggressive public figure who speaks derisively of the "egg heads," and who states publicly that Harvard University is a public menace.

Only in case a number of aggressive movements should unite in time of some national emergency would there seem to be a very serious menace from such sources. I lean to the opinion that our culture has deep roots in the people, will survive any probable adversity, and will evolve into something finer than the world has yet known. Yet that opinion is the product of well based optimism, rather than a necessary conclusion from a study of history, and I think I should treat it as such.

I do not expect that my house will burn down during my lifetime or that of my children. Yet I keep it insured against fire. With all the experience men have had of the loss or precarious survival of the cream of their various cultures, is it anything less than unethical and criminal to leave our own culture uninsured? While hoping and working for the best, should we not provide economical and reasonable insurance against the worst?

* * *

Suppose we *are* interested in "cultural insurance." How can we go about it? I think of the various means by which great writings have survived the long continued disinterest or hostility of men. I think of Ikhnaton's secret desert tomb, undisturbed for more than three thousand years, of the precious Chinese manuscript encased in a brick wall for eight hundred years, of the book of Isaiah hidden in an urn

in a desert cave for more than two thousand years. I think, too, of the Sanscrit scholars I saw at Santiniketan in North India, translating very ancient writing found in Tibet recorded on strips of bamboo, and of the recent discovery of manuscripts concerning the Bogomils uncovered in a desert cache in central Asia, and of a similar collection concerning them found in a collection of papyri hidden in Egypt.

Most of these were saved by *ad hoc* undertakings, unrelated to any general policy or plan. Why not replace such hit-or-miss effort by policy, design and adequate technology?

What steps then could be taken toward cultural insurance? It is entirely possible to preserve in many places the world's great literature and some other cultural possessions where they would be safe from serious deterioration for very, very long periods, but would be subject to occasional discovery. This could be done on such a large scale, and in so many ways and places, that intentional or accidental discovery or destruction within a short time would be a remote possibility, while occasional discoveries over a long period would be highly probable. Every degree of ease and difficulty of rediscovery might be provided. For instance, a major deposit in the field of mathematics might be made deep in one of the Smoky Mountains. Then directions for finding it might be planted in numerous places where some of them would be surely found from time to time, but which could not be followed except by men who could follow astronomical or somewhat advanced mathematical guidance. Should a general impulse for cultural insurance come to prevail, the variety of material dealt with might be as wide as the range of human interest. No intended censorship would be effective.

At first the methods of preservation might be simple. Glass baking dishes with glass lids, preferably made of some of the new types of glass, such as "vicor" which is chemically inert, would provide simple containers. Pine pitch would do for sealing the lids. Its suitability is indicated by the fact that fossil pitch fifty million years old, which we call amber, preserves almost perfectly to the present the delicate bodies of insects which became imbedded in it when it was fresh. Copper dishes with copper lids also would last for ages. To prevent gradual oxidation of the paper in books, a salt cellar full of iron filings, which in rusting would consume oxygen, might be included in the container. There are less familiar substances, such as alkaline pyrogallol, which

are commonly used by chemists for quick removal of oxygen. Another small container of silica gel would absorb moisture from paper and air and would leave the container air drier than any desert. If copper containers should be used the tops or ends might be corrugated and flexible, so that as the oxygen within should be absorbed the corrugated part would collapse slightly and so avoid the formation of a vacuum which might draw in more air.

To further insure a tight seal the container might be dipped in mineral asphalt and then wrapped in aluminum foil or asbestos wool for convenient handling. For protection against damage from without, containers probably would be buried in mineral asphalt or in concrete, preferably with aggregate of granite or quartz which would not dissolve as would limestone. Such containers could be buried in the foundations of buildings, the embankments of highways, and in holes in the ground where there is little prospect of either extensive erosion or deposit. Should a movement for cultural insurance get under way, research and experiment would develop methods which would make these suggestions seem crude and cumbersome indeed, and which, in case of a good quality of paper, would protect against disintegration for thousands of years.

In a general movement for cultural insurance, men of every type of interest would undertake to preserve their basic literature. Also, manuscripts of great music would be deposited, along with recordings and with instruments for reproducing the music. Examples of many expressions of human culture could be passed on to even a very distant future. It seems not impossible that many an educational and other cultural organization would have a continuing department or other provision for cultural insurance.

Perhaps the foregoing suggestions remind the reader of the story of a householder who, finding it necessary to leave home when a guest was expected, left a message on his doorpost, "Will be back this evening. If you cannot read, ask the blacksmith next door." Of what use would an accidentally discovered store of literature be to people whose language had changed, and to whom the marks on paper would be no more legible than Mayan inscriptions are to us? Should a movement for cultural insurance get under way, at least the larger deposits probably would be accompanied by easy and suggestive lessons in reading, with illustrations of universally familiar objects and actions. Bi-

lingual or multilingual dictionaries probably would be included. The entire movement would develop intelligent purposefulness and method which it would be useless to try to forecast here.

For what distances in the future would people undertake cultural insurance? Some would make deposits under the cellar floor, ready for the next century. Others would inform themselves as to the limits of past glacial action, and would make deposits outside the range of that source of destruction.

A final question is: "Why take the trouble? What has such a distant culture done for me? Why not let the people of that remote time make their own mistakes, and find their own way?" A short answer to that question is, "If that is the way you feel, do not take the trouble." There will be no loss if that attitude is not preserved. Leave cultural insurance to those who have a sense of cultural responsibility and opportunity, to those who believe that their cultural inheritance includes treasures which should not be lost.

Value is associated with life. The road of life has been long and hard, with seeming endless tragedy. Yet there have been gains. The discriminating sensitiveness which makes one aware of the age-long tragedy of man is a hint of his capacity for felicity. Is there not priceless value in a Beethoven sonata, in a Sermon on the Mount, in Shakespeare, in the scientific mind? Should there be those of a distant time who again are stumbling toward the light, might we not reach out a helping hand, as our great cultural inheritance has held out a helping hand to us?

Summer Place

By SEYMOUR EPSTEIN

HE COULDN'T REMEMBER having been sent on the errand, or what it was he was supposed to buy, but there he was in the supermarket, standing in line. In front of him was Mrs. Stevens, the tall lady with the sick boy who lived in the shingle house on the other side of the hedge, and she was talking to the clerk in her stiff-lipped manner. He felt none of his usual impatience to get out, but the person behind him kept pushing at that one spot on his shoulder, whispering, "Hey . . . Hey . . . Hey." He tried to shift his position, but the hand remained, pushed him harder, and finally a voice whispered in his ear . . . "You wanna go, or not?"

Dick opened his eyes and felt his heart pound against the mattress for fright.

"What's the matter?" he whined.

His brother Walt straightened up and stepped back. He was wearing just his shorts, and his tanned body looked threatening in the yellow light. Beyond Walt, on the shelf, the little hurricane lamp was lit. It gave their room an atmosphere of crisis.

"It's five-thirty," Walt said. "You forget?"

He didn't speak in a whisper, but his voice was carefully modulated. Then Dick remembered. He remembered the previous evening, the conversation just before sleep, the astonishing offer.

"No," he answered, "I didn't forget. Shall I get dressed now?"

Walt nodded. "Sure you're not too sleepy?" he asked. "Maybe you'd rather sleep?"

Dick kicked off the sheet and put both feet on the straw matting. He groped for his socks and moccasins. "No," he said. "I'm O.K." He found a sock, but his fingers betrayed him. They fumbled drunkenly,

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unable to perform the simplest task. Walt came over and took the sock out of his hand.

"You don't need socks," he said. "Just put on the moccasins."

Dick slipped his feet into the moccasins and began to shuffle out of the room.

"Where are you going?" Walt asked.

"To the bathroom," Dick mumbled.

Walt had his jeans on by this time. He stood there regarding Dick, his hands on his hips.

"To brush your teeth, I suppose?" he asked.

"No," said Dick.

Walt shook his head. "Anything you got to do you can do after we get clear of the house. You go in the bathroom now and start splashing around, and you'll have everybody up. What kind of soldier are you?"

"I'm no soldier," Dick said, resentfully. He felt then like asserting what he was usually at great pains to minimize. The seven-year spread of their ages seemed vast in the half-lit room. Walt loomed big and was full of a harsh impatience. Being treated at this sinister hour with the equality he always campaigned for made him wish to crawl into his nine years as into a soft blanket.

How differently his mother or father would have treated him! They would have coaxed him out of sleep with patience and tenderness. They would have taken him by the hand and led him to the bathroom so that he wouldn't stub his toe, or, as was once shamefully the case, use the clothes hamper for a toilet.

"Well, are you going to stand there all day?" Walt asked. "Get dressed."

Dick took off his pyjamas and reached for his clothes. Walt crossed the room and drew aside the curtain. A queer shade of gray entered the room. Dick had never seen its like before. "This is dawn," he thought, repeating the word Walt had used last night, and he was taken with a shiver of guilt and terror. He knew they were doing something their parents would be furious about. He wasn't scared for himself, because his age was his shield, but the inevitable showdown between Walt and Dad showed on the horizon like a lightning-lit thunderhead.

Instinct told him that this whole business was related somehow to last night's argument. He thought the word "argument" to himself as he might have "walk" or "supper." It aroused no particular reprobation in his mind. Arguments were part of his parents' mode of life. They started out of the ripeness of time and circumstance, were conducted in his presence with formal coldness, and then, when it was assumed that he was asleep, they would rise like surf on a windy day, sending muffled breakers against his closed door and occasionally casting up a word white with violence.

Being at this summer place decreased the number of arguments but increased the intensity of each. His father came out only for weekends. Saturday night there was usually a big party, and on Sunday an argument that started in the early afternoon and continued until late at night. Last night, Saturday, there was no party. During the week, Dick had heard his mother tell his father over the telephone that his precious customers could do their swilling elsewhere one week. All arguments revolved around Dad and his customers in one way or another. His mother hated them . . . "every gross, stupid, paralyzing one of them!"

"You like good clothes, don't you?" was his father's retort. "And a choice spot on the Cape for the summer?"

"I'd live in a hovel not to endure those pigs!"

"Keep it up. You may get your wish."

"At least I'll be able to choose my own company."

"Your own company! Who? Fakes? Queers? Leeches? Why don't you get smart? They'd drop you in a minute if it wasn't for my money."

Of the many inexplicable things about his family, Dick counted the behavior of Walt at these moments as the darkest and most troubling. Having absolute freedom of movement, Walt would nevertheless choose the environs of the house whenever an argument started. Dick would find him pacing the porch, roaming up and down the staircases, moving about, generally, like a caged tiger. Friends would drive up and honk their horns, and Walt would go out and exchange a few words with them. After a moment, they would drive off and Walt would return to the house to resume his pacing. There was nothing to be read from those brown eyes which at other times gave

such clear signals of mood. Like the tiger's, they showed neither hatred nor fear, but only a cold, passionless withdrawal.

Last night Walt had paced and paced while the voices rose and fell in tireless monotony. And finally he came into the room they shared and switched on the hurricane lamp. Dick was not asleep, but he pretended to be. By sound he followed Walt's movements about the room. He visualized him throwing his jeans over a chair, stripping off his T-shirt, going to the closet and fussing with his fishing tackle. When he heard the creak of Walt's ship-style bed, Dick opened his eyes.

Walt was stretched out, his hands folded beneath his head. Against the dark panelling of the wall, his profile showed as sharp and immobile as stone. There was no flicker of life on his features, but Dick knew that his brother was *listening*. He listened with his whole body, with all his nerves, as though to lose a decibel of the vicious rhythm would destroy him. And when the voices were no longer to be heard, Walt still listened, as one listens for the pebble dropped into a bottomless well.

Dick watched his brother, wondering what terrible secret lay at the heart of his silence. Outside a muted chorus of crickets and one shrill leader began to counterpoint each other. Dick's attention strayed to the see-saw of sound, letting it rock his mind like a hammock until sleep was only a step away.

"You awake, Dick?"

The words flared like a sudden light. At first Dick thought that someone else had uttered them. Once in bed, Walt hardly ever spoke. And when there had been an argument, it was as if all speech had been sealed in an iron vault.

"Dick?"

It *was* Walt, still lying so, with his hands under his head.

"Yeah?" Dick answered.

"I'm going fishing tomorrow," Walt said to the ceiling. "Real early. At dawn. You wanna come?"

"Me?"

"You're always crying you wanna go fishing with me, so here's your chance. Mr. Demerest down at the wharf says the fluke run early. Yes or no?"

"Did Mom say it's O.K.?"

"I didn't ask her."

Then Dick knew that Walt was putting him to a test, and that if he failed, Walt would consign him to hopeless infancy for all time.

"I'll come," Dick said.

"O.K.," said Walt. "I'll wake you up." And he turned over on his side.

* * *

They left the house through the kitchen, pausing there to put cold cuts and bread and fruit into a paper bag. Walt held the screen door so it wouldn't bang. They walked to the tool shed where Walt kept his bait—angleworms bedded in seaweed. Dick carried one of the fishing rods with studied nonchalance, but all the while delighting in the weight and spring of it. After picking up the bait, they started down the dirt road that led to the inlet.

It was a warm morning, but long, nervous shivers coursed through Dick's body. Everything seemed altered in the pale blue light. The trunks of the trees were almost black, and every leaf stamped its green intensity in the air. Dick walked behind Walt in a kind of dew-soaked lethargy. Deliberately he would put his face in the way of an overhanging branch and let the chilly moistness trail across his eyes, his cheeks. Once, when a pheasant startled him with its loud thrashing, Dick turned his gaze away from Walt and accidentally ran the tip of the fishing rod into his brother's back. He halted, waiting to be accused of clumsiness, but Walt merely glanced over his shoulder and continued walking.

The inlet surprised Dick. Beach, water, wharf, everything seemed to lie under a spell. No ripple or noise disturbed the vast serenity. On each piling of the wharf sat a motionless gull, its beak buried in its feathers. It was as if they had intruded upon a scene not meant for their eyes, a gigantic slumber they would be rash to disturb.

Their rowboat, a gift from mother to Walt and fancifully named Nausicaa by her, was tethered to the beach with a lead weight. Walt walked straight to the boat and put in all his gear. He motioned to Dick to do the same. Then he removed his moccasins and rolled up his jeans.

"Get in," he ordered Dick.

Dick got in, and Walt shoved off, hopping in himself when the boat was afloat. As soon as he was in, Walt picked up the oars and began to row. He rowed with an easy, strong stroke, dipping the blades just right and making the boat leap ahead with each pull.

"I'm going to row to deep water," he said. "It'll take about fifteen minutes. You hungry?"

Dick shrugged. He hadn't thought about food, but now that Walt mentioned it Dick felt his stomach twitch. He reached for the brown paper bag and began to investigate.

"Make me a ham sandwich," Walt said.

"There's no butter," said Dick, after rummaging around.

"Tough," said Walt. "Didn't you ever eat a sandwich without butter?"

They each had a sandwich and an apple, and then Walt continued rowing out past the wharf, into deep water. The sun was up now, turning the water to jade. A blunt-nosed trawler came toward them, and two fishermen in canary-colored oilskins waved to them as they passed. Dick waved back.

"I guess this is all right," Walt finally announced, and began to tie the extra length of rope to the lead weight. He tossed the weight overboard and played out the rope. "Can you bait your own hook?" he asked Dick.

"Uh-huh," said Dick, but when it came to cutting the wriggling worms and impaling them on the hook, he made a queasy mess of it. Walt took it over and baited both their hooks.

"Cast out," Walt instructed. His own cast described a clean arc, but Dick's snapped short and plopped in the water.

"That's O.K.," said Walt. "It doesn't make a difference."

The waves of the trawler reached them then, and their boat rose and dipped, rose and dipped. Dick looked at Walt, wondering whether he could risk a smile. Before he could decide, however, it was Walt who smiled, a rather awkward, reticent smile that seemed to take the whole strange morning into account.

"Dad's going to raise hell when we get back," he said.

"Maybe he'll see the boat gone at the beach, and he'll know we went fishing," Dick offered, hopefully.

"Sure," Walt said, ironically. "That'll square everything." His gaze went out toward their lines, and then quickly back to Dick, where

it rested in a half-humorous way for a moment before he spoke. "Do you think a bell is going to ring when you've hooked one?" he asked.

Dick shot a wild glance at his float and saw it bob under once—twice. Panicked, he gave a tremendous heave on his rod and began to reel in. "That's the way," Walt said, calmly. "Rip it out of his mouth." He took the rod away from Dick, reeled it in, rebaited the hook, and cast out again. "Now, look," he explained, "when you've got a nibble, you give it five seconds, and then you pull like this . . . see? Just enough. Think you can do that?"

Dick nodded, and Walt handed the rod back to him. He then reached into his jeans and pulled out a crushed pack of cigarettes. He lit a match and cupped it expertly in his hands. Dick looked steadfastly at his float as his brother applied the flame to his cigarette. Walt's smoking was not just simple disobedience; it was a breach of honor. "I know you can smoke as much as you please behind my back," their mother had said. "I have no way of stopping you. But I'd rather you didn't. I'd rather you would wait until you're eighteen before you start. Can I have your promise on that?" Walt had given his promise, and if he broke it on occasion it was only because that occasion wanted some equalizing act of dishonor. Dick noticed that Walt smoked on mornings after a bad fight.

"You hear anything last night?" Walt suddenly asked.

"You mean the crickets?" asked Dick.

Walt shook his head. "No, I don't mean the crickets."

"Hear anything where?" Dick asked. "In the house?"

"Jesus, you can be such a stupid little bastard," Walt said, wearily. "Of course in the house. Where do you think I mean—in Africa?"

"You mean Mom and Dad?" Dick said, uncertainly. They had never spoken of it before. It was there, unalterably, from the beginning of time, like the gold-fretted, antique clock his mother took with her wherever they made their residence. And it was, however wrong, stamped with a higher rightness by reason of its familiarity.

"I mean Mom and Dad," said Walt.

"They were having an argument," Dick stated.

Walt lifted his pole, waited, then reeled in some line. "That's right," he said. "An argument. I'm surprised you know it has a name. You usually look six million miles away whenever they square off.

Talk about bliss!" The mingled contempt and anger on his face dropped swiftly, as though a sudden voice had counseled him. He spoke again, quietly. "They've been arguing a long time. Long as I can remember. If it's not about people, then it's about things; if it's not about things, then it's about places. They have a real talent for it. By the law of averages, you'd think that they'd agree about something. But they never do!"

Dick wondered whether he was expected to say something. He would have liked to offer a helpful suggestion, not for his sake, or for his parents', but for Walt who looked isolated in his hurt. He could do nothing, however, but stare at the oarlock and feel a resentment against his mother and father.

"It's no one's fault," Walt went on. He sat hunched forward, his gaze on the water. A slight breeze had come up, and a pleasant, liquid sound caressed the boat. "I think you ought to understand that it's no one's fault. Dad has his good points; Mom has hers. They just don't get along, that's all."

Dick tried to be everything at once: glum, sagacious, sympathetic, angry. If he could make his face a composite of all things, Walt might find a portion of the one needful to the moment. He promised himself a program of coercion. Hunger strikes, irregularities, disappearances, all sorts of strange eruptions whenever an argument took place. The power of frailty swelled in him, and he knew for a certainty he could bring his parents to their knees with this most versatile of weapons.

"Suppose," Walt asked, making the question sound innocuous, "suppose you had to live with either Mom or Dad, which one would you pick?"

Dick shrugged. "I don't know," he said.

"Well, which one do you like better?"

"I like them both."

Walt bit the corner of his lip. He played his line for time. "Sure," he said. "I know you like them both, but don't you like one just a little bit more than the other?"

"Which one do you like better?" Dick asked.

"It doesn't make a difference which one I like better," Walt said. "I can take care of myself."

"I can take care of myself, too," Dick retorted.

Walt turned his gaze away from the water and looked at Dick. "All right," he said. "I like Dad better."

Dick had never known his brother deliberately to lie—even when the moral stain of the lie would be infinitesimal compared to the explosive consequences of telling the truth. But he was lying now. Dick knew it, and that knowledge made him all caution. A shadow of significance touched the edge of his mind.

"I like Dad, too," he said.

"Better than Mom?"

Dick was silent.

Walt flipped his cigarette into the water. They both watched it ride on the ripples.

"Look," said Walt, "Mom and Dad are going to get a divorce. That's what they were talking about last night. Do you know what a divorce is?"

Dick nodded his head.

"Good," said Walt. "At least I don't have to explain that. They're going to be real clever about it. They're going to feed you the idea with an eyedropper—a little each day. That's Mom's jerky psychology. Instead of giving you the whole business all at once, she's going to 'accustom' you to it. Well, O.K., now you're accustomed. You don't have to wonder what the hell they're talking about when they start working on you."

Dick kept his eyes riveted on the oarlock. Once, to cure him of fear of the dark, Walt had dragged him to the threshold of a darkened room. He had kicked and screamed and, at the last, bit Walt's hand so hard that it bled.

"What's a divorce?" he asked.

Walt's face clouded with anger. "For Pete's sake! You just told me you knew what a divorce is."

"What's a divorce?" Dick repeated, sullenly.

"A divorce is when two people separate. Mom and Dad are going to separate. They're going to live in different houses."

"Where are you going to live?" Dick asked.

"With Dad."

"Where?"

"How do I know? Somewhere. In a house."

"Where am I going to live?"

"With Mom."

"Will I ever see you?"

"Sure. We can see each other as much as we like. The whole business is just for Mom and Dad's sake. They're not happy together. Now, listen, you gotta promise me that you won't tell them that I told you. I only told you because I didn't want you to get the same slow poison I got. If you tell them, so help me God, I'll never speak to you again!"

"I won't tell," said Dick.

* * *

They stayed out on the water until the sun was almost directly overhead. Walt caught three flat fish that churned the water when they came to the surface, flashed agonizingly in the sun, and then lay panting their life out on the floor of the boat. When they were dead, Walt strung them together and hung them over the side in the water.

"That'll keep them fresh," he explained.

They ate the rest of the food, and Walt smoked two more cigarettes. Finally Walt looked at his watch and said, "I guess we better get back." He hauled in the anchor and set the oars in the locks. As soon as he began to row, Dick reached out with both hands and seized his wrist.

"What's that for?" Walt asked.

Dick said nothing. He pulled at his brother's wrist with dumb, maniacal strength.

"Cut it out!" Walt snapped.

But Dick held on, his eyes sightless and unheeding. The rim of his compressed lips was white with the strain. Walt released the oar and tried to free his arm—but without violence, without anger.

"What's the matter, Dick?" he asked, quietly.

Dick didn't answer. He only held on as though all time could be stayed if only he could stay it now. Then Walt twisted his wrist, and Dick realized that his strength was not enough. He let go. Walt reached out and put his hand compassionately on Dick's knee.

"We have to go back," he said.

People were on the beach when they got there, but not their parents. Walt carried the fishing rods and the three fish he had caught. They walked in silence up the little dirt road and came in view of the

house. Their mother was standing on the porch wearing a red bandana and a red polka-dot dress. Their father was on the lawn, in shorts, his arm raised in a gesture that was half-salutation, half-menace.

Dick walked behind Walt, in an agony to know where to rest his gaze, until finally it fell on the three dead fish that dangled from the end of Walt's line. He watched them slowly revolve in the sunlight, one after the other, as if they were playing a stately, lunatic game.

Skid

By W. R. Moses

Virginia mountains, though small for mountains, rise
Beyond the range of houses. In early winter,
With a first little snow to pick out the brown trees
And scent the clear air spilling so far down
To the valley, one is gratified by these.
From the artificiality of the car,
One says, How fine natural things are.
One says, Yes, the peace of natural mountains.

In the ridge's shadow, where yesterday's thaw spilled
Snow water, there is ice on the road this morning.
A car must follow its artificial track;
It hits the ice. Then the force of brute momentum
Delivers its irresistible attack
Upon the driver's convenient artifice.
One gasps, Lord, not so natural as this!
One gasps, I am not made for a meteorite!

Skidding feels like a kind of political lesson:
One emerges impressed anew with the need of checks
And balances. This does not mean to stay
Home when the winter air lies on the uplands
More than when they allow the colors of May.
One thinks, The artificial will only permit
Brief look at natural mountains as they sit
Under such conditions that I can relish it.
One thinks, The unchecked naturalness of death!

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Labor Unity Is No Panacea

By SIDNEY LENS

FOR THE FIRST TIME since the industrial-minded CIO burst the bonds of a craft-minded AFL back in 1935 the reunification of labor is clearly imminent.

Liberals, second-line labor officials and decent people generally will greet this news with cheers. The schism has been painful to those who yearn for a solid labor movement, capable of leaving its imprint in the halls of politics and strong enough economically to erase the pockets of poverty and insecurity which still haunt us. For such "friends of labor," unity has the impact of panacea.

But to cynics, to the rank and file, to realists, the essence of labor unity is less abstract, more functional. A shop steward in a novelty factory expressed it most graphically. His particular plant has two unions in it, both affiliated with the AFL. One represented about 50 skilled machinists, the other about 300 unskilled men. A year ago both unions were given some rough treatment by the employer, who refused to yield a wage increase. The skilled men hit the picket line. Their union was democratic and militant. But the unskilled were in a bureaucratic outfit and their leaders were mere dues collectors, who were in the shop in the first place only because they had a "deal" with the employer. The unskilled men respected the picket line for one short day, but when the employer got in touch with their union leaders they were instructed to go through, to work, for three long months thereafter.

Nonetheless the strike ended in partial victory at long last—mainly because there was a shortage of machinists at the time; but the whole affair left a big gaping question mark in the mind of the machinist shop steward about "labor unity."

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"What the hell," he said. "We *have* 'labor unity' with these other guys in our plant. But they walked through our picket lines for three long months like a bunch of scabs. So what good is unity?"

This isn't cynical, and it isn't typical. The average rank-and-file worker is undoubtedly pleased with prospects of AFL-CIO merger. "Unity" is a word he loves. The first circular he received from his union years ago carried the pervasive slogan, "In Unity There Is Strength." His attitude therefore is pragmatic and earthy: "Why fight amongst ourselves; let's unite against the boss."

But what does this word "unity" mean? The rank-and-file unionist has a nebulous vision of everyone working together, of love and harmony unparalleled. Unfortunately the word has a hundred different meanings and implications. Suppose you just bring AFL and CIO together under one physical roof; suppose that in every area where there is an AFL regional director and a CIO regional director they too merge offices and one becomes the top man and the other the assistant. Suppose you weave together the staffs of the AFL and CIO newspapers, the AFL and CIO research groups, the AFL and CIO international affairs committees. Will that be unity? Will that be unity in the sense that our machinist shop steward meant it to be? Obviously not. Obviously it will be only the first stage of the process—a necessary first stage, but not an end or a panacea in itself.

Not only that, but there are some features of this kind of "first stage" unity that will be oppressive to the rank-and-file—unless accompanied by additional steps towards *functional* unity. Organizational unity without functional unity can be worse than none at all. The competition between AFL and CIO is *sometimes harmful*, but not *always*. Frequently it is a boon to the rank-and-file. Almost every union official can tell you of dozens of instances where AFL-CIO competition helped some group of rank-and-filers. It spurred the less militant of two groups to emulate the more militant and get higher wage increases than it otherwise might have gotten. It helped beleagured men in one outfit find a decent home in the other. Workers sick of bureaucracy or ineptness were able, because of the competition, to either press their leaders for more forthright action or in some cases to shift to the other federation and clean the slate entirely.

Competition is undoubtedly harmful when two unions—such as the carpenters and machinists—fight as to who shall do a particular

job. It is harmful when an employer can play off one against another, as in the General Motors strike of 1946 when GM settled with the Stalinized United Electrical Workers for 18.5 cents an hour, while the UAW-CIO was holding out for more. But competition is not *always* harmful; it sometimes helps.

A few years ago a group of 1,200 workers in one federation (I'm omitting the names and details not to embarrass the participants) switched to the other federation. This switch was not only justified but quite beneficial. For more than two decades the members had been trying to get a financial accounting from their leaders—without success. Appeals to the president of their international, to the president of the national federation to which their international was affiliated, to the American Civil Liberties Union, to the President of the United States, had availed naught. Their membership meetings were run by a handful of six or eight men in a room no more than fifteen feet square. All opposition was dealt with harshly; the union leaders had an "arrangement" with the company and were able to get malcontents fired. Contracts were poor, wages relatively low. The international union president refused to aid the harassed rank-and-file because the local union leadership was part of his power structure, his support. And the national federation of labor, because of the tradition of autonomy for international unions, was incapable of intervening even if it wanted to. The end result was a disillusioned union membership and barren working conditions. Had these men been forced to remain in that particular set-up, as they might if there were a superficial labor unity, they would have been stymied. They would have spent many more fruitless years trying to break out of the strait jacket. But an enterprising young organizer molded them into an effective force, switched them to the other federation and helped them forge a democratic organization with greatly enhanced wages and conditions.

Will "unity" doom dissatisfied rank-and-file workers to captivity in unions of this sort? American unions are an instrument for progress, an indispensable weapon for the working man in his struggle against insecurity. But there are bad apples in every box, and bad unions in each federation. No self-respecting unionist can gloss over this problem. It is not as great as pictured by anti-labor columnists, nor as vile as indicated by certain one-sided reformers. But it is there and it is

one feature of the labor movement that mere amalgamation or jurisdiction pacts can not obliterate.

Here is a not-too-unusual labor story.

A union organizer distributes a circular in front of a factory gate. Attached is an application card with a "return postage guaranteed" imprint on one side. The next day he receives six or eight returns and that night he visits some of the applicants. The situation looks excellent. Once he forms these six or eight people into a committee, he can move ahead to the next stage—coming out into the open and overcoming the fear of the employees. The handful of people who have signed cards are enthusiastic. For the first time in their lives probably a union organizer has visited their home. They await the next circular and the first meeting.

But the organizing drive suddenly ends. The union organizer has received a telephone call from the company attorney or from another union official telling him that management already had a contract with another labor union. None of the workers knew of this contract, it is conceded. None of them ever paid dues or had dues checked off their weekly paycheck. None of them had ever met union officials from this other union. But sure enough the "back-door" contract does exist; the employer has been paying the dues himself; and in return the back-door union didn't bother him with demands for wage increases, with grievances or the like. The legitimate union official is checkmated. He can call the men out on strike, but he doesn't have enough support yet for that sort of an effort. He can file a charge with the National Labor Relations Board, but the Board will take at least eighteen months to process the case—and then probably two years kicking it around the federal courts. And in the end he will probably lose the right to hold an election anyway because an existing contract, back-door or otherwise, is considered by NLRB as a "bar."

Sometimes workers suffering from back-door contracts can appeal to other unions to help them break this stranglehold. They sign petitions and shift from AFL to CIO or from CIO to AFL, as the case may be. In New York just recently a factory of 400 workers was under contract to a CIO union. The members rebelled and sought help from an independent union. The independent union—then negotiating to re-enter CIO—was unable to help them and referred them to an AFL

group with whom they were friendly. While all this was going on, the CIO group was being investigated for welfare fund irregularities and its officials were removed from office by the international president. What happened subsequently was a comedy of errors and a blight on the good name of labor. But one thing is significant: the uneasiness of the rank-and-file workers—in this instance almost all Puerto Ricans—found an outlet, due to the competition between federations. And probably in part it was responsible for cleaning up the old union—or at least beginning the cleanup.

Or consider the case of a department store union in one federation of labor which had been bargaining with management for eight months but was incapable of budging the company. This particular local union was run by decent, even militant, leaders. But they lacked financial resources, their international union was splitting apart and their economic power was weak. The department store employees switched to a rival union in the other federation, with greater bargaining power and fewer handicaps. In a few weeks they were able to push management to a good settlement. Would unity prevent switches of this type? If so, how would it get around the problem involved?

Obviously there is more—and there is less—to labor unity than meets the naked eye. Unity can lay the groundwork for solving problems, for improving the plight of the man in the shop, but it can also centralize the movement and deprive the rank-and-file of certain safety valves which it now enjoys. It is a calculated risk, not a cure-all.

* * *

Why then is that "calculated risk" so imminent now, at this historical juncture? Why not eight or ten years ago? The dispute over craft-industrial unions long ago ceased to be an obstacle. So did whatever ideological differences persisted. Yet reunification was not achieved up to now. There seems to be three good reasons for the new optimism:

First, the pressure of economic recession.

Secondly, the substitution of George Meany for William Green, and Walter Reuther for Phil Murray. In both cases the change was towards more dynamic leadership.

And third, most important of all, the fact that the 1955 unity plan is not ambitious. As currently projected it is the "lowest" form of unity

possible. Under it the two groups will find a common name, a single group of officers, one constitution, one headquarters. Some of the technical staffs will be merged—the education and research groups, the international affairs departments, the weekly newspapers, the publicity staffs. The men in these jobs are hired hands without any mass base or real power except in their ability to influence what C. Wright Mills has called the "new men of power." Functional, real unity will still be a long way off. To be an effective economic and political power the labor movement, following this organizational amalgamation, will have to find means:

1. To merge the rival international unions.

2. To develop centralized and effective striking power in the economic field.

3. To develop centralized and effective striking power in the political field.

Step one—after unity—is in itself colossal. Steps two and three, as they say in Hollywood, are stupendous. They would involve so much change in the structure, outlook, and ideology of the labor movement as to make it almost unrecognizable from present points of observation.

The reason for this—and the reason why unity has not been achieved in the past ten years—lies in the power structure of the labor movement. It is a power structure that differs radically from the early years of American labor, and will undoubtedly be altered again one fine day in the not too distant future.

The rank-and-file union member seldom knows his union as the "United Cement, Lime and Gypsum Workers International Union." To him it is simply "AFL." And he refers to the United Automobile, Aircraft, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America" usually only by the initials "CIO." The varieties of international unions, local unions and other structural bodies are not entirely clear to him. Ask any group of a hundred union members the name of their local union and ninety will be unable to give it to you. Perhaps they will know the number but not the title. What will stand out is merely the label of the national federation to which their local and their international is affiliated—the AFL or the CIO.

To the man on the street therefore the power in the labor movement rests in the national structure of the American Federation of Labor or of the Congress of Industrial Organizations. The big men of

labor for him are George Meany, president of the AFL; Walter Reuther, president of the CIO; and perhaps the two secretaries William F. Schnitzler and James B. Carey. These are the men who presumably make the decisions.

But this lopsided view distorts the whole panorama of American labor. For the real seats of power are neither with the national federations of labor, with the city or the state federations of labor, or with the local unions. The real seats of power are the international unions. There are some 34 CIO international unions, some 110 AFL international unions. Each of these is *autonomous*. The AFL can not remove one of these leaders—say Bill Hutcheson of the Carpenters. It can not tell the carpenters how to run their union, what dues to charge, what per capita tax to pay, when to strike, when to call a strike off, what political candidates to support. It can not tell its 109 affiliates anything. As a matter of fact when the AFL recently expelled the International Longshoremen's Association it was a tradition-shattering precedent. International unions have since time immemorial done as they pleased and AFL or CIO proposals to them have been mere recommendations. They have no mandatory force. Dave Beck is many times more potent a union official than George Meany. Meany's proposals to Beck have only the force of suggestions. If Beck does not wish to follow, as in the case of the no-raid pact with CIO, he does not have to. He can not be disciplined by the AFL central body.

On the other hand the international unions have wide and sometimes complete power over their local unions. In most organizations the international president must sanction a strike before it takes place. In others, as in the CIO auto workers, the international officials must *authorize* the strike before international strike benefits are paid. The international frequently supplies the organizers and legal service to a local. In most instances an international president can lift the charter of a local union or remove its officers. In the AFL teamsters Dave Beck has removed the officers and placed trustees over scores of local unions at one time or another.

In early days in America the city central bodies and the local unions were centers of labor power—bodies like the Chicago Federation of Labor. But, there is no doubt of it, today it is the international union which predominates. Walter Reuther is a power in labor not because he is president of the CIO, but because he is president of the

international union of auto workers. The roster of power includes a whole host of international union presidents or secretary-treasurers—Dave Dubinsky, Bill Hutcheson, Al Hayes, Pat Gorman, Jack Potofsky, Emil Rieve, Dave MacDonald, James Carey. Not the AFL, but the AFL teamsters, garment workers, carpenters, machinists, butcher workmen are the power forces. Not the CIO, but the clothing workers, textile workers, steel workers, electrical workers, auto workers, are the pivots of strength.

The American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations are essentially lobbying forces, dealing with federal and sometimes state governments. They have certain organizational functions, their regional directors do a little organizing, they sometimes loan or give money to a weak international union. But primarily the AFL and the CIO are political forces. They have a certain patronage with government—jobs in the department of labor, overseas mutual security administration, a few judges here and there. They are consulted by the State Department, by local bodies, on a whole series of matters, and they frequently are permitted to nominate a few candidates for political office. They testify before Congress and they publish a raft of material against antilabor legislation. Their subordinate bodies —the city and state federations of labor—do a similar job on a local and state level. Undoubtedly they get more publicity in the press, and their convention resolutions and pronouncements on world and local affairs make headlines. But these are only auxiliary powers, second-class citizenships in the field of labor.

The real power is with the international union. Here is the *economic* strength of labor. The AFL carpenters' union is capable of suspending all carpentry in the nation; the CIO steelworkers can close the whole vast steel industry. Mr. Hutcheson and Mr. MacDonald have great power as a result of this; and this economic power vis-a-vis management translates itself into personal power within the labor union. To disturb these power-structures is like putting a fuse to dynamite. These are all power-structures—for good or ill—that have taken decades, sometimes scores of years to build. They are not too flexible to the touch, not too easily disturbed.

And yet—if there is to be functional unity they will have to be disturbed. There—as the bard said—is the rub.

Take a union like the AFL teamsters. Originated in the days of the horse and buggy, it once sported a horse-and-buggy structure. In each city, as the union grew, there arose a central teamster council composed of individual local unions—coal-wagon drivers, fish-wagon drivers, ice haulers and what have you. Each teamster city council was a type of barony, often controlled by one man, pretty much isolationist and not too closely in contact with other baronies. Dan Tobin eventually welded these forces into a centralized union which he thoroughly controlled, but which still permitted the isolationist power existence of the local unions and the local councils.

But with the march of technology and the integration of business, the teamsters—now under Dave Beck—are forced to organize vertically, as well as horizontally. In the last two decades they have used the power that comes from controlling surface transportation to branch into the warehouse field, manufacturing, agriculture and many other industries. Teamster organizers merely had to threaten to shut off deliveries to recruit innumerable other groups into the fold. Thus instead of being a simple craft union of truckdrivers, the AFL teamsters today has hundreds of thousands of retail employees, warehousemen, factory hands, service workers. And like the unions of auto workers, electrical workers, steel workers, it is confronted with a new *strategical* approach. It can no longer confine itself to horizontal organization, to the tightly knit baronies of the past. It needs vertical organization as well.

Consider the teamster problem when it organizes a mighty empire like Montgomery Ward as it is currently doing. Unless the whole chain is brought into the union the organizing drive can not be effective. If the union wins recognition rights just for the St. Paul warehouse, the company can do the St. Paul shipping out of Chicago or Detroit or Kansas City, and reduce the union in St. Paul to impotence. The union finds that it must match the bargaining power of the employers structurally. It must have reasonably similar conditions in all the large cities, so that a factory or a warehouse won't find it advantageous to move from a high-wage area to a low-wage area, or to shift operations from a high-wage to a low-wage plant. To organize Montgomery Ward, therefore, the Teamster union needs solid ranks in *every* major Ward warehouse. It needs to add a more flexible, more vertical structure, to that of the old tightly-knit councils.

Recently the teamsters in Chicago had a strike of 1,500 employees at the Kraft Food Company. In the course of the walkout the local officials noted that management was switching production of its products from the two struck plants to two nonunion plants in the South. It dismantled machinery in Chicago and shipped it elsewhere. This presented a problem for the union that only a vertical structure could cope with. No doubt this will be given some attention at some future date.

A few years ago a small lamp concern, with three different factories, was being organized by three different unions in the AFL—building service, teamsters, and brick and clay workers. When the building service union gained a foothold in the Chicago plant the company shifted some of its operations to a Paducah plant, and when brick and clay began to breathe down management's neck in Paducah, part of the operations were shifted to a plant in the center of Kentucky. The three unions never formed a council to take concerted action simultaneously. Management fired scores of union workers. The unions filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board, and eventually won the cases. But it took four or five years for the cases to run the gamut of the courts and by that time all organization efforts were dead.

Wherever you turn in the field of labor this problem bobs up in a hundred different forms—labor is disunited not only in the sense that there are two federations of labor and quite a few independent unions, but in the *functional* sense that labor does not match the economic power of management. In a group of retail stores in Chicago there are some twenty or twenty-two unions; the company is one centralized operation force, but the unions have no machinery for working together. During the famous newspaper strike in Chicago a few years ago, the typographical union was left high and dry all by itself. Twenty-one other craft unions—in the same AFL—went through their picket lines. It cost the typographical union millions of dollars and many, many months of pounding the bricks before they could eke out a partial victory. Had there been *functional* unity victory could have been achieved in a matter of weeks.

To meet this kind of problem the CIO auto workers have set up various departments and councils. There is a job shop department, a Ford department, a Chrysler department, a GM department, a farm implements department, and subdivisions within each for the large

manufacturing companies—Harvester, J. I. Case, etc. The teamsters too now have divisions—"over-the-road" truckdrivers, bakery, laundry, miscellaneous, cannery, chauffeurs (taxis and funeral cars), automotive, dairy, warehouse and produce, building and construction, brewery and soft drinks. Each tries to formulate common policy in a particular industry for the whole country. Each tries to keep wage rates and other conditions in line with what they are elsewhere so that there are few "runaway" warehouses and few "runaway" operations.

A big union like the teamsters can do this, with some effectiveness. Big unions like auto, steel, electric, coal, can also do it with a degree of success. That accounts for the far higher wage levels that prevail in these groups than among other workers. But there are two features that must be considered about this trend towards vertical union organization:

First, it disturbs the old power structure within the union movement and disturbs it drastically.

Secondly, it is only in its infancy—in the beginning of its first stage.

* * *

The minute you ask two local unions in different sections of the country to work together you are dislocating the small centers of power. Assume that a company has fifteen branches in fifteen different cities. Assume that each is organized by a different local in the same international union—say the teamsters. So long as there was no vertical —functional—organization the allegiance of each local was primarily to its local teamster council. The head of each local was a top man in his own local subject only to the alliances in his city teamster council. But if now he must make decisions in concert with fourteen other local presidents on another—a functional—basis, then this power alliance shifts. There is a shaking up of the old tree, a whole series of new branches encasing the old—a lot of dead wood being hacked away. That is precisely what has been happening in the teamsters union under Dave Beck. The undynamic people are being pushed into the background. In cities like Toledo and St. Louis Beck has taken power out of the hands of the old isolationist baronies, removed some old officials, and put the power into the hands of young new mavericks who only recently joined the Teamsters. Wherever possible there has been a shuffling of personnel and a shift towards those more vigorous.

Parenthetically we might note that the shift in structure and power is not necessarily always a shift towards more democracy. But it does open the door, it does permit realignments and it is certainly a danger to the entrenched powers.

This trend, it seems to me, is inexorable. To make unions more effective it is necessary to group them together in such a way that their economic power is greater. Recently Walter Reuther has pushed through the merger of a number of small CIO international unions. For instance, the toy and novelty workers have merged with the retail and wholesale union, both tiny groups, neither making much progress for the time being. The merger, however, lays the groundwork for a more optimistic future. More resources, more organizers will make possible some organization work not now possible. For the workingman that is certainly on the plus-side, but for the union officialdom it means a shaking up of power structures; the leader of the smaller union is no longer a big fish in a little pond, but a lesser fish in a bigger pond.

The big question therefore about current AFL-CIO unity talks is not whether unity will be achieved between the two big *lobbying* bodies, but whether *after* unity there will (a) be a new *functional* regroupment of *international* unions; (b) be a functional regroupment *between* international unions. This latter phase is not yet on the blueprint boards of the architects of labor, though it is an inevitable process that must spring from the shape of the American economy.

The United Auto Workers, for instance, are fairly effective in gaining concessions from General Motors. But they would be far more effective if the economic power behind the union could match the economic power behind the company. To do that they would have to form a council composed of representatives of other unions at General Motors—unions like the independent United Electrical Workers, the CIO electrical workers, the teamsters, and many others. CIO's UAW is undoubtedly the most important union that GM must deal with. By itself it can affect the whole auto production of the company. But GM, it should be remembered, has many other fields of production *not* organized in UAW. Furthermore, the power behind General Motors is the DuPont family. To match the economic strength of DuPont, a labor council—vertical and functional—would have to include

unionists from the DuPont chemical interests, United States Rubber and other DuPont-controlled economic operations.

This sounds like a vast operation, but trim it down to the proportions of a smaller economic interest and it appears not only feasible but most essential. The owner of a small factory in Chicago, owns a pottery in Ohio, a factory in New York, and a dozen or so real estate buildings. The union that shuts down his pottery in Ohio can be confronted with a long and painful strike because it hits only a small segment of his economic strength; the employer temporarily buys pottery elsewhere, at higher prices, and takes a loss for this one operation. He is compensated by the profits of the other operations. To match such economic strength, the unions of factory, building service, and pottery would all have to work out a common operation, in a common operational structure.

Such a functional regroupment is not only vital for the already organized industries, but is a *sine qua non* for the unorganized. Few people realize the disparity in wages amongst American workers. A bricklayer may earn $3.50 an hour, where a hospital worker in the same area gets as little as 60 cents an hour, a retail worker 65 or 75 cents. Until the unorganized industries are brought into the fold such disparities will continue to prevail and will act as a pressure against wage increases for the highly organized groups. For the past fifteen years the three biggest blights on the organizational record of labor have been in the retail, office and professional fields, and the South. Of these the South is probably the easiest to organize, but as everyone knows labor's effort there has met with only small success. Organization of the retail and office fields has been even less spectacular. Only a quarter of the American working class carries a union card. But if the rest is ever to be enrolled it needs *functional* unity of the highest sort.

Put yourself in the place of a retail union organizer trying to organize Woolworth's. Suppose you succeeded in signing up all the employees in one particular store. Could you force Woolworth's to bargain with you? The chances would be slim. So large a company can close one store out of its many hundreds yet hardly feel it. What's more, even if you organized all the stores of the company you might run into difficulties unless you had *functional* unity with the teamsters, railroad workers, warehousemen. The relatively unskilled

salespeople and stockboys of an operation of this sort can easily be replaced. The economic power of the retail union would be fairly weak unless it were supplemented by that of the transportation and warehouse workers.

* * *

So far we have only discussed functional unity in the economic field. The same pitfalls await labor in the political field. Mere unity will not mean united action. Within the AFL today there are Republican union officials who usually go against the pro-Democratic trend of the majority. Within both federations there are a few third-party advocates who would like an opportunity to break away from the two-party system. Will organizational unity automatically mean that these groups will subordinate their differences and put a solid front to the world at large?

Perhaps, but it is not altogether assured and it will certainly not be automatic.

Furthermore there is another problem that obtrudes at this point. A politically effective union movement will have to involve its rank-and-file in door-bell ringing, in the day-to-day tasks of a political campaign. So far, for the most part, CIO's Political Action Committee and AFL's Labor League for Political Education are skeleton organizations. Here and there they have meat and marrow, but in most places they do not deeply involve the rank-and-file.

If the worker at the bench is to become a political asset he will have to be welded into still another union structure, a more flexible political structure. He will have to become an active member not only of an *industrial* unit in his factory, but a *geographical* unit in the combined PAC-LLPE. This too will affect the power structure. In those unions which have become static, with small rank-and-file participation, the stirring of union members in any way, shape or form threatens the old power-relationships. Political action that is functional and effective will inevitably result in internal changes in the union itself.

No matter how the problem is surveyed the agglomeration of the two federations of labor can only open the door, can only *lay the basis* for functional unity. This latter, it is obvious, is an operation in itself. It requires ideological clarification, disturbance of hundreds of power structures, big and little, and a certain cleansing within the House of

Labor. There need be no illusions that this process will be automatic. It will require innumerable future conflicts inside and outside the labor movement before it is achieved.

To the rank-and-file worker labor unity means labor effectiveness. Since he is not too conversant with the ins and outs of the labor structure, the mere unification of AFL and CIO means to him a solution of the problem: "We won't be fighting each other, we'll be fighting the boss." But the road towards unity and effectiveness runs through a far more complex maze than the combination of the two federation labels. Given the present climate in the House of Labor, that is perhaps all that can be done. That is the beginning. If the competition between labor unions is replaced by a functional unity of labor unions, that will mark an earth-shaking change not only for labor but for America as well. It will obliterate the pockets of poverty that still haunt us. It will raise labor to true stature in the halls of politics.

But if structural unity is achieved without functional unity, and if in the process the competition between unions is cut off, then the rank-and-file worker not only will have made no gains, he will have lost one of his true safety valves.

The Only Green Is in the Sky

By HOLLIS SUMMERS

The blackbirds sing illiterately,
Darkly blossoming in a tree
Where once a tentative mocking bird
Waited carefully until he heard
A tune sufficient for him to sing.
The blackbirds bloom.
Pretending spring
I remember the borrowed vow
Of summer.
But it is winter now.

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Organization, Bureaucracy, Loyalty

By KERMIT EBY

IN THE SIX YEARS that I was with CIO I was always careful to register my title as Director of Research and Education, rather than the reverse, Education and Research. The reason, to those who know the labor movement, is obvious: research has bread and butter value. Economic facts are useful in negotiation, testimony, and debate. Education does not have such tangible and demonstrable uses. I determined early in my experience to do as good a job as possible in bread and butter areas, so that I might plead for tolerance, if not support, on the educational part of the job.

For, even before I came to CIO, my heart lay in the work of education. From my earliest days in the Teachers' Union, I believed and still do, that the best program for the advancement of teachers' economic interests is a public understanding of their professional claims and the relation of those claims to the pupils in the classroom.

With the Teachers' Union, I pushed the professional development of teachers and their community responsibility. I put every energy into it, always conscious that as I did so, there would be opposition from countless teachers who did not want to be disturbed in their routines, and who pictured the Teachers' Union as a kind of streamlined AFL Building Service operation. My misgivings were dramatically affirmed on one occasion when a delegation from the union came into my office and reminded me that I was employed to represent their economic and job interests before the Board of Education, and before the public,

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and that I was not employed to reform the school system nor to concern myself with teaching methods.

* * *

He who would understand union administration, must understand the pragmatism which governs the behavior of its leaders, a bread and butter pragmatism which is deep, and springs from the rank and file. It is this pragmatism which is the despair of many a European and a few Americans who believe that the trade union movement cannot exist without a philosophy of reform. I confess that although I understand the nickel-an-hour approach, and have gone along with it, the plus factors excite me more, for instance, the belief that man expresses himself in his function, in the job which he performs.

There is one occasion which no union officer ever misses—namely, contract negotiations. He is always present when the economic interests of the members are under consideration, and the place most coveted by a staff man is at the side of the president when the bacon is being delivered. Walter Reuther may be known as a dreamer (to many), as a dangerous radical (to a few), but to the Autoworkers he is more than that; he is the man who put the Autoworkers out front in wages, pensions, and job security. Yes, Walter can make speeches about rice fields of Asia and the social responsibility of business, but his followers *tolerate* these excursions into fields of the irrelevant because—and only because—their chief has properly delivered to them in relevant areas.

Phil Murray, the tolerant father who permitted his staff to concern themselves with the whole world of reform, summarily pushed aside all sideshows when contract negotiations came around. Phil believed that, as steel goes, so goes the nation, in wages and security as well as production. And in his heart of hearts, while he went along with Hillman's PAC and many innovations of the modern trade union leader, he really believed that a union's strength was economic, that its total responsibility consisted in getting the best deal it could for its members.

The Lewis illustration was even more obvious. His members repudiated him politically, but they never repudiated his economic leadership, because Lewis in this area delivered.

Now that I look back on my twelve years in labor unions I recall the tensions which existed between department heads for a place on

the right hand of the chief. I am amused. Yet this is not an amusing experience—while you are living with it and in it. The labor world is a legalistic world. It is a world of contract-interpretation, a world of fine print. In other words, it is much like the world of the corporation lawyer.

It is, in fact, the lawyer who is present in the last steps of negotiation. He deals out the figures which the research men and economists make available. There is, consequently, little love lost between the two types of specialists. For example, in 1949, while the CIO convention was on in Cleveland, Murray presided, the research men were in conference, and Arthur Goldberg, attorney, continued the successful termination of negotiations with United States Steel. The economists sowed what the lawyers reaped: kudos.

There are more tangible rewards than kudos for trade union lawyers. Almost without exception they are on a salary scale of their own, and what they receive bears no relation to the salary of other department heads. The argument, of course, runs as follows: "Look at the sacrifices we are making by working for a union! Think what we could make, if we were representing a corporation."

And the argument is quite readily accepted as valid. Economists, publicity men, and legislative representatives are not believed to be able to sell their talents nearly so high. Of course, it follows that their rewards and sacrifices are considered in direct proportion, not as great.

One of the deepest impressions I took away from the CIO experience was the memory of Phil Murray walking down the hall at 718 Jackson Place to the back end of the building where the law department was located, so that he might confer with Pressman and Goldberg. When he wanted to confer with department heads, he called them into *his* office. For lawyers are hired to keep you legal, and sometimes, because they do, they know where the corpses are buried. The only time I recall Murray in a cynical mood about lawyers was on a day when he slyly remarked that he thought the Taft-Hartley Act should be christened, "Lawyers' Full Employment Act, written by lawyers, interpreted by lawyers, and contested by lawyers."

When I recall this part of my past to my classes, I tell my young men that if they want first place at the round table next to The Chief, they should study law. If they want political standing, further, they should certainly study law. The senior member of a law firm can

ultimately go to Congress, while the junior member can look after the firm's interests.

* * *

If the lawyer is the most powerful staff member among union administrators, the most powerful official is usually Director of Organization. The Director is doubly powerful if he combines an elective with an administrative position, as did Allan Haywood of the CIO.

This is so because it is the organization, after all, which is the life blood of the union. There is nothing for a union to do—functionally speaking—except one thing: expand its membership, and consequently its per capita. Since the organization of CIO, its organizational growth (with the possible exception of the pre-Korea period and today's recession) has constituted a kind of escalator. Membership has expanded along with our economy, and actual organization of the union in new areas has not been overly difficult, except in the South.

Since 1940, the great labor organizations have been growing by accretion more than through either the impetus of history or the impetus of their own activity. Consequently, the organizational staff has had more than a little time to consolidate its political position, and to strengthen its own structure. As consolidation took place, the organization jelled, and with the jelling each found his place in the political structure, and engaged in strengthening the union. Whenever possible, these men engaged also in the undermining of rival unions. This accounts for much that has been described as cannibalism in the labor union movement. From time to time, efforts have been made to end jurisdictional disputes by writing agreements. At present, there are uneasy rules of the game which are binding on those who respect them. At last report, the teamsters did not commit themselves to playing this game at all. And, of course, the left-wing unions which either left CIO or were booted out, are always easy game.

The organizational staff is, among other things, the haven for the brokendown political hacks of the trade union movement. The staff is usually large enough so that the incompetence of the few can be made up by the competence of the many. Perhaps in a world where loyalty and the struggles of the past merit award, it is only just that a man's flaws of today are forgiven for the heroic organizational triumphs of his previous years. But of course, in the smaller departments

where the contact between chief and staff are direct, it is not easy to cover up a failure.

Whenever there is pressure for funds from rival departments, the director of an organization has an unanswerable reply to all criticism of his administration: "How many dues paying members do you bring in?" To this query, neither the research director, the legislative representative, nor even the lawyer has a ready reply. Nor can one point out with consistent effectiveness that education will eventually strengthen membership.

Unions, like corporations, prefer to operate in the black. More members, more dues, and the better the financial statement. Aren't the ILGWU and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers models of solvency? In fact, they are so solvent that they are sometimes in a position to help maintain the solvency of the business with which they negotiate. Each year as I read the reports of the CIO and the AFL, I note that their assets are on the increase. Ironic indeed is the contrast which unions make between deficit financing in government and their own economic practices. I've yet to find a secretary-treasurer who liked to come to a convention to report a deficit. It may be all right for government to do this, but not unions.

The union is like the corporation in other ways. Efficiency in administration is admired in both organizational set-ups, and line and staff in both are almost military in their hierarchical delineation of responsibility.

The first lesson which a union staff man learns is where power rests, and if he doesn't learn that simple fact, he doesn't stay a staff man very long. To question the Lewises, the Murrays, or the Reuthers, is to question the gods. And how often have I seen the look of shock on the faces of the lesser satellites when one of them dared to have the temerity to contradict—or even question—his superior.

My own bitterest internecine battle came at exactly this point. As executive secretary, I challenged on occasion the elective president of the union, and I was ultimately dismissed under charge of insubordination. During that struggle—and even today—members of that union insist that I was guilty, at the very least, of heresy.

If you went into a sociological study of the factors mentioned above, you might come to the conclusion that unions are produced by the society which conditions them; or, as Ernie Bevin said, the union

leader is also influenced by the man who sits across the table from him in opposition. Table pounders produce table pounders. The Amalgamated Clothing Workers cannot be understood unless one understands Hart, Schaffner, and Marx. The steelworkers took on much of the sociological coloring of United States Steel, and the Autoworkers are not unaffected by the composition of General Motors.

As a consequence, the modern American trade union is an institutionalized service organization which may be judged by the splendor of its building, the competence of its staff, and the success with which it represents its members. Its voice is as close as long distance can bring it, and its spokesmen are never more than a few hours away by plane. Further, its technicians are as competent as their counterparts are competent on the other side of the collective bargaining table, and often their speakers are more eloquent. Increasingly, those who seek careers in unions are asked to display their technical competence rather than their missionary fervor. Sectarians may be fine, but you can't use them in the auditing department. In spite of twelve years of union experience, I would not be at home in the pension division of a large union in 1954, because the technical demands are far beyond me. The young man who wants a career in the union today looks forward to it as he might to a career in business. He prepares himself in accounting and law, gets himself a contact, and finds himself a niche. The pay is good, and if our hero can make himself indispensable enough and colorless enough, the security is first rate.

The bright young man, if he wants to get along, also should have a modicum of ideas. From wages to pensions to annual wages has been the most recent triple play. The number of people who understand the complications of the annual wage can be counted on the fingers of one hand.

A former student of mine, active in a New Jersey UAW local, put the annual wage situation this way:

> The Guaranteed Annual Wage, if correctly understood, will lead to obvious and extensive changes in the economic organization. Its potential as a stabilizing factor in our economy is tremendous. At the same time, it will attach to the business centers of power a corresponding increase in responsibility to their workers, and to consumers as a whole.
>
> But this program is to be initiated from the top down. It is essentially an administrative decision, made by a leadership which is not extensive.

> Many of the international reps and local union leaders I talked to at the convention had nothing whatever to do with the initiation or formulation of the program—and it can safely be said that the great majority of the UAW membership, the most enlightened union membership in the United States, have no idea of the meaning, the implications, or the potential struggle for the successful achievement of the guaranteed annual wage.

Unions in their corporate structure are little different in their administrative practices from the corporations and business structures which they challenge. Just as there are tensions which lead to periodical jurisdictional conflict among union administrative men and staff men in the internal structure, so there is a constant vying for the attention of the chief, and often the constant necessity to establish proofs of one's indispensability. The best way to sense this fact might be to study the president's reports to the respective conventions. Without exception, they are the combined reports of departmental and committee chairmen. Each enumerates the year's activity, lists meetings attended, hearings held, literature distributed, legislation and candidates defeated. Not too careful a reading of the reports is required to draw the obvious inference that the particular department cited did indeed meet the challenge to keep the union on an even keel.

The clever union administrator is not beyond taking advantage of jealousies and sometimes contributing to them. Union officers have probably more variations in salary schedules than their business counterparts. So it was among the teachers. And in CIO, when we argued that there should be some salary equity, Jim Carey always argued that salary schedules were undemocratic, and that men should be rewarded by the contribution that they made to CIO. Of course, Carey was judge of what *contribution* meant, and occasionally, he confused loyalty to himself with loyalty to the union.

One of the fictions which developed in the CIO because of line and staff organization and because of the emphasis on loyalty, was that of the omniscience of the departmental head men in preparing not to deal with anyone of lesser rank. This emphasized the cleavage between those who had *arrived*, and those who had not. Consequently, memos, irrespective of origin, went to top officials signed by department heads. It was the department head who was responsible for their contents. And so, the fiction was kept alive of peers dealing with peers. The rewards went along with the fiction. For example, while you, as de-

partment head, could always be fired at the wishes of your superiors, it was understood that you were king in your own domain. Within the limits of numbers, you could hire and fire as you wished—if you weren't sensitive to human values or ethics. Department heads could appear and be present at the inner council of officers, where they were almost treated as equals. They could travel without question and their requests for advancement were honored. Not so with the lesser lights. They only entered the Holy of Holies on rare occasions, and took their turn for free trips to the conventions. Of course, this was not an absolute; there were occasions when indispensable secretaries went along with their chiefs to Europe and other far-off places.

Because of such deep interpersonal relations, the unions of union employees are consistently little better than company unions. There are too many opportunities for playing person against person to permit clean-cut bargaining.

An understanding of union administration means an understanding of the emphasis on interpersonal loyalty, and loyalty to the man ahead of you in the power hierarchy. This is the loyalty of the battlefield, where the security of each is dependent upon the unity of command. It is understandable, when one recalls that those who demand it and those who receive it develop their leadership qualities in states of conflict. It is important when one faces company pressures, police pressures, and societal pressures, that the men who work beside you are loyal. It is doubly important to know that they are loyal in a world of stool pigeons and company police. I think that I understand the emphasis on loyalty when such early conditioning experiences of many old-time union members is understood.

However, I am of the opinion that a man to be a man at all must be loyal to values which transcend those of his chief. There is, I think, an incompatibility between the concept of loyalty to the hierarchy, and loyalty to the democratic ideal. It has always been my theory of administration that departments and organizations are healthy only in proportion to the disappearance of the status differentials. That is why, in the departments which I administered, everyone came to meeting and had a determination in policy. Each understood that he was important to the whole, and as a consequence, the esprit de corps was high. This sort of organization was interpreted as a weakness on the part of the director of research and education, who was dependent upon

assistants, associates, and lowly secretaries. The moral is obvious: that an attempt to take seriously the democratic ideal in an organization which uses the word as a device for propaganda rather than as a plumb line for life, produces tensions which ultimately lead to liquidation.

Psychologists have fun analyzing human identification. Some of us identify upward and some downward. Perhaps those who work in the union bureaucracy should be psychoanalyzed before accepting a position, and if they don't identify upwards, they shouldn't apply. One doesn't learn to be a ghostwriter easily, and loyalty is the indispensable virtue in such a task. But particularly when one does not respect the man above one in hierarchy, conflicts develop which are irreconcilable.

I shall conclude on this point, which I think is a most significant one. Big fleas have little fleas . . . ad infinitum.

America's Conservative Revolution

By CHADWICK HALL

In 1949, Peter Viereck, historian, Pulitzer prize winner in poetry and a self-confessed conservative, after nine years of preaching the conservative gospel to Americans, concluded that the word conservative was "the most unpopular word in the American vocabulary." "To be praised as a conservative," he wrote in *Conservatism Revisited*, "has become an insuperable political handicap." A scant five years later a Republican President, describing himself as a "conservative in economic affairs," told a cheering crowd that Americans should not be afraid of the word conservative. What had happened between 1949 and 1953 to have caused such a radical shift in attitudes?

One thing which happened was that the businessman rode back to power on the crest of postwar prosperity. Accompanying the businessman's return to a position of dominance in public affairs was a broad shift in outlook which reinforced many of the attitudes which the business community had been trying to bring back into fashion ever since 1934. The change in outlook which followed in the churning wake of World War II was clearly recognizable by 1950 although its symptoms, particularly among the intelligentsia, began to appear as early as 1940.

The businessman's crusade against the New Deal began in 1934 with the publication of Herbert Hoover's *The Challenge to Liberty*. It shifted into high gear the next year when Roosevelt launched what has come to be known as the Second New Deal. Up until Landon's defeat the opponents of the New Deal had won their victories in the federal courts. But as a result of Roosevelt's court-packing bill which alienated a great many conservative Democrats, resistance to the New

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Deal began to stiffen in 1936. Roosevelt's failure to purge the Democratic Party of Southern obstructionists who opposed the Fair Labor Standards Act and other New Deal measures brought the New Deal to a halt. Unlike Wilson's New Freedom, the New Deal was not a casualty of war. It was put to death by a coalition of dissident Southern Democrats and conservative Republicans. The stalemate within the Democratic Party and the deadlock between the Fair Dealers and the renegade Congressional coalition reached its peak in the 80th "do-nothing" Congress. The deadlock was finally broken by the Republican victory of 1952 which marks the final defeat of New Deal progressivism and the beginning of another chapter in American history in which new life was to be pumped into the collapsing arteries of the free enterprise system.

The object of the New Deal was to create a prosperous America. It tried inflation, pump-priming, price-pegging, relief, state loans, fiscal and currency manipulation, crop curtailment and public works. It also tried to nurse the economy back to health by underwriting purchasing power. It tried to breathe life back into the American economy by expanding consumption, by increasing demand. Labor's right to organize and anti-monopoly laws were strengthened; minimum wage laws, subsidies for agriculture and social security legislation were adopted; inheritance and upper-income bracket taxes were increased; and the price of electricity and housing was cut in some sections of the nation where the government entered the power and construction field. Whether or not these reforms had a salutary effect on the economy is a question which has not yet been settled by the economists. One effect it did have was to redistribute the national income. The major achievement of the New Deal was to distribute economic power more evenly by strengthening the hand of the farmer and the withered arm of organized labor.

The New Deal reforms, which increased the power of organized labor at the capitalist's expense, were bitterly attacked by the businessman who insisted that they weakened the foundations of capitalism. He argued that meddling with the complicated machinery of the American economy would throw it out of gear and that the political consequences of the New Deal would push the country down the precipitous road to tyranny. Although the business community was

able to thwart the New Deal after 1938 it was not until the 1952 Republican victory that it had an opportunity to dismantle it. Filled with corporation lawyers, electrical appliance and automobile executives, the Eisenhower administration has lifted the excess-profits and luxury-item excise taxes, eased corporation taxes by the adoption of an accelerated depreciation allowance, given tax relief to stockholders, narrowly missed strengthening the anti-labor provisions of the Taft-Hartley law, turned $50 billion worth of tideland oil reserves over to the states, $12 billion worth of atomic power installations over to a handful of corporations, cut funds for public power and transmission facilities, adopted a "partnership" program which would subsidize private utilities, approved the Dixon-Yates contract which will cost the American taxpayer $90 million and the price of a generating plant, and reduced price support. Many professional economists as well as the business community sincerely believe that this type of legislation will create a more prosperous America by stimulating investment. Despite the fact that their argument is politically inexpedient, they insist that it is better economics to encourage investment and subsidize business than to increase consumer spending by distributing the national income more evenly. They argue that if the wealthy are penalized by confiscatory taxation, investment will dry up and the health of the economy will be seriously weakened. Whether the economic measures which the Eisenhower administration has adopted will benefit the American economy as a whole or just the stockholder remains to be seen. Their immediate effect has been to increase dividends and corporate wealth. If prosperity does not trickle down in the months to come, future historians may describe the domestic accomplishments of Eisenhower's first administration with the phrase, "What's good for General Motors is good for the country," just as they seized upon the phrase "the business of government is business" as a shorthand summary of the economic policies of the Coolidge administration.

The return of the businessman to a position of power in public affairs in 1952 was due partly to the return of prosperity in postwar America which restored public confidence in the free enterprise system, a confidence which had been badly shaken by the Great Depression. But it was also due to an educational crusade which was launched by the business community in 1946 to "sell" free enterprise to the American public as the American way of life. The program was a stepped-up

continuation of a propagandist war waged in defense of the citadel of capitalism during the New Deal by such groups as the National Association of Manufacturers, the National Security League, and the Liberty League. It was spearheaded by such organizations as the Constitutional and Free Enterprise Foundation, the National Association for the Preservation of Free Enterprise, the Committee for Constitutional Government and the Foundation for Economic Education which recently purchased the *Freeman*, the most respectable organ of the radical right published today. One of the most effective organizations of this kind is George Stuart Benson's National Educational Program which supplies, as do many similar groups, an anti-Fair Deal weekly news column to an estimated 2,500 weeklies, dailies, house organs and trade journals; distributes a monthly news letter to 40,000 individuals and organizations; sponsors Freedom Forum and a weekly radio program "Land of the Free" which is carried by 363 radio stations. The National Educational Program also distributes a great deal of visual-aid material for use by private organizations and schools as well as technicolor cartoons lampooning "planning" and the welfare state, which cost between $80,000 and $100,000 to film (they are distributed by Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer through their regular commercial outlets). Facts Forum, subsidized by the Texas oil magnate Haroldson Hunt, is another anti-Fair Deal organization which exerts a great deal of influence on public opinion. Besides a broadcast which is carried by 246 radio stations, and a televised version of this feature, which is carried by 67 stations, Facts Forum sponsors "Answers for Americans," which is given free air time on 139 ABC radio and 13 TV stations; "State of the Nation" which is broadcast free on 131 MBS stations, and the nationwide "Reporters' Roundup" which gets free air time from 216 radio stations. To any list of groups dedicated to discrediting the New Deal and organized labor should be added organizations like Spiritual Mobilization and Dr. James W. Fifield, Jr.'s Moral Re-Armament. Both these groups do as much proselytizing for Adam Smith and the National Association of Manufacturers as they do for Christianity. Another group which belongs in this category is Students for America which was set up to counteract the activities of Students for Democratic Action, an affiliate of Americans for Democratic Action. Successor of the National Collegiate MacArthur Clubs, Students for America stands for the "Constitution, religious freedom and free enterprise" and is

pledged to combat "socialist expansion, appeasement and subversive elements."

One of the most effective mediums for carrying the business community's message to the public has been the corporation advertisement. Instead of plugging their product, since the war many companies have run advertisements in the mass media press extolling the virtues of the free enterprise system and linking the New Deal with socialism overtly or by insinuation. Typical of this type of advertising, once used exclusively by public utilities, is a full-page advertisement sponsored by Bohn Aluminum and Brass which appeared in the April 12, 1952 *Saturday Evening Post:* besides a picture of a tumbler which has fallen from the grasp of a lifeless hand there is a caption which reads: "IT LOOKED SAFE but it was deadly poison. A dose of Socialism can be just as deadly. It kills freedom . . . leads to Communism. Would you risk a little POISON?"

The success of this program cannot be accurately measured, but it obviously helped to create a more sympathetic attitude toward the business community. An indication of the influence which the program wields within the Eisenhower administration itself was revealed back in July, 1953, when Budget Director Joseph M. Dodge admitted that the President's attitude toward TVA and public power had been shaped largely by information which was prepared for him by the Edison Electric Institute, the public relations arm of the electrical trust.

Besides these groups which have been trying to indoctrinate the public mind against the infection of "creeping socialism," there are others which have tried to mobilize sentiment in favor of the free-enterprise system into political channels. One of these is the Constitutional Party which was organized in Philadelphia in August, 1952, under the sponsorship of Operation America, a holding company for such groups as the Council of Independent Business, the National Coalition Committee and the Christian Freedom Foundation, Inc. Convinced that the virus of socialism had contaminated both major parties and inspired by Colonel Robert McCormick's plea for a new party dedicated to the defeat of "international New Dealers," the Constitutional Party called for "an end to all international spending and boondoggling," the withdrawal of the United States from "any organization which is contrary to the law and the Constitution," and pledged itself to the immediate re-establishment of a free economy. The con-

vention endorsed Senators Jenner, Bricker, and McCarthy for re-election and nominated General MacArthur and Senator Byrd of Virginia to head its ticket (both MacArthur and Byrd subsequently refused the nomination), but it drew up no plan to seek popular support for its candidates. Upton Close, the group's spokesman, told reporters that the Constitutional Party would try to persuade the delegates to the Electoral College to "disregard the instructions of their party and pick a man capable of coping with the two-pronged crisis facing this country, financially and militarily." The strategy of manipulating electoral votes as a means of catapulting a conservative party to power is not new; the idea was worked out by the chairman of the Citizen's Committee, J. Harvie Williams, in 1943 and was pushed by Senator Carl Mundt, foremost spokesman for realignment who tried to formalize the Dixiecrat-conservative Republican congressional coalition in 1951 into an independent party. The new party was to be called the Freedom Party and Senators Bricker and Byrd were to head its slate.

Discredited by the disclosure that it harbored a handful of notorious anti-Semites, the Constitutional Party fell apart. Two years later, in May, 1954, a much more powerful organization made its appearance, For America. Committed to realignment and pledged to combat "super-nationalism and interventionism," this group was headed by Colonel McCormick, former Senator Burton K. Wheeler, Howard Buffet, former Representative from Nebraska who was also present at a preliminary meeting of the Constitutional Party; Hamilton Fish, former Republican Congressman from New York; John T. Flynn, the author of a library of anti-New Deal literature; Clarence E. Manion, former dean of law at Notre Dame; Eugene F. McDonald, president of Zenith Radio Corporation; Chauncey McCormick, director of International Harvester; Robert Harris, wealthy Texan farm and oil owner, and several other luminaries from the industrial, advertising and financial world. Despite the very serious legal and political obstacles which confront any third party in this country, For America's prospects are much rosier than its predecessor's because Col. McCormick's crusade against "international New Dealers" has a powerful newspaper as a forum, experienced organizational ability in its ranks, enthusiastic leadership, ample funds and the informal Dixiecrat-conservative Republican coalition out of which it could forge a powerful machine.

The rightward shift in outlook has also been reflected in scholarship. Although it has affected other fields, this shift is particularly noticeable in historiography where a revisionist school has sprung up dedicated to the task of rehabilitating the reputation of the American capitalist and the conservative tradition in general.

Recently Friedrich A. Hayek, an old-school classical economist best known for his *Road to Serfdom*, charged that the Anglo-American historian had willfully and maliciously smeared capitalism. The argument of his *Capitalism and the Historian*, which also includes contributions by other economists who share Professor Hayek's view, is that the anti-capitalist bias which has infected the thought of many Anglo-American historians has discredited capitalism in the eyes of the English-speaking world. Hayek's charge comes three years after Allan Nevins, two-time winner of a Pulitzer prize in biography, delivered a lecture at Stanford University in which he pleaded for a reappraisal of the capitalist's role in American history, for a re-evaluation which would stress his constructive contribution to Western civilization. This plea was repeated again by the eminent Columbia historian last year before the Society of American Archivists. Edward N. Saveth, one of Professor Nevins' students, carried his master's message to the readers of *Fortune* shortly after John Chamberlain had used its pages to scold the American novelist for his unsympathetic treatment of the American businessman. But the plea for a new look in American history had been made as far back as 1950 when Harvard's Samuel Eliot Morrison, newly elected president of the American Historical Society, predicted that "fame and success await one who will make a fresh distillation of our entire history with the conservative tradition acting as a leaven." The time has arrived, Professor Morrison argued, for a history of the United States "written from a sanely conservative point of view."

Ever since the publication of Henry Demarest Lloyd's *Wealth Against Commonwealth* and Ida Tarbel's epic study of Standard Oil, American historians have taken a critical attitude toward the capitalist. The best known works in the field are Gustavus Myers' *History of the Great American Fortunes* and Matthew Josephson's more recent *Robber Barons*, but the views so elaborately developed in these books can be found in any less specialized history written after 1915. The publication of Louis Hacker's *The Triumph of American Capitalism* and Nevins' biography of John D. Rockefeller in 1940, marked the beginning of

a shift in the historian's attitude toward a more charitable view of the businessman. Since the end of World War II the revisionist school has rapidly developed. Its disciples have written a series of sympathetic studies of the American businessman; among these are Thomas Cochran and William Miller's *The Age of Enterprise*, Cochran's *Railroad Leaders 1845-1890* and Edward C. Kirkland's *Business in the Guilded Age*. Since the war research teams have begun to remove the heavy layer of dust which has accumulated on mountains of company records and have started the job of compiling the histories of corporations like Ford Motor (a volume of which was recently completed by the productive Professor Nevins) and Standard Oil (soon to be completed by Ralph Hidy).

But despite the fact that more and more scholars are turning a sympathetic eye toward the businessman, a great deal of the animosity directed against the intellectual today originates in the business community. The businessman has not forgotten that the New Deal was hatched by brain-trusters, by "eggheads" who were recruited from the faculties of our leading universities. The belief that the intellectual is somehow more susceptible to the virus of socialism than anyone else, that the educated are irresistibly attracted to the idea of a planned economy is widespread. The president of a Massachusetts state teachers college, denying a charge that his school was infested with Communists, argued that "the type of student who go here are not of the highest intellectual type among which such tendencies exist." Representative Velde, former chairman of the House Un-American Activities Committee, voted against an appropriation for mobile rural libraries because he feared that education fostered socialism. The recent attack on tax-exempt philanthropic foundations by the Reece Committee was motivated by the belief that education weakens the mind's resistance to the seductions of socialism. The really virulent side of anti-intellectualism, the hysteria which is contaminating American life today, does not stem from a fear of Russia as an imperial power, but from a fear of Russia as the headquarters of a world-wide conspiracy to overthrow capitalism. As the special beneficiary of capitalism the businessman naturally is a vigorous anti-Communist.

Anti-intellectualism has another source besides the businessman's fear that the intellectual is plotting to destroy capitalism. In spite of the fact that irrationalism is responsible for much of the anti-intellec-

tualism which has erupted since the end of World War II, there are many intellectuals today who are themselves among the most vocal opponents of an unbending rationalism. Reason, they insist, has severe limits. An economy, for example, is far too complex to plan. No group of experts can expect to be able to calculate accurately every inevitability or predict every contingency. But the antirationalists also fear a ruthless rationalism because it would leave no room for personal liberty. They feel that a "rational" society would be a tyrannical society. This cautious attitude toward reason also stems from the fact that the intellectual fears the disintegrating force of too rapid change. The rationalist does not realize that there is often a gap between what is reasonable and what is possible and that change begets change. Change, the cautious rationalist argues, has its own logic which the mind unassisted by the wisdom of experience cannot fathom. This cautious attitude toward change is so widespread today that it can be exploited by the conservative and used as a defense of the *status quo.* The conservative is arguing today, as he has argued in the past, that as an initiator of change pure reason is blind to the "logic" of events. History, he insists, has a pattern or "reason" of its own which the mind cannot comprehend. The human intellect unseasoned by the cautious hand of experience is a destructive force and runs against the grain of reality. Experience rather than irresponsible intellect, the conservative force of the past rather than the destructive power of reason, the wisdom of history rather than the virtuosity of a nimble wit—these, the conservative declares, are the only reliable guides to action. The conservative also attacks reason because he associates it with perfectionism. Utopian schemes, the conservative charges, created by the systematic and visionary mind, upset the delicate equilibrium of society and open the sluice gates of anarchy. The conservative prides himself on his realism, his common sense, his practicality, his level-headedness and condemns the rationalist as a utopian who would destroy civilization by attempting to make it over in the image of some vast, visionary scheme or fantastic hallucination. There can be no perfection in history, the conservative insists, because there is no rational pattern in events. Each conscious attempt to remake society has brought something infinitely worse in its stead—a French or Russian terror.

The shift from a blind reliance on pure reason as a guide to action and formulator of ends is one example of the change in outlook which

the conservative has been able to utilize as a defense of the principle of stability and indirectly as a defense of the *status quo*. Another is the shift from a belief that man is inherently good to the idea that man is "capable of every insanity and atrocity." This shift was caused by the war and helps to account for the religious revival which has been sweeping the country since 1948 and the popularity of the violence-fiction of William Faulkner and works like Robert Penn Warren's sinister *Brother to Dragons*. The idea that man is bad is, like the argument that reason is treacherous, a traditional justification of the principle of stability and the *status quo*, just as the idea that man is good is one of the traditional arguments used by the progressive as a defense of the idea of change. The logic of the conservative's position compels him to argue that man is evil, for if man is not then institutions must be. The conservative has to argue that man is depraved and that change must be moral and not institutional; if he were to admit that man is good, his argument against external or institutional change would collapse.

The new outlook, nourished by the horror of war and the rigid rationalization of the social idealist, has generated a climate of opinion which is sympathetic to the conservative's message. The change in attitudes has not only left its mark on historiography but upon literary criticism as well. In 1949 Robert Gorham Davies announced that such ideals as equality and progress were going out of vogue among critics and that ideals like tradition and hierarchy were coming into fashion. The shift is also reflected in the popularity of Russell Kirk's sympathetic treatment of Anglo-American conservatism, *The Conservative Mind*, and in the enthusiastic reviews which greeted a new edition of Irving Babbitt's *Democracy and Leadership* and Mr. Kirk's recent work, *A Program for Conservatives*. A renewed interest in intellectual conservatism is also reflected in the flurry of articles on conservatism which have recently appeared in the pages of the learned journals. But the most significant result of the shift in the American outlook has been the conversion of a number of intellectuals to conservatism. Peter Viereck is perhaps the best known of the self-confessed conservatives even though his thought has more in common with the progressivism of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., than with orthodox conservatism. Less well known outside of academic circles is Francis Graham Wilson, a professor of political science at the University of Illinois. What makes

Wilson an attractive figure in the conservative movement today is that he is keenly aware of what is implied in the conservative's position. Despite a certain awkwardness of style which tends at times to obscure his thought, Wilson has shown a logical consistency in developing the conservative position and a refreshing willingness to acknowledge its contradictions, which is lacking in the work of other contemporary conservatives.

There are two themes which occur again and again in Wilson's thought: the necessity of stability and the inevitability of inequality. The way in which these two ideas are dovetailed in his mind is illustrated by his argument that inequality is an historical law, a fact of life that cannot be overcome. If it is disregarded, he warns, chaos will tear society to shreds. Although it is never clear whether stability or inequality is Wilson's ultimate ideal he appraises everything his mind touches in terms of whether it does or does not exercise a stabilizing influence on society. His attack on rationalism, relativism and idealism, for example, is based on the argument that they lead down the bumpy road to revolution; his defense of capitalism, which he insists is "not an inherent or lasting element in conservatism," is based on the argument that no contemporary institution should be modified because any change may kindle the flames of a gluttonous anarchy. Wilson's devotion to the principle of stability is even reflected in his insistence on the supremacy of moral law, a feature of his thought which is of special interest because it reveals a theistic vein in Wilson's philosophy which is characteristic of all conservative thinking. Obedience to law is an important stabilizing agent, he argues, because it regularizes behavior by making it predictable. But what compels man to obey law? The fear, Wilson thinks, that he will be punished in the next life if he disobeys God's and the community's mandate. The idea of retribution, however, does not stand alone in Wilson's thought because it is based on the assumption that man is capable of obeying law. In order to be able to obey law man must have free will, and cause must be personal, not aggregate or cosmic. If man does not have the power to make a free choice, if he is not the initiator of cause, but the powerless agent of cosmic forces, if he is totally depraved, he would be incapable of responding to moral law and the threat of retribution would lose its power to compel obedience. Like Wilson, Peter Viereck also fears chaos, but although he shares Wilson's belief that law exerts a stabil-

izing influence on society he rejects the idea that obedience must be based on fear. Man, he insists, can be controlled through his rational faculty. If law is reasonable, rational man will obey it. Reason, not fear, is the disciplinary force in Viereck's thought. The rational faculty frees man from the bondage of anarchy and impulse. Civilized man, Viereck declares, is rational man, and rational man is free man. The wonderful but somewhat thin utility of Viereck's conception of reason as a disciplinary force is that it reconciles stability and freedom. Wilson, whose article "Public Opinion and the Intellectual" published in a recent issue of *The American Political Science Review* was a full scale assault on the bastion of rationalism, differs sharply with Viereck on the question of reason. Wilson distrusts it as an initiator of change and the agent of a treacherous idealism which lures the visionary into the vortex of anarchy. But the most important point of conflict between Viereck and Wilson is their disagreement over the question of change and equality, a disagreement which reflects the progressive element in Viereck's thought and the orthodoxy of Wilson's conservatism. What makes Wilson a conservative is his defense of the principle of stability *as* a defense of the *status quo* and inequality. What gives Viereck's thought its special flavor of ambivalence is the fact that he defends both the principle of stablity *and* the idea of a wider diffusion of power among men. These two elements in Viereck's thought clash because the defense of stability is a defense of the *status quo* which in turn is an indirect defense of inequality. This inconsistency in Viereck's thought is ironed out by his insistence that stability *depends* on change, an idea which is expressed in the aphorism "change in order to preserve." Viereck does not oppose all change; what he is afraid of is too rapid change, change which will weaken the foundations of society. But what is just as much of a threat to stability, he warns, is the friction generated by inequality. Stability, Viereck feels, not only depends on a cool head but also on a greater diffusion of power.

The shift in outlook which occurred in the late '40's from the idea that man is good, that pure reason is a reliable guide to action to the idea that man is bad, that reason is treacherous, idealism tyrannical, and change destructive has been so profound that it has left an indelible mark on progressive thinking. The prewar progressive was a happy optimist. He insisted that man was good; he deified change and reason; he saw no inconsistency in assailing the citadel of monopoly

with one hand and constructing an omnipotent state with the other. Perhaps the most typical representative of the postwar progressives who have discarded the ideological paraphernalia of the '30's is Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., a leader of Americans for Democratic Action. The shift in outlook which has prepared the way for a more sympathetic reception of the conservative's message is clearly visible in Schlesinger's analysis of the contemporary crisis. A critic of total planning and the centralized state, Schlesinger insists that the omnipotent state threatens liberty. Freedom, he argues in *The Vital Center*, is generated by conflict, by the friction of competing interests. Liberty is also threatened by a bigoted, iron-fisted idealism, for there is no tyranny, Schlesinger warns, as terrible as the tyranny of a brittle abstraction. Even the idea that man is good jeopardizes freedom, Schlesinger declares. Although the belief that man is utterly depraved can be used to justify authoritarianism, the young Harvard historian thinks, a "moderate pessimism" alerts the public to the danger of concentrating power in the hands of an elite. Progressivism is only possible, he argues, if the fact of man's depravity is acknowledged because constructive change can only be achieved in the realm of the possible. Change, he concludes, should be introduced gradually and tempered by the cooling hand of experience; otherwise change will deteriorate into anarchy.

What is so surprising about the change which took place in the American scene in the late 1940's is not that the businessman was able to rehabilitate his reputation, so badly damaged by the Great Depression, nor that a shift occurred in American attitudes which has made the public more susceptible to his message. What is so extraordinary about this period is that the shift was so sweeping, so profound. The ideas which came into fashion in the 1940's had never been popular in America—their pessimistic and anti-equalitarian character do not suit the American temper. They attracted the Federalists, it is true; but since the death of John Adams they have had no articulate spokesman and but a handful of disciples. Yet now this galaxy of ideas suddenly appears on the American scene. What is revolutionary about the new outlook which is so conservative in tone is the fact that it has become so pervasive that it has even altered the foundations of progressive thinking.

The Rootless "Roots": Defects in the New Conservatism

By PETER VIERECK

To the new conservative, not the least of the ills of our society is a tendency, as we wholesomely consolidate against communism and outmoded Marxism, to become *smugly uncritical* and self-satisfied, content with orthodoxy, conformity, and national power. Thereby we may lose or suppress that fundamental ethical and philosophical radicalism so vital to the purification of our traditions.

—Professor Thomas I. Cook of Johns Hopkins University, a leading political philosopher of the new conservatism.

It is not remarkable that the new conservatives should take *particular* care to disassociate themselves from what often goes by the name of conservatism, but which for them is a dangerous perversion or misrepresentation of an honorable faith: blind resistance to change; a tyrannical elite; ignorance of the social process; negativism which leads to the stifling of dissent. . . . The new conservatives regard the nineteenth century Spencerians and their modern equivalents as false conservatives, anarchic if not reactionary.

This attitude of reasonable conservatism, which seeks to moderate between the claims of the past and the future, is better or at least more interestingly exemplified by our writers than by our political leaders. The modern conservative, it seems to me, will find a kind of political wisdom in the works of Cooper, Emerson, Hawthorne, Melville, Thoreau, Whitman and Henry James that is rarely discernible in the nineteenth century political tracts customarily discussed in our social science courses. They remain the keenest observers, the shrewdest commentators of the nature and *price of progress*, and they are all troubled men of divided allegiances. . . . The prophets of liberalism have not dealt with these considerations as seriously or as profoundly as they might have done, but contemporary conservatism will do

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no better if it ignores its own reformers and constructive thinkers and permits a noisy riff-raff to speak for it.

—Daniel Aaron, "Conservatism, Old and New," from a paper read May 8, 1953, at 46th Annual Meeting of the *Mississippi Valley Historical Society*.

I

EXAMPLES of a conservatism of living reality are Madison and Burke in their day, Metternich in his Austria, Calhoun in his ante-bellum South, or Adenauer and Churchill today. In contrast, the time has come to examine more rigorously the role in America today of a conservatism not of living but of yearning, not of life but of nostalgia, based not on existing roots but on roots either never existent or no longer existent. Such a conservatism of yearning can still serve salutary purposes, first of all in the realm of literature and secondly as an unusually detached perspective toward current foibles. Such a conservatism becomes useless or of bad use when it leaves literature and enters short-run politics, conjuring up mirages to conceal sordid realities or to distract from them.

In America, southern aristocratic agrarianism has long been the most attractively sincere and most intellectually gifted form of the conservatism of yearning. The most important intellectual expression of southern agrarian conservatism has been *I'll Take My Stand* (1930). The book, it will be recalled, is a symposium of a dozen southern writers and, in the best sense of the word, literary intellectuals, starting off with John Crowe Ransom. The symposium contrasts the cultivated human values of an aristocratic agrarianism with the dehumanized mechanization and crass commercialism attributed to modern materialistic liberalism and to the northern post-Civil-War industrialism.

At their best, these and other expressions of the conservatism of yearning are intelligent warnings against the betrayal of deeper values by shallow utility. The fact that such warnings come from the losing side of history is in itself a merit, insofar as they caution a nation of success-worshippers against the price of success. But at their worst, such writings of the 1930's, and again of the 1950's, are merely a futile back-to-1788 kind of conservatism, reflecting not the organic traditions of genuine conservatism but the lifeless ones of a contrived synthetic substitute. They are a Nescafé of conservatism.

Sometimes the more doctrinaire of new conservatives ignore or minimize the fact that much of modern American liberalism (like it or not) does have real historical roots. They ignore the fact that, unlike Europe, more of our roots go back to the rationalist eighteenth century than to the conservative and religious Middle Ages. They ignore the fact that there is more rootlessness today in their own program for an aristocratic agrarian restoration than there is in democratic liberalism, even at its crassest and worst. By such an un-Burkean ignoring of actual concrete history, they become as rootless and abstract as the eighteenth-century liberalism they rightly criticize. They become doctrinaire counter-revolutionaries rather than evolutionary conservatives. Theirs becomes an unhistorical appeal to history, a traditionless worship of tradition, a rootless appeal for roots.

The above distinction represents the spirit of the anti-reactionary conservatism of an Irving Babbitt and the Burkean-conservative half of a contemporary like Reinhold Niebuhr, as opposed to the counter-revolutionary abstractions of the more extreme contributions of *I'll Take My Stand*. Their rootless appeal to roots is reviving among much younger writers and educators in the 1950's. These achieve some acute psychological and literary perceptions but ought not to be confused with a genuinely rooted, history-minded conservatism. The latter conserves what history it finds and what roots it finds, including Lockean-liberal history and Lockean-liberal roots, exactly as Edmund Burke did when he conserved not only throne and altar but also several of the deep-rooted, Lockean-liberal aspects of the heritage of the bloodless revolution of 1688. 1688 was a conservative as well as a liberal revolution because "a revolution averted." Here the difference in history between Europe and the Anglo-American experience requires the conservatism of the latter to synthesize with 1688 liberalism or else to become window-dressing for greed or for authoritarianism.

In central Europe, with its feudal past and lack of liberal traditions and liberal roots, a sound conservative during the age of Metternich still could be rooted in aristocratic and monarchic principles and in whatever was still alive of feudalism, if only as a freedom-enhancing check and balance (countervailing force) against middle-class attempts to set up—in the name of liberal democracy—a mechanizing dictatorship of urban capitalism over peasants and workers. Such indeed is the profound historical justification of the nonrepressive half of the

Metternich era and the Congress of Vienna era of 1815-1848: that era slowed up into a sane and gradual industrial evolution what in England had been a mad and hectic industrial revolution. And evolution is to be preferred to revolution because it is less disruptive to the moral and psychological framework.

Consider only the aesthetic and moral harm done by the trauma of overhasty industrial *revolution* to the post-industrial Anglo-American culture, in terms of making it more shallow (for example, the notorious Benthamite equating of push-pins with Shakespeare). A non-evolutionary industrial revolution, triumphing too overwhelmingly, brought with it the materialist schools of philosophy, whether a soulless, Benthamite utilitarianism or a heartless Manchester liberalism, the former hostile to art and religion and the latter hostile to a decent compassion for child labor and slum conditions. That decent compassion, from 1800 right through the Tory reform laws of Lord Shaftesbury and the battle of Disraeli's Tory socialism versus Gladstone's Manchester liberalism, was more often felt by aristocratic conservatives and by democratic socialists than by nineteenth-century liberals.

In central Europe, feudal and aristocratic remnants were valuable because they slowed up the industrial revolution into evolution. In England, they were unable to slow it up, but they were valuable because they afterwards undid much of its harm. They undid its harm by sometimes allying with the factory workers against industrial inhumanity, so long as there was a Disraeli around with sufficient vision to conceive that alliance. After his death in 1881, the alliance gradually faded, so that by the turn of the century the workers turned either to the Liberal party or to the new Labor party. Disraeli preached the Tory-worker alliance in his two great books of the 1840's, *Sybil* and *Coningsby*. Refuting doubts about his sincerity, he put that preaching into practice during his second ministry by enacting his charter of trade union liberties in the 1870's. His "Tory socialist" laws protected the rights of trade unions, of striking, and of picketing.

In contrast with Europe, America has always lacked those feudal roots which central Europe still possessed during the age of Metternich and which England under Disraeli possessed at least in the literary imagination, even if not in economics. And when have economic statistics been able to stand up against the magnetic intensity of a literary imagination? America's literary as well as economic and political tra-

ditions are more liberal and more democratic than feudal. Therefore, the American kind of conservative is not being truly Burkean, truly historical and organic, unless he includes the liberal and democratic tradition as the cornerstone he builds on. His conservatism becomes a qualifying adjective to that 1688-Lockean liberalism, a rightist deviation of liberalism rather than—as in central Europe—something anti-liberal or something historically separate from liberalism.

The American kind of conservatism does not lose its importance nor its virtue by the fact of being an adjective rather than a noun. If anything, its capacity for good is increased by being harnessed inside instead of outside the British parliamentary tradition of 1688 liberalism. While building on that shared cornerstone, the American conservative at the same time moves beyond that origin and enriches the variety and the depth of the shared structure by also building into it the conservative insights of John Quincy Adams and Henry Adams, of the Madison of the tenth Federalist paper, of Melville or of Irving Babbitt, of de Tocqueville or of Ortega y Gasset. Such names are all rooted, evolutionary conservatives in the tradition of Burke, not rootless, counter-revolutionary conservatives in the tradition of Maistre.

This distinction between rooted conservatives and rootless, counter-revolutionary doctrinaires is the measure of the difference between two different groups in contemporary America: the new conservatives and the Old Guard Republicans. The latter are what loose journalistic usage means by "conservative"; for convenience and to clarify their antithesis to the new conservatism, let us in this essay simply call them "old conservatives." However, the term is a reluctant concession to the power of that loose journalistic usage. More properly speaking, the old conservatives are either petrified Manchester liberals, as with the Old Guard Republican of the North, or they are literary conservatives of yearning and nostalgia, as with the feudal agrarian of the South.

Be that as it may, the new conservative does cherish—and the old conservative does not cherish—New Deal reformism in economics and Lockean parliamentary liberalism in politics, as traditions here to stay. Indeed, it is not the least of the functions of the new conservatism to force a now middle-aged New Deal to realize that it has now become conservative and rooted and that, therefore, it had better stop parroting the anti-Constitutional, anti-traditional slogans of its youth. These slogans are now being practiced instead, and to a wilder extent than

even the most extreme New Deal liberal ever envisaged, by the Republican radicals of the right.

Such rooted and philosophical new conservatives in America are found first of all in the literary and educational world. Politics will not be ready for their ideas for another generation; they should shed their illusions on that score. The normal time-lag of a generation likewise separated the literary and university origin of Coleridge's conservatism from its osmosis into the politics of Disraeli Toryism. Until then American politics, with certain distinguished exceptions like Stevenson among Democrats and Clifford Case among Republicans, will be condemned to alternate between an exhausted and unimaginative liberalism and the no-longer-rooted old-conservatism that is forever yearning anachronistically to return to 1788 or to 1932.

Elected to the Senate in November, 1954, Clifford Case of New Jersey has explicitly called himself "a conservative," an unpopular word most politicans fear to use. In contrast, Old Guard Republicans like Senators Taft and Wherry used to insist on calling themselves "old-fashioned liberals"; in several interviews they protested against being labelled "conservative." Their protest was justified. It was wiser than they themselves knew. For they and their current Republican successors are indeed no conservers, no traditionalists. They have lost their old roots in Lockean-liberalism and in 1688, without having gained new roots to replace them. They fall between two chairs, performing neither a liberal nor a conservative function but only the unintentional function of provoking class-war radicalism.

The Republican Senator Clifford Case, a man of scholarly learning in political philosophy as well as a practical statesman, has explicitly called himself (in conversations with the author and elsewhere) a genuine new conservative in the tradition of Burke, Churchill, Disraeli, and the Federalist papers. His enemies in the party reveal the bankruptcy of their vision and of their terminology when they denounce him and the equally conservative Flanders as "too liberal"; by that they really mean he and Flanders have too much moral courage for their party; that is, they are too bravely, too outspokenly for civil liberties against the right-wing radicals.

Unless America suffers an unexpected political or economic disaster, there will be an increasing revival of conservatism in the next decade. Some of this revival will be for the right reasons. But much of

it will be for the wrong reasons. The wrong reasons include not merely opportunism. They include those new graduates from immigrant to suburban status who are not opportunistic but sincere about their would-be conservatism. Yet their sincerity is self-deceptive; in order to gain status and to seem upper-class, they overdo the patriotic act and antiradical act to the point of ham-acting. Thereby they not merely assimilate to their new Republican neighborhood: they outdo their neighborhood intolerantly at its own right-wing nationalist game. They become the new minority-group recruits supporting the McCarrans and the McCarran acts, supporting the Rabbi Schultzes, or supporting the several Negro McCarthyite editors.

It is necessary to insure having conservatism revived for the right or Constitutional reasons and not for the above wrong or thought-controlling reasons. Therefore it may be helpful, in the second part of this essay, to anticipate in advance the potential sources of corruption for even the best kind of new conservatism.

II

One source of corruption for conservatism is to see as traditional those empty shells of the past which no longer have a living, organic content. Another corruption is to accept in a merely smug and mechanical manner those traditions which really are living and valuable, thereby devitalizing them into easy respectable pap. A third corruption is to let what is good in value-conserving be used to rationalize inhumane, unjust, or authoritarian aspects of the *status quo*. Thus, under the Tsars the beneficent conservative force of religion was maleficently used to rationalize economic injustices, the lynching of radical and religious minorities, and a revolution-provoking absolutism. Such absolutism forever defeats its own conservative aims by goading even its moderate and friendly critics into radicalism and revolutionary extremes.

Fortunately the Anglo-American heritage of 1688 rules out, as unhistorical, any attempt to carry the Tsarist analogy that far in America. No more is meant by the Tsarist example than a timely reminder that only revolution and radicalism can result from a conservatism too rigidly doctrinaire or too indulgent toward outrageous social injustices.

Most of the writers and scholars known as new conservatives,

notably such civil-libertarian and all-out anti-McCarthy conservatives as August Heckscher, Clinton Rossiter, Will Herberg, and Thomas I. Cook, are trying to prevent philosophical conservatism in America from succumbling to the above corruption. For, being historically aware of how such corruptions have often killed conservatism in the past, they and we who admire them are determined this time to avoid such corruptions at all cost, including the cost of being considered unrealistic, paradoxical, merely one more liberal in disguise, or merely a reactionary concealed behind a hypocritical lip-service to civil liberties and social reform. This position, and our joining the liberals in safeguarding civil liberties and New Deal reforms, is nothing new and nothing contradictory for conservatives but in the mainstream of philosophical conservatism, finding its precedent in Burke himself. For few things are more significant of Burke than that he was a Whig, not a Tory; that is, he was a conservative within the more liberal, less conservative of the two available parties; he supported the American Revolution and George Washington (on account of shared 1688 roots) against the king's attempt to imitate that kind of central and eastern European absolutism which, as in Russia, is ever the father of radical revolution.

Aside from Burke's being a Whig and not a Tory, we may more broadly generalize: a conservative is most valuable when serving in the more liberal party; a liberal is most valuable when serving in the more conservative party; a monarchy is firmest and freest (as in Scandinavia) when scooping the democratic socialists in humane reforms (short of what I have defined as "the statist line"); a centralized mass democracy is firmest and freest when it encourages, even to the point of tolerating eccentricity and arrogance, the few remnants it possesses of aristocracy, local and family and regional pride, and decentralized provincial divergencies, traditions, and privileges.

As another example of the salutary balancing process, note that Reinhold Niebuhr, a Burkean conservative and even a reactionary in his view of human nature and of history, is not a Republican but a New Dealer in political party activities; and when the New Deal was in power, was not a New Dealer but a democratic socialist, all the while being denounced as an extreme conservative and Burkean traditionalist in philosophy, not to mention his familiar anti-modernism and anti-liberalism in theology.

III

While a philosophical conservative best avoids corruption by wealth and *status quo* when he serves, like Burke and Niebuhr, in the more reformist party, he yet retains his basic conservatism by leading a united front against revolution whenever revolution or subversive infiltration become a genuine and not merely hysterical or imaginary danger to tradition and to traditional liberties. Such a genuine danger did occur from Jacobin subversion in Burke's day and from Communist and fellow-traveler subversion in Niebuhr's day. Both responded courageously by exposing the subverters, masked as liberals, as the totalitarians they really were. This act takes courage in intellectual circles because one runs the danger of being stigmatized as an alleged "witch-hunter" and "hysteric" and being maliciously classified with bad company (the real witch-hunters, those who really do slander innocent liberals as Reds).

Burke's exposure of Jacobin agents of the French Revolution disgraced him, just as in similar cases today, among those liberal literary intellectuals who were purposely blind to the real suppression of liberty under Jacobinism (or under Communism today). Similarly Niebuhr, by his dramatic act of resigning from the masthead of the *Nation* magazine on grounds of disagreement about the nature of Soviet Russia, set off the most important recent controversy over the fellow-traveler in the world of literary intellectuals. Doubtless only a tempest in a small and unnoticed teapot. But if that teapot is the world that we as writers and teachers live in, then we have an ethical duty to take it seriously, even while retaining enough sense of proportion to realize that, in the big extraverted outside-world, the main internal danger today is not the few remaining fellow-travelers but the coercive conformism of Republican nationalists.

The latter danger, rather than the lingering Popular Frontists, concerns the present pages; for it goes without saying that one first of all hits those foes of liberty who are the strongest and most popular in one's country. Nevertheless, we must never retrospectively forget how urgent it was several years ago (when the Yalta spirit still lured) for some of us, at the risk of being called conformists and witch-hunters and philistines, to follow anti-communists like Niebuhr and Norman Thomas in forcing the liberal and intellectual community to distinguish with full ethical clarity between valid liberalism and the ambiguities and silences of the *Nation* about slave labor and foreign

policy. Today the fight has been more than half won for the soul of "the liberals who haven't learned"; it would be ungenerous to belabor them disproportionately so long as every radio blares forth the voices of coercive Republican nationalists who not only have never learned but never will learn. But had that fight for the souls of the liberal intellectuals not been fought and won during 1945-1953 (a fight for which George Orwell deserves most of the credit), had we as writers and teachers not learned during that struggle to face up to Popular Frontists and Yalta myths and ethically to set our own house or teapot in order, then our whole world of anti-fascist literary intellectuals would surely have succumbed to the McCarrans, the Jenners, the McCarthys, the Dirksens, and the rest. Our world would in that case have succumbed because it would then not have been able with a clear conscience to refute their slanders against intellectuals and anti-fascists as "Reds."

Instead, we have been able to rally the successful counterattack of our literary media against McCarthyism because the intellectual has been rehabilitated as a leader against both kinds of totalitarianism, and not merely against one kind alone. What rehabilitated him was his facing-up ethically, with ruthless self-criticism, to the dishonesty of anti-anti-communism. That facing-up involved not only a teapot tempest over the *Nation* and over its unjust libel suit against the *New Leader* (and for a second time, not apologies but quixotic pride about living in a teapot); the facing-up also involved the exposure in 1948, by "Americans for Democratic Action," of the Stalinist control of the Wallace Progressive party. By that act of "premature" anti-Communism, done long before the McCarthys showed any interest in the Soviet danger, the ADA has earned a lasting place of honor among all veterans of genuine anti-Communism.

That special and unequaled honor of the anti-Communist liberals of ADA can never be tarnished, not even by the subsequent decline of that increasingly peripheral organization. While it partly consists of some of the sanest and most courageous civil-libertarians in the country, it consists even more of zombie Gaylord Babbitts, the dead who walk, aging ambitious professors with a frustrated will to power, still mumbling dead liberal clichés from a long-since conservatized New Deal and eternally waiting with their ideological hope-chest for an economic depression to call them back to Washington, just as in their nostalgic 1930's:

"They liked their dictaphones a lot;
They met some big wheels and will not
Let you forget it."

Be that as it may, only the accumulated moral capital, gained by that resistance to the *Nation* mentality and to the Wallace Progressive mentality, has enabled our world of anti-fascist writers and teachers to draw upon that same moral capital against the nationalist radicals of the right today. Those who accumulated that capital against the Communist fellow-travelers but who now hesitate to spend it fully and freely against the fellow-travelers of McCarthyism, are guilty of the same double standard of morality which they rightly attacked in the anti-anti-Communist kind of liberal. Even more guilty are those who call themselves conservative and yet hesitate to expose themselves to the slanders and other unpleasantnesses that fall upon forthright anti-McCarthyites. The same law of balance that makes the exposure of Communist fellow-travelling the particular duty of liberals and socialists, makes the exposure of right-wing and nationalist coercers the particular duty of conservatives.

IV

The Burkean conservative builds on the concrete existing historical base and not on an imaginary one of wish fulfillment that conceals a vacuum. When, as in the exceptional case of America, that concrete historical base includes eighteenth-century Lockean-liberalism and includes New Deal social reforms, then the real American conserver assimilates into conservatism everything lasting and good in liberalism and in the New Deal. He does not repudiate that liberal heritage, even though he transfigures its frequent narrowness with the insights of the great tormented conservative novelists and psychologists (Melville, Dostoyevsky, some of Hawthorne). In contrast, those who refuse to conserve our deep-rooted Lockean heritage and our New Deal social heritage and who disdain to conserve anything except some aristocratic-agrarian heritage that no longer exists, may be reminded of the words of their own conservative hero, Cardinal Newman, about the need for conservatives to "inherit and make the best of" liberalism in certain contexts:

> If I might presume to contrast Lacordaire and myself, I should say, that we had been both of us inconsistent;—he, a Catholic, in calling himself a Liberal;

> I, a Protestant, in being an Anti-liberal; and moreover, that the cause of this inconsistency had been in both cases one and the same. That is, we were both of us such good conservatives, as to take up with what we happened to find established in our respective countries, at the time when we came into active life. Toryism was the creed of Oxford; he inherited, and made the best of, the French Revolution.[1]

Consequently, it is imprecise to call conservative those counter-revolutionary ideologues of the right who defy the conservative principle of continuity with the past by trying to wrench American life out of its liberal and New Deal past. Such a violent wrench, such a combination of utopianism and coercion, based on abstract a-priori blueprints rather than on concrete historical experience, is what caused the French Revolution to degenerate from wholesome reform into murderous despotism. That is why *Shame and Glory of the Intellectuals*, defined Old Guard Republicans and their intellectual apologists as "Jacobins endimanchés," a term objected to by several reviewers, including Elmer Davis. They objected because Old Guard Republicans are supposedly conservative and Jacobins radical. What I meant and mean is: the abstract doctrinaire leaders of Republicanism and of a capitalist Adam Smith a-priorism in the north—and analogously the more doctrinaire aristocratic southerners—are applying the same violent wrench, the same discontinuity with the past, the same combination of utopian blueprints with coercive conformity which characterized the French Revolution and which, in Burke's analysis, doomed it to inevitable disaster.

America's current Jacobinism of the right is doomed for the same reasons to inevitable disaster, even though milder, more presentable, and dressed up in its Sunday best.

The need for new conservatives to maintain continuity with America's liberal past does not mean conservatism is basically the same as liberalism and New Dealism. George Washington and Madison surely are not the same as radicals like Paine and liberals like Jefferson. John Adams is not the same as Andrew Jackson. Irving Babbitt (about whom Russell Kirk, when writing *non*politically, has wise things to say) is not the same as the editorialists of our liberal weeklies. Charles Evans Hughes is not the same as LaFollette or even as Woodrow Wilson.

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[1]From the Appendix inserted by Cardinal Newman at the end of the second edition of his *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*, London, 1892.

Instead, conservative continuity with our liberal past simply means that you cannot escape from history; and history, in the exceptional case of America, has provided both conservatives and liberals with a common Lockean-1688 base. That base is not entirely liberal or unconservative (*cf.* the author's stress elsewhere on the conservation of 1776); nevertheless, that base is more than half liberal, and it is more democratic, unfeudal, unmedieval, unhierarchical, and boisterously egalitarian than is the base of any other country in the entire world.

All this is but another way of saying that conservatism may be ultimately defined as the organic relationship of concrete to concrete in history, rather than abstraction piled on abstraction (whether of Adam Smith, Rousseau, Paine, or Marx). So the first duty of new conservatism is to stop becoming what they accuse liberals and eighteenth-century rationalists of being: rootless doctrinaires.

In contrast with reactionaries and romantics, the new conservative does not parody traditionalism by accepting *all* traditions as good. Instead, the conservative stress on continuity with the past means overcoming what is bad in the past. You overcome the social injustices of traditionalism by assimiliating the past, as Disraeli did, into a larger and juster framework. The reactionary accepts the past indiscriminately; one kind of liberal pretends the past does not exist or can be removed by abstract decree; the evolutionary conservative assimiliates the past discriminately, purifies it, and moves on. But if you ignore the past or try to decree it away, then the more benevolent the utopias you decree (whether of liberal progress or of Marxism or of Old Guard commercialism), the more thought-control and terror you need in order to enforce your decreed utopia upon a reluctant past and upon a refractory human nature.

Parallel: in the same way that many conservatives underestimate how deep-rooted is America's major tradition of Lockean-liberalism, many liberals underestimate how deep-rooted is America's minor tradition of the Burkean and Federalist conservatism of Washington, John Adams, Madison, and Calhoun (the Calhoun of the doctrine of minority rights and concurrent majorities, not the Calhoun who abused those sound conservative doctrines into rationalizations of the moral evil of slavery). Both liberals and conservatives, each minimizing the roots of the other, narrow down the creative richness of the American past to make it fit their particular preference.

Federico García Lorca:

SEVEN LYRICS

from the *Cante Jondo* Poems

Translated by NORMAN DI GIOVANNI

JOURNEY

A hundred riders in mourning,
where will they go
by the lowering sky
of the orange grove?
Neither in Cordova nor in Seville
will they appear;
nor in Granada that longs
for the sea.
Those sleepy horses
will carry them
to the labyrinth of crosses
where song trembles.
With seven piercing cries,
where will they go,
the hundred Andalusian riders
of the orange grove?

AFTER PASSING

The children gaze
at a distant point.

The candles die.
Some blind girls
question the moon,
and spirals of weeping
climb on the wind.

The mountains gaze
at a distant point.

NORMAN THOMAS DI GIOVANNI is a student at Antioch College. Other translations of his are to appear in Lorca's *Selected Poems* to be published by New Directions.

THE SILENCE

Hear the silence, my child.
It is an undulated silence
where valleys and echoes slip,
a silence
that bows heads
to the ground.

VILLAGE

Upon the barren mountain
a Calvary.
Clear water
and centenary olive trees.
Through the narrow streets
cloaked men,
and on the towers
weathercocks turning.
Eternally
turning.
Oh lost village
in the Andalusia of tears!

SURPRISED

Left dead in the street
with a dagger in his chest.
No one knew him.
How the streetlamp trembled!
Mother.
How the tiny lamp trembled
in the street!
Early dawn. No one
could face his eyes
open wide in the cruel wind.
Dead he was left in the street
with a dagger in his chest
and no one knew him.

AND THEN

Labyrinths
born of time
vanish.

(Only desert
remains.)

The heart,
fountain of desires,
vanishes.

(Only desert
remains.)

The illusion of dawn
and kisses
vanishes.

Only desert
remains.
Undulating
desert.

AY!

The cry leaves in the wind
a shadow of cypress.

(Leave me in this field,
weeping.)

All has been demolished in the world.
Nothing remains but silence.

(Leave me in this field,
weeping.)

The lightless horizon
is bitten with bonfires.

(I have told you, leave me
in this field,
weeping.)

Do We Need Another "Great Debate"?

By THEODORE SANDS

A BRIGHT NEW FIXTURE has been added to the Washington scene: the "Great Debate" on foreign policy. A reflection of both growing concern and increasing fear, this need to talk their way to the core of the problem of foreign policy has been felt by both Congress and the public. In almost every case, however, the search has been detoured into secondary issues, and the fundamental problems of foreign policy remain unexplored and unexplained.

We Americans have had the Great Debate on our European policy, begun by Herbert Hoover and carried into the Senate by the late Robert A. Taft. The virtues of peripheral defense and the dangers of commitment to Europe were publicly discussed for five months. We decided that NATO was "an essential part of the foreign policy of the United States."

This was followed by a public talkfest over the dismissal of General MacArthur. We decided the General was a great man but that unfortunately he was being inconveniently belligerent in trying to win a war at a time when we were most interested in stopping the fighting and bringing the boys back home. We never did decide what our Far Eastern policy ought to be even though the problem stared us in the face.

In the last presidential campaign, we debated the containment policy. Subjected to the heat of partisan debate, it became discredited with the public; but after a semantic metamorphosis, it survives in current use.

The nation is three debates wiser. But we are also poorer by China, North Indo-China, some 150,000 American casualties, and approximately thirty-five billion dollars in postwar "aid." We are also faced

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with a steady erosion of world confidence in our leadership and in our purpose. Nor have we escaped a growing fear of an impending crisis with Soviet nuclear strength. At this uncomfortable juncture in our national life, there is need for yet another "Great Debate."

Some searching questions about our Asian policy are in order. Avoided, evaded, or perhaps just missed, certain facts now clamor for attention. In talk about China we gave little heed to the fact that the Chinese Communists had managed to build a devoted and efficient following, while the group we chose to support neither rallied sufficient public support nor made efficient use of the strength we gave them. Concerning Korea, too, we missed a central issue: that Communism had again gotten native peoples to fight its cause while we, unable to rally the free world to its own defense, had had to expend our rarest commodity—American manpower—in fighting the free world's battle.

Nor did the Great Debate over containment assay much more than fool's gold. In our concern with "seizing the initiative" we overlooked the fact that before turning to the offense in the Cold War we had to first be able to hold our own. Korea, Indo-China, the Tachens stand as stark testimony to our difficulty in guaranteeing the borders of the free world. So the question is still with us—how to contain Communism in Asia. Only after we have successfully found the answer to this one can we pose the next question, "Initiative for what: roll-back, co-existence, or war?"

It seems clear that we have but two means to block Communist expansion in Asia—American manpower and/or American aid. Used intelligently, aid might in time create the conditions in which a containment of Communism in Asia could be realized without the expenditure of American manpower.

We might with profit re-examine the policy of containment. Although the label is politically unpalatable, the policy is still with us. However, the method by which we attempt to prevent further expansion of Communism has been changed. Where the Truman administration had relied on counteracting military force at all points where Communism attempted to overflow its boundaries, the present administration has relied on the threat of massive retaliation. This was no longer to be a battle of thrust and parry. Instead we threaten to retaliate by hitting those areas that would hurt the enemy most. The

implication at the time of Dulles' "massive retaliation" speech was that this would be atomic retaliation. This is a policy of containment—but one that relies on the threat of all-out war to prevent further little wars. In short, this is containment by ultimatum.

It does not work. Its failure is evidenced by the loss of North Indo-China. The full measure of failure of this method of containment was revealed in the administration's reply to Senator Knowland's demand for a blockade of Red China if our soldiers were not returned. In effect the administration rejected this line of action because it seemed to lead toward war. Does it not follow that a Communist nation which might consider a blockade tantamount to a declaration of war would unquestionably look upon a "massive" attack as an out-and-out declaration of war? And if we do not feel that we can risk war in an instance where our national honor is clearly violated, why would we be more likely to risk war because another piece of Asian real estate had fallen into the Communist orbit? Surely this must by now be very clear to the Communists. The arrest of the thirteen American prisoners of war and the offensive of Dienbienphu may well go down in history as the points where our policy in the Far East was tested by the enemy and found to be but an empty threat.

In spite of this rather sorry record, containment as a basis for immediate policy is incontrovertible. What has been wrong with containment is the method of application. Certain facts stand out. In areas of the world where Communism has been brought face to face with a strong military force, it has not tried further expansion. This is the case in western Europe. In those places where attempts were under way to take over additional territory, the Communists have given up the struggle when met with adequate military resistance, as in Greece and Korea. And in those areas where states were threatened by Communist coercion or subversion, as in Turkey and Iran, on-the-spot material assistance stemmed the tide.

On the other hand, we have failed to foil Communist expansion in those areas where strong military resistance was not created, *i.e.*, China and Indo-China; or where we depended on threats of "massive retaliation" as in Indo-China.

In the heat of political campaigning, the impressive record of success of the old containment policy was forgotten and easily discredited. Why? Because containment was expensive in both men and

money. By a sort of unreasoning and emotional process, the public came to realize that a policy that required American manpower to police the boundaries of the free world was an impractical one. To an administration that was intent on reducing expenditures, this was an uneconomical policy. Both reactions were right. But these were hardly valid reasons for repudiating the entire policy of containment. They were indications that what should have been eliminated were its weaknesses.

The central weakness of the policy was that it required American manpower to implement it. And this was made more painful by the fact that Russia was achieving her victories without the expenditure of one Russian division. In other words, Russia was getting others to do her fighting for her, while we had to do the fighting for others.

To a Monday morning quarterback this weakness seems absurdly apparent. But in the heat of crisis it has not been so abundantly clear either to the public or to our policy makers. Containment, by the nature of Communist postwar policy, had to rely primarily on military power. The entire years 1945-52 were overshadowed by a tremendous Russian military force-in-being. In too many places nothing but paper boundaries and the uncertain deterrent of the American atom bomb plugged the gap between a power vacuum and a straining Communist force.

To fill the vacuum became our primary public occupation. In our hasty concern we neglected one essential distinction: military power is not synonymous with national power. We failed to realize until too late that the power vacuums in the free world could only be filled by national strength, and that military power was only one component of national strength.

Military might can come into being only when there exists a viable economic and social base to nurture and support it. In Europe where the Marshall Plan made possible the regeneration of productive forces, there has come into being a strong NATO. In Asia where little was done to improve the economy and social structure, no effective military force exists.

To be sure, this is an oversimplification of a complex situation; but it is perhaps a useful oversimplification in that it outlines the main problem. We were forced to pour in American manpower to fill

the gap in Korea because there was no other effective military force able or willing to do the job.

How can the United States create the conditions that will bring into being native defense forces that have both the technical ability and the *élan vital* to defend their lands against Communist absorption? To speak in terms other than strong native governments backed by adequate native military strength is to evade our responsibilities and to ignore our interests. To dream of defending weak areas of the world with an umbrella of American air power is to misread the lesson of Korea and Indo-China.

Our experiences in Indo-China teach that there are no short cuts to containment. Local forces equipped and trained to fight with conventional weapons must still be used. The pattern of Communist expansion has been carefully cut to fit situations which would give it local victories without provoking general war. Thus, we could lose South Indo-China and never be given an opportunity to apply "massive retaliation." To retaliate against either the Viet Minh or Red China would, because of the "colonial" overtones involved in Indo-China, gain us no support from the governments of Asiatic peoples. And how could we use "massive retaliation" if the Communists in Thailand start a civil war?

In considering how to create conditions of vital national strength in the power vacuums of the world, we might with profit learn from our mistakes of the past. One of our most tragic errors has been to confuse "containment" with "maintenance of the *status quo*." Containment is not necessarily the handmaiden of the *status quo*. To the contrary, it is in many cases incompatible with existing regimes and governments. Containment, as originally conceived, was aimed not at native populations in the free world, but at Russian imperialism working through the instrumentality of world Communism. Yet in the hysteria of "crash" programs of military build-up, and in the frantic diplomacy of air-base acquisition, we committed ourselves to a policy of "containing" the forces of reform and change in too many places that needed a bit of social revolution.

It is not in the American tradition to support political and social regimes which are characterized by corruption, oppression of the common man, and perpetuation of underprivilege. Nor is it the desire or

intent of the American taxpayer to foot the bill for maintaining these conditions. In his heart he wishes to bring to all people the freedom and the opportunity that is found in the United States. Yet millions of workers, peasants, and small entrepreneurs throughout the world, many of them people of the Arab-Asian bloc, mutter against us as the source from which their oppressors and masters draw their strength. It is among these voices, not those of the chancelleries, that the measure of our failure in foreign policy is to be heard.

We cannot disassociate ourselves from our actions. We have too often and too long supported the corrupt and the inefficient. And by doing so, we have poisoned our largesse and turned it into wormwood. We have chosen to ignore that there has been a revolution in the thinking of the "little people" everywhere.

Among the poor workers and peasants of all lands has dawned the realization that in this century their plight need not remain the same—that the means exist for bettering their lot. They now believe that science and technology, if only applied to the underdeveloped areas of the world, can bring to the poor what is now enjoyed only by the rich.

The natural leader of this world-wide social revolution, by rights of political tradition and proven economic competence, should be the United States. Instead we stand pictured in too many minds as the symbol of preservation of an unjust present. We have adopted the cause of Syngman Rhee, a brave patriot, but unfortunately also a social reactionary and petty autocrat. In spite of our support of the Diem government in Indo-China, the United States continues to be forced into the position of posing as a defender of the Bao Dai regime: corrupt, selfish, inefficient, and tainted with collaboration with the French. Nor can we evade the fact that the alternative we offer the Chinese people is a Chiang Kai-shek who stands branded as a symbol of reactionary conservatism, corruption, and inefficiency.

Equally serious to our world posture has been the failure of our aid programs in Europe. The Marshall Plan achieved only one of its objectives: the rebuilding by Europeans of their production plant. The other objective, creating the social and economic conditions which would bring Europe hope and a will to defend itself, fell short of the need. Working on the false assumption that European capitalism was the same as American capitalism, we expected increased production

to be automatically transferred to workers in the form of cheaper goods and higher wages. To our amazement, production increased tremendously but the standard of living of those we needed to influence most, the wage earners, increased in nothing like the same proportion. By the time we got around to realizing this grievous situation, the Korean War was upon us; and our aid program changed its orientation from social and economic rehabilitation to military aid.

The result is an uncertain Europe. Though the economy is booming, the social malaise continues to fester as evidenced by the 4,900,000 Communist votes in France and 6,200,000 Communist votes in Italy. NATO is strong and growing stronger; but the undercurrent of smoldering discontent, apathy, and disillusionment that runs through Western Europe's wage earners may well, in time of crisis, negate this military strength.

We now have an opportunity—a second chance, as it were—in Asia. Applied intelligently, an aid program could help create the economic and social foundation for an effective "containment" force. But if we are to create these conditions, we will have to be more realistic in our aid planning. In the past, our aid programs were conceived, drawn up, and administered in the antiseptic and rarified atmosphere of statistical charts, economic formulas, and production tables. And as is so common in the quasi-scientific field of economics, more emphasis was placed on the nonhuman factors of production and distribution than on the human. Our planning seldom got beyond the stage of thinking in terms of "pour in x quantity of raw materials, y of power, and z hours of labor and you will get out an umpteen per cent increase in production." But we must be concerned with something more than merely increased production. Production of what? Who gets the increase, and in what proportion? In our past programs we have faced up to these questions only after our ability to influence the answers had been lost.

We cannot delegate this responsibility to the planners. The question of what elements in the society are to benefit from our aid is fundamental to the planning of an aid program. This can be decided only by our people speaking through Congress.

There are several alternatives open to us. We can refuse to accept the responsibility. In this case, it is probable that our billions will purchase an increase in production and an even more discontented

citizenry. Or we can say frankly that we distrust the Asiatic masses, that our real allies are the native aristocracies, the moneyed groups, and the bureaucracies. We can turn over our billions to these men, with no strings attached, and hope they will have the good sense to use at least a part of it to improve the lot of the common man. Our total experience in Asia would suggest that this choice would make the wealthy richer, bring no significant improvement to the majority of the native population, and merely identify the United States more closely with the élite. Our third alternative is to proclaim boldly that we stand for a political, social, and economic revolution in Asia, and that we will use our aid program as a lever to displace the inefficient, the corrupt, and the undemocratic.

We would explain that we stand for a "revolution" in the American sense: a rapid transformation of an agrarian society with a relatively static and low standard of living into a dynamic society with a high standard of living. We must make it clear that we will encourage Asia to bring about this "revolution" as we have done in our own country: by using ever-improved machines and production techniques to increase the productivity of both industrial and agricultural labor; by passing a fair share of this increased productivity on to farmers and laborers in the form of higher wages and lower prices; by allowing the individual entrepreneur to be the best judge of how, when, what, how much, and at what price goods and services are to be produced, so long as his judgment is subjected to the test of competition.

At the same time we would make it clear to the world that we offer this revolution not at the price of tyranny and forced labor as the Communists do, but in such a way that no person or class will be arbitrarily or forcibly deprived of his property, his dignity as an individual, or his right to participate in the functions of government or the traditions of the society. We could openly take the position that we will make available to Asia the famous American know-how and a large share of the capital with which to finance the necessary machines and installations, asking nothing in return for ourselves. But we would grant our aid only on condition that a fair share of the resultant increase in goods and services be passed on to those who need it most.

Our public agreement on this point would have to be clear for all to understand—both here and abroad. Something more is needed

than moralistic generalities. To preface our foreign aid appropriations with requirements that recipients agree to an "equitable sharing-out of the gains obtained" or to promise to work toward establishing conditions "essential to lasting peace and prosperity" is not enough. The spirit in which our programs are administered and the specific day-to-day operations by which our aid is disbursed will in a large measure determine the end effect.

We must make sure that our aid will help create the conditions that will give rise to the means and will for self-defense. Yet there does not seem to be any single formula that will cover the diverse local conditions in which we must operate. We need not, however, stick to the pattern of the past. The situation in Asia would seem to call for a maximum of flexibility and maneuverability.

An aid program set up and administered in this spirit would be a most delicate venture. Most of the Asiatic states that we would like to strengthen are young and sensitive about their newly-won sovereignty. An aid program with formal political strings attached would be rejected out of hand as mere "colonialism" in an American disguise. Nor is any Asaitic country likely to accept aid at the price of granting to an official agency of the United States government control over the economic and social incidence of that aid. There is every reason to believe that such an official and heavy-handed approach would achieve results opposite to those we desire.

Since we cannot effectively put strings on aid granted to governments, we should keep official largesse to a minimum. In some areas official aid can be granted with assurance that the funds will do the kind of things we would find desirable: famine relief, public health programs, road-building, educational grants, and village developmental programs. But in the larger field of capital investment for industrialization and modernization of agriculture, we would do well to consider distribution channels other than our own government agencies. The possibilities are many: an adjunct of the World Bank, such as the newly proposed International Finance Corporation; a United States government corporation authorized to finance specific foreign developmental programs; a Pacific Basin Developmental Bank, authorized to make loans and grants to both governments and individuals.

We could with profit consider a sizeable increase in our contribution to the United Nations technical assistance program. By doing so we could more certainly realize many of our objectives in the underdeveloped areas. Aid through the United Nations is in many cases more likely to be solicited because it is free from cold-war connotations. Nor is it susceptible to the charge of "colonialism." The UN can draw on a large pool of nonwhite experts—agriculturists and technicians from Japan and the Philippines, for instance. It is significant that in Thailand, where the main dish is fish, the prolific and highly nourishing Tilapia carp of Indonesia was introduced by a Chinese expert. Thailand is now harvesting two and a half tons of this fish a year per acre of pond.

The actual distribution of aid funds is a matter for the experts. But before the experts can come up with the answer of how—through what instrumentalities we are to achieve our purpose—the public and the Congress must first decide what it is they wish to accomplish with an aid program.

We can again set up an aid program with the primary objective of increasing production, with only secondary consideration given to the social consequences of that increased production. Or we can remain production-minded, but encourage an increase in production only where it will have the desired social and economic effect. In other words we can, in Asia, be selective in our aid. We could grant it where we were sure it would be an instrument in desirable social and economic change. We could withhold it where we believed it would perpetuate or strengthen the corrupt, the inefficient, and the undemocratic. A program administered in this spirit could become a tremendous catalytic influence for economic and social reform. In time it would significantly contribute to establishing the conditions on which a containment of Communism could be achieved.

Unfortunately, it is questionable if an aid program geared to produce social and economic change could be administered in our current political climate. If we perpetuate the myth that "capitalism" the world over is in the American image and must be kept unchanged, we will repeat our errors of the past. If in our public thinking we hold suspect all "reformers" and consider every revolution "subversive," we condemn ourselves to a policy of maintaining the social and economic *status quo* throughout the free world. Public servants cannot be ex-

pected to encourage leftist (but non-Communist) labor leaders, moderate Socialists, leaders of cooperatives, land reform advocates, and just plain old-fashioned "social reformers" if doing so will make them suspect before congressional committees. Yet, to the consternation of our conservatives, these are some of the types of people an effective aid program must depend on.

The circumstances under which the current aid program is being established also threaten to neutralize much of its potential effect abroad. The discussion in Washington—and in the press—is not over the question of what kind of Asian aid program is needed, but over the political strategems that might pull any old aid program through the congressional grinder. As a result, domestic political considerations are taking precedence over both policy requirements and sound administrative procedure.

The Foreign Operations Administration is to be dismantled and its functions dispersed. This may cool off some critics of foreign aid, but it will also set back administration of the 1956 program by a number of critical months. The new International Cooperation Administration is being turned over to the neutral, if not skeptical, leadership of John B. Hollister, a close associate of Herbert Hoover and a former law partner of the late Robert A. Taft. Again this can be justified as a brilliant political move which might neutralize some of the congressional opposition to the foreign aid bill. But one cannot help but speculate that the appointment of a more zealous and sympathetic administrator might not have been a wiser choice. Such an appointment would certainly have aroused congressional opposition. But it would also have had the incomparable compensation of projecting the question of Asian aid into proper focus on the national scene.

On the other hand, there is some indication in the current proposals that the administration is aware of the need for a new departure in Asian aid. In a special message to Congress President Eisenhower has recommended United States' membership in the proposed International Finance Corporation which would be affiliated with the World Bank. The purpose of the IFC will be to provide risk capital for financing private investment enterprises and to act as a catalytic agent in bringing native savings and investment needs abroad together. The Point Four program is to be expanded from a budget of 116 million dollars to 170 million.

These are steps in the right direction. They are, however, very modest steps indeed. The capitalization of the IFC is to be only one hundred million dollars, of which our contribution is to be about thirty-five million. Of the three and one-half billion dollars requested for foreign aid, almost half ($1,717,000,000) will go for military aid, another billion is to be used for defense support aid,[1] and only $712,500,000 is budgeted, as such, for economic aid. It is perhaps significant that while the foreign aid budget was in preparation last winter, the sum of one billion dollars for Asian aid was the unofficial estimate of what would be requested. But now it is estimated that about $585,000,000 will be spent in 1956 for Asian economic assistance. Last year about $500,000,000 was spent.

By any standards this is not a spectacular increase in Asian aid. But perhaps the real measure of the inadequacy of our legislation is that there is no indication of concern over the incidence of our aid. It is almost inevitable that even the modest request of the administration will be cut. What is to be feared is that the cut will be taken out of developmental aid funds, an area of which Congress has been notoriously suspicious. So at best we will operate on a minimum program in Asia in the next year, and this at a time when a massive infusion of capital and know-how is required.

It is regrettable also that our American know-how, unique and world-famous, is being unnecessarily rationed. The cheapest and most immediately effective method of aid is technical assistance. The fact that the allocation for Point Four is being increased can be regarded as symptomatic of a growing realization of the potentialities in this field. But even here our outlook is myopic. In our concern with identifying technical assistance with national cold war objectives, we have underestimated and neglected the possibilities of the United Nations technical assistance program. The greatest handicap of the UN program has been a shortage of funds. It has spent only about eighty million dollars since 1950. (Of this about fifty million came from the United States.) The requests from underdeveloped areas for UN technical assistance have far exceeded this modest sum.

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[1]In Washington terminology this means economic aid to countries carrying a particularly heavy military load.

But Congress has shied away from suggestions of increasing appropriations to UN technical assistance. For 1955 the administration asked for $17,958,000 for this purpose; $9,957,621 was appropriated. Given the current temper of Congress and the complete unconcern of the public with this matter, there is little likelihood that much improvement is to be made in the current appropriation.

It is this public unconcern, this apathetic turning of our backs to the whole Asian aid question, that may make futile our strategy of military containment of Communism in Asia.

Our present thinking on Asia is oriented around acceptance of the present social and economic structure. In our innocence of conditions abroad, we have often confused aspirations for social and economic change with Communist subversion. Before an effective aid program can be put into motion, there must be public agreement on certain basic questions of foreign policy: Are we willing and able to help bring about the kind of revolutionary changes the Asiatic peoples want? Do we have the patience and perseverance to undertake this expensive and indirect route to containment?

A "Great Debate" that centered on these questions might reorient our thinking. Without a clearer public understanding of where our interests lie, our millions will do little to stop the spread of Communism.

The basic appeal of Communism in Asia is that it promises to break down a society that obviously needs to be changed. It promises to bring in its wake industrialization and modern techniques. But it is now clear, even to Asia, that the Communist change is to be achieved only at the price of forced labor, forced savings, and a police state. Our position in the Great Debate could well be that we too can offer change, social reform, and industrialization. And we have the incomparable advantage of offering it in a humane and truly democratic framework. If by our actions we show the people of the Arab-Asian bloc that we are ready to underwrite a peaceful and democratic revolution, we will not for long have to protect their frontiers from Communism. Once the American "revolution" takes hold in the free world, there will then be established the social and economic strength to contain the forces of Communism.

The Congress and the public might well consider this basic issue.

Books - - - -

BUSINESSMEN IN AMERICA

By RAY GINGER

The influence of businessmen on American life has long been a popular topic for fiction, scholarship, and political rhetoric. The current world-wide crisis of private business has served to accelerate the debate. Unfortunately, and doubtless inevitably, few writers on the subject have seriously tried to take a complete view. In the fashion of the wise men studying the elephant, each has insisted that the part he knew was the whole beast. Thus one analyst can insist that the typical businessman is all brain; another can protest that a businessman is nothing but mouth, stomach, and pants pockets.

Five recent biographies of American businessmen[1] furnish a convenient vehicle for approaching this question. The careers of these five men span a century of our national life. Charlemagne Tower, lawyer by trade, made a moderate fortune out of his acquisitions of Pennsylvania anthracite lands soon after the Civil War, and he multiplied this beginning to a reported $6 million by opening up the Vermilion iron range in Minnesota. E. W. Marland got his start in Pennsylvania and West Virginia coal and natural gas, then built up an integrated oil company in Oklahoma with assets of $100 million. What Marland did with oil, Henry Ford did with the Model T. Hugh Roy Cullen in the last three decades has amassed a fantastic fortune—he is said to be the second richest man in the United States—as an oil prospector in Texas. John W. Ernsthausen is founder and majority

[1]Hal Bridges, *Iron Millionaire: Life of Charlemagne Tower* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1952. $4.75); John Joseph Mathews, *Life and Death of an Oilman: The Career of E. W. Marland* (University of Oklahoma Press, 1951. $3.75); Allan Nevins, with the collaboration of Frank Ernest Hill, *Ford: The Times, The Man, The Company* (Scribner's, 1954. $6.75); Ed Kilman and Theon Wright, *Hugh Roy Cullen: A Story of American Opportunity* (Prentice-Hall, 1954. $4.00); Wayne G. Broehl, Jr., *Trucks . . . Trouble . . . and Triumph: The Norwalk Truck Line Company* (Prentice-Hall, 1954. $5.50.)

RAY GINGER, who formerly taught at Western Reserve and Harvard, was the first editor of the *Business History Review*. He is now in private business in New York.

owner of the Norwalk Truck Line Company, operating between Chicago and Pittsburgh. This firm, with assets in 1953 of about $9 million, is one of the half-dozen biggest motor carriers in the country.

If we consider these five volumes in terms of their merits as books, they need not detain us long. The Cullen affair, meant to be inspirational, is merely insubstantial; Cullen, with all that money, should have been able to find admirers with more technical competence than Kilman and Wright. The book on Marland is also "popular" in about the worse sense. For instance, in relating the episode in which Marland was allegedly forced out of his own firm by J. P. Morgan and Company, Mathews neglects to tell what kind of pressure the investment bankers exerted. The whole episode is incomprehensible. The works by Bridges and Broehl were both doctoral dissertations, but, while somewhat more solid, they too suffer from the authors' efforts not to be eggheads. Bridges makes little use of business records, avoids using the dollar sign more than a dozen times in his book, fails to impart any real understanding of the crucial transactions in Tower's career. Broehl gives many time-series on revenues, earnings, operating ratios, and so on, and he is much more sensitive to business affairs. But the folksy style of the book, calling the characters by first names and similar devices, becomes terribly exasperating.

Allan Nevins' book, which covers Ford's career to about 1917, deserves more attention, if only for the prominence of subject and author. More than any other historian, Nevins has become an enthusiast for American big business, and a work by him on Henry Ford is sure to be used to render judgment on business history as a whole. This procedure is not warranted. As one reviewer has pointed out elsewhere,[2] Nevins gives a bare minimum of information about many aspects of the Ford Motor Company, including relations with dealers, accounting practices, sales, profits, the allocation of costs, internal administration generally. Almost all of Nevins' information comes, not from the firm's contemporary records, but from court records and reminiscences. The book contains instances of egregious carelessness, perhaps because of Nevins' practice of leaving much of his work to junior associates. A photographic copy of a contract with a parts supplier in 1903, for example, bears the caption: "Tires, at four for $26." The contract actually is for wheels rather than tires. In another place, a significant fact entirely reverses its meaning between the source, fortunately quoted verbatim, and Nevins' text. (See page 285 and the note on page 618.) The number for a

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[2]See review by Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., in *Business History Review*, XXVIII (December 1954), 387-389.

footnote can appear in the text and the note itself be missing. (See page 414.) It may be taken as symbolic that listings like Accounting, Distribution, and Marketing are not included in the index.

In spite of the marked inadequacies of each of these books, they do contain much provocative information which must be considered in any effort to evaluate the influence of businessmen in American life. With few exceptions the useful data fall, very significantly I think, in the area which might be designated as administrative economics, or the economics of the firm. Call it how you will, we mean to focus attention on the internal coordination of the firm and especially on the ratio of input to output, both conceived as real quantities of goods and services. The yardstick here is efficiency: the maximum production of commodities from the minimum consumption of labor, raw materials, capital goods, power, and so on. In any economic system, somebody must decide how the productive resources of the country shall be allocated, and in the United States for the past century these decisions have been largely made by the owners of capital or their managerial representatives. (For obvious reasons of space, I cannot enter here into the laborious discussion about the "managerial revolution.")

Judged by this standard of increasing the economic efficiency of his own firm, each of the five businessmen under review can claim some impressive achievements. Tower's activities in Pennsylvania anthracite seemingly had little effect on the productive capacity of the country; he simply acquired title to land where everybody knew there was coal, held it a while without making much effort to develop it, and sold out at a profit. This looks like a case of Henry George's unearned increment. But the Minnesota phase of Tower's career is quite different: he raised the capital, financed the prospecting expedition, helped to determine where this prospecting would occur, kept the venture going during the extended period when outgo exceeded income, built a railroad. He took the risk, made the main decisions, coordinated the enterprise. In brief, he opened up a productive region (and very nearly went bankrupt doing it). One could argue, of course, that if Tower had not done it somebody else would have. Maybe so, but he might also have wasted a lot more resources in the effort. In any event, he might not have done it for a decade or more, and Vermilion iron ore was enormously important in the decade following 1884.

Marland found oil where nobody else had found it. So did Cullen. Granted, they did not put the oil in the ground. But they did find it at a low cost in productive resources. Also—and the point merits emphasis—several of Cullen's major strikes occurred in locations that big oil companies had already tried and abandoned as worthless. Cullen hit where they had missed by drilling deeper. He invented new equipment which would drill

deeper than anybody had gone before him. He not only added to our proved oil reserves, he added to our theoretical and practical knowledge of petroleum geology. If Cullen had not made the discoveries he did, years or decades might have passed before these pools of oil flowed actively into our economy.

Henry Ford, by this yardstick of administrative economics, was almost as praiseworthy as his most ardent admirers have claimed. The key policies were his: a cheap and serviceable car produced year after year in standardized parts, repeated price reductions to reach wider markets, the first really modern assembly line which emerged from a series of innovations at his Highland Park plant. The result? In August 1913 it took 12½ man-hours of labor to assemble a chassis at Highland Park. Then a line driven by machine-power was installed. Within six months, a chassis could be assembled in one hour thirty-three minutes. Perhaps even more crucial, Ford institutionalized this technical revolution and made it continuous. Nothing was ever good enough or cheap enough; it had to be better and cheaper, better and cheaper. In the spring of 1914, the Ford Motor Company employed about 12,000 men making cars, and another thousand in making better tools to make cars. Nevins' account of these developments, however vague and inadequate at times, is conclusive as to the main point.

This production of a complex product fabricated from thousands of parts depended on split-second coordination. If one trivial part was not on hand, the entire assembly line would stop. As Nevins puts it: "Precisely the right amounts of coal, iron, nickel, brass, leather, rubber, lubricants, gasoline, and other commodities had to be brought to Highland Park in a hundred ever-flowing rivulets, delivered at just the right time" (page 475). This was the requirement that was met by transport firms like the Norwalk Truck Line Company. Broehl gives an instance. Norwalk trucks pick up aluminum blanks at the Alcoa plant in Cleveland in late afternoon, deliver them to the Zollner Piston plant in Fort Wayne (about 200 miles from Cleveland) before the first shift next morning, pick up the completed pistons that afternoon and deliver them the following morning to auto plants in Detroit (about 150 miles from Fort Wayne). This fast and reliable service saves warehouse space in Fort Wayne and Detroit; it saves the handling that would be required to put supplies into a warehouse and take them out again in both cities. Such coordination of production, it seems safe to say, has been carried to a higher level in the United States than in any other country, with gigantic savings in productive resources—savings to the country as well as to the firm.

So long as a student confines his gaze to this area of administrative economics, he can be legitimately bemused by the constructive role of many

American businessmen. This has happened in large measure to the authors of the five books under consideration. It was true in the main of neoclassical economists, who were concerned chiefly with the economics of the firm. It is true of those business historians who, following the lead of N. S. B. Gras, insist that their proper focus is the administrative development of single companies. This perspective has resulted in some solid and useful books.

But the viewpoint of administrative economics, while valid, is not exclusively valid. It yields only a partial truth, and a partial truth rigidly reiterated can become a falsehood. This has happened, it seems to me, in many of the judgments of Professors Gras and Nevins. They have ventured, basing themselves almost entirely on considerations of administrative economics, to pronounce general (and highly favorable) evaluations of American businessmen. They fail to recognize that an economy of perfectly administered firms, with each company reaching in its internal operation a peak of efficiency—they fail to recognize that such an economy can be extremely wasteful and extremely unjust.

As to wastefulness, the most obvious, and most important, illustration is the depression which began in 1929. Any well administered firm, when faced with falling demand for its product, will reduce output, lay off workers, reduce inventories, and so on. The better the businessman, the more quickly and decisively will he take these steps. But this road, which means salvation for the firm, means chaos for the economy, destitution for millions of citizens. The efficiencies of the firm continue and even increase, but large quantities of productive resources find themselves excluded from all firms. The efficiencies of the firm are indissolubly tied to the vaster inefficiencies of the economy as a whole.

Nor is waste of this kind confined to depressions. Even in the best of times, large amounts of productive factors are used inefficiently or not at all. In 1954, a very prosperous year, the steel industry operated at about two thirds of capacity. Today automation in the automobile industry is a vexed issue, a threat as well as a promise. Surely in a perfectly rational economy this labor-saving method would be welcomed as offering a richer life for everybody, including those workers temporarily displaced by it because the burden of readjustment would not be thrown on them as individuals.

There is no intention here to blame the businessman for not stabilizing the economy. He could not, even if he tried. But two other considerations are relevant. First, our leading businessmen (and their companies) gather unto themselves enormous incomes, only a small portion of which can be spent for consumer goods. Periodically the resultant savings cannot profitably be used for investment purposes either. To the extent that our economy

generates these inequalities in the distribution of income, the world of private business is inherently unstable. Secondly, the typical businessman insists that nobody else shall try to stabilize the economy, at least not if it involves actions that might conceivably injure his own interests.

The wealth of American businessmen gives them an enormous influence on public affairs, and the influence is exerted largely in destructive directions. The five books at hand furnish sobering examples. Ernsthausen, so far as Broehl reports, has stuck pretty close to his trucking firm. Not so the other four. Each of these men, his ignorance matched only by his arrogance, seemingly regarded himself as a universal genius. It requires a charitable disposition to characterize the views of Hugh Roy Cullen, for instance, as the cheapest of platitudes. He abhors "creeping socialism," the United Nations, government action to improve the health of the people, former President Truman "and his bunch of socialists in Washington," the "foreign agitators" who lead organized labor, the entire foreign aid program, and the Democratic party because it is controlled by "big-city machines, racketeers, minority groups, and unscrupulous political bosses." He greatly admires the Dixiecrats, Senators McCarthy and Dirksen, General MacArthur, high tariffs, employee stock-ownership as a solution to labor troubles, and unfettered free enterprise. Cullen has spent a lot of money trying to convert these opinions into public policy; a few years ago he bought a large chain of radio stations to increase the range of his voice. He is a large donor to several churches and hospitals, and he has contributed millions to the University of Houston, where he is chairman of the Board of Regents. He doubtless has very pronounced ideas on how a university should be run and what should be taught and who is qualified to do the teaching.

The two approaches to American business already considered can be supplemented by an ethical perspective. Is the American businessman in his business affairs an agent of justice or injustice? From this viewpoint, the executives being considered here are not an attractive group. They were self-centered, willful, tyrannical. Tower could charge interest on a small loan to his son and he broke strikes with abandon. Marland was a lifelong adolescent who surrounded himself with idolaters. Allan Nevins is upset by Ford's character even in 1917, and how much worse the picture became after that: abuse of dealers and employees and suppliers, the seamy adventures with Harry Bennett, the venture into anti-Semitism with the *Dearborn Independent*. Henry Ford, said one of his close associates, had a "mean streak."

These repulsive personal traits should not divert us from a more vital aspect of the ethical problem. Admitted that Ford, in the period covered by Nevins' present volume, slashed the prices of cars and raised the wages of

his workers. But did he cut prices and raise wages fast enough and far enough? After all, the net income of the company in the fiscal year 1912-13 was about 30 per cent of *sales*. Was it socially desirable that Henry Ford should have acquired personal control over such an enormous portion of the wealth of the country?

These three viewpoints—administrative economics, political economy, and ethics—all ask questions which are pertinent in evaluating the role of businessmen in American life. Moreover, we must investigate the relations among these various approaches. For instance, is there some way to combine efficiency within each firm with efficiency in the economy as a whole? Can we establish an arrangement which will stabilize the economy and still stimulate the executive of an individual enterprise to experiment and innovate? To what extent can efficiency within the firm be reconciled with industrial democracy? Can a highly coordinated and interdependent economy function at all without a hierarchical structure, without dictatorial control over the productive efforts of each worker?

Perhaps all of these questions are subsumed under the one asked by Adam Smith, who, however much we doubt the present relevance of his appeal to the "invisible hand," had the perception to focus on a central problem of any economy. Today we may well ask, as Smith did: What institutions will assure that no person can benefit himself without simultaneously benefiting his society as a whole, while also assuring that any person who benefits society as a whole will gain a commensurate reward for himself?

MAGAZINE "WITHOUT CLASS"

The Saturday Evening Post Treasury; selected from the complete files by Roger Butterfield and the editors of the Saturday Evening Post. Simon and Schuster, New York, 1954. $7.50.

The editors of the *Saturday Evening Post* have culled through their back numbers, far back to Benjamin Franklin, to come up with an attractive volume of stories, articles, poems, magazine covers and advertising copy. The guiding criteria of selection seem to have been: original publication in the magazine; coverage of the magazine's life span, although concentrating on 1900–1950, its era of greatest success; and however determined, intrinsic merits of the material. Some pieces do little more (but do it agreeably enough) than reflect a period of American history or culture; for example, the report of Lincoln's death or the brief exposition on the nickelodeon's advent as

a mass medium of entertainment. Others present famous characters of our popular fiction which were introduced through the pages of the *Post,* such as Scattergood Baines and Tugboat Annie, although Marie Dressler and motion pictures may have more responsibility for the latter than did the *Post.* The fame of an author, whom the *Post* had the good fortune to entice to its pages, warrants the inclusion of stories by Booth Tarkington, Irvin S. Cobb, and Thomas Wolfe, for example. And related to this is the inclusion of items by authors to whom the *Post* can proudly and self-consciously point as having been captured after a raiding party into the uncharted wilderness of literature—yet safely, just past its borders. These are, notably, a story by William Faulkner and an article by Gertrude Stein. Finally, there are stories that the reader may have encountered innumerable times without ever asking himself about their modest origins: Poe's "The Black Cat," Lardner's "Alibi Ike," Fitzgerald's "Babylon Revisited," and Benét's "The Devil and Daniel Webster." In all there are "thirty-five stories, twenty-five articles and eleven poems from the all-time pages of the *Post,* plus three selections from its predecessor, the *Pennsylvania Gazette*," the introduction tells us.

With the first two of the major criteria dictating what would and would not be included held as constants, I would have suspected the third to suffer. Status and age before beauty. Fortunately, this is not so. Over the period of the last fifty years, with a slight assist from the preceding 150 years, there was clearly enough material from which to choose to make the volume a worthwhile venture from a literary point of view. All the writing is competent; some is exciting.

What can a reader legitimately expect from an anthology? Surely, not that every bit of writing included should equally please him. He has a banquet, a smorgasbord, to feast from in this volume. There are prose, poetry and illustrations of diverse kinds, all arranged to be a chronological cavalcade of Americana. And Americana is a strong point of this book, as it is of the periodical.

The anthology has variety. In this respect, it seems quite faithful to the *Saturday Evening Post.* To provide variety has been a professed value of the magazine, impressed upon it by its foremost editor, George Lorimer, during the almost forty years (1898–1936) he was responsible for its publication. The analogy to a banquet made above was not accidental. Lorimer, according to his biographer, John Tebbel, in his 1940 book, remarked to one of his authors that "a magazine like the *Post* has to be like a full meal, beginning with soup, going on to the most important course, which is roast beef, then maybe a salad, and it must have dessert." He visualized its appealing to all tastes at all levels of class and intellectual sensibility. Hence the inclusion of stories which, it was assumed, would appeal to but a small

percentage of the population. As Tebbel wrote, "Lorimer knew exactly what he wanted to make of the *Post*. It was to be a magazine without class, clique or sectional editing. . . . He meant to edit it for the whole United States." It is not surprising therefore that Lorimer and the *Post* have been described as the "wave length of the American people" and "a mirror of the American mind from 1900 to date." In so far as this attunement to, or reflection of, American life is the result of the great variety characteristic of the magazine, perhaps there is no need to be overly impressed. It should not be difficult to hit the bullseye if one makes it the whole target and uses buckshot.

However, there is a unity, a central core, within this multiplicity characteristic of the magazine, and this the book fails to capture. This feature seems to me embodied in two kinds of writing not represented in the *Treasury,* the editorials and what the introduction calls "formula fiction."

The conservatism that made the *Saturday Evening Post* shun the muckraking of the Progressive era, unless presented in sugar-coated fictional form, largely oppose the New Deal, and generally support Republican party politics, including the present administration, is reflected in the continuity of the magazine's editorial policy throughout the period of the past half century. There is not so much a reflection of American minds here, as an idealization, a simplified synthesis. There is not so much an attunement to American minds as a seduction of them. Thus, the New York *Herald Tribune* could say at the death of Lorimer that the *Post* (and by implication, Lorimer) "had left a definite imprint upon the lives and thinking habits of what, for want of a better term, may be called the great American middle class. . . ." It is difficult to escape the thought that in this context "middle class" is merely a euphemism for "no class," one of the most pervasive idealizations of American society. The hero of the "formula fiction" probably best exemplifies this idealization. He is virtually nondescript. Being everything, he is nothing. Put horn-rimmed glasses on him and he is an intellectual; top him with a coonskin cap and he is a frontiersman; hand him a briefcase and he is a bright young aspirant to executive status; give him a wrench and an impeccably clean pair of overalls and he is a working man. But through time and among the occupational role continuum, he has the same virtues and the same ideals, a member of that monumental middle class. He is everywhere in the *Saturday Evening Post's* America, but he does not appear in the *Treasury*.

It is interesting to reflect again on the professed aim of the magazine to be "without class, clique or sectional editing." From one perspective this takes the form of providing variety, to satisfy by satisfying recog-

nized differences. From another perspective, it takes the form of idealization, to satisfy by denying or ignoring differences. The first is certainly found in the book; the second is not. The magazine makes the most of both and perhaps herein lies its pervasive success.

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ONE-VOLUME NOVELIST

Thomas Wolfe, the Weather of His Youth. By Louis D. Rubin, Jr. Louisiana State University Press, 1955. $3.50.

Although it is still fashionable in some quarters to dismiss Thomas Wolfe as a talented adolescent who never mastered the principles of fiction, the Wolfe cult continues to grow—and not just among college undergraduates. Half a dozen critical studies have appeared in America, France, England, and Germany. Among these are studies by Pamela Hansford Johnson, Pierre Brodin, and Herbert J. Muller.

Now Professor Louis D. Rubin of the University of Pennsylvania adds what surely is the most thorough and level-headed discussion of Wolfe yet published. Mr. Rubin, who once edited the *Hopkins Review,* is neither one of those fervent champions of Wolfe nor one of the many detractors who see him only as an overgrown Rover Boy. Mr. Rubin knows Wolfe's faults—his verbosity, his lack of perspective in the later novels, the bombast and weary exposition, the meaningless hyperbole. But he also sees his virtues—the tremendous dedication to his work (a virtue Faulkner pointed out in placing Wolfe first among his contemporaries), occasional magnificent prose style, moving descriptions of a Southern city, and his many fully-realized characters.

Professor Rubin's main interest is not so much balancing the faults and virtues as in searching out the meaning in Wolfe's work. Fortunately Mr. Rubin avoids most of the jargon employed by self-styled "explicators," although he does write in that "we-shall-now-examine" manner of Brooks and Warren, and he uses such phrases as "suffice it to say now." His understanding of the novels and Wolfe himself is penetrating, sensible. He is also quite frank. He chides Bernard DeVoto and he takes a few pot shots at Oscar Cargill and Thomas Pollock who assume in their recent books on Wolfe (*Thomas Wolfe at Washington Square, The Correspondence of Thomas Wolfe and Homer Andrew Watt,* New York University Press) that Wolfe was anti-semitic. Mr. Rubin wonders whether anyone who wrote the magnificent prose-poetry

about Aline Bernstein and dedicated his first novel to her could be fairly accused of being anti-semitic!

Of course it is impossible in a brief notice to give much idea of Mr. Rubin's probing study without over-simplifying to the point of distortion. But Mr. Rubin considers in some detail the nature of the autobiographical fiction, the element of time in Wolfe's work, Wolfe's obsessions with home, trains, and rivers. In the process, Mr. Rubin manages to say some rather positive things. "There is no other American prose writer of our time," he says for example, "who had done the job of depicting the metropolis that Wolfe has done." He points out that Wolfe's belief that you can't go home again is refuted by his work, the best parts of which are concerned with North Carolina. And he mentions the urgent need for a re-editing of the posthumous fiction so the George Webber-Esther Jack romance appears as a unit in one volume.

Throughout the study Mr. Rubin shows his enthusiasm for Wolfe's first novel *Look Homeward, Angel* which he considers far superior to anything else Wolfe wrote. And he ends with this prophecy: "It may well be that Wolfe's eventual place in American literature will be as a one-volume novelist. But what a tremendous one volume *Look Homeward, Angel* is! Its characters are rounded and complete. It tells a story fully and well . . . and it truthfully captures a twenty-year segment of time for us. It is alive in space and color and time. . . ."

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